/lit/ - Literature

>>23480017
Vasubandhu conclusively refutes theism in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. For years, I studied classical Anglican theism, and after reading the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, I realized that the incoherent nonsense of theism relies on nothing more than logical fallacies and the common tricks of sophists.
>Infinity: The infinite cannot be distinct from the finite. If God is infinite, then God is identical to created things.
>Immutability: An omniscient God would know mutable things, but the immutable cannot know the mutable.
>Eternity: An omniscient God would know temporal things, but the eternal cannot know the temporal.
>Oneness: Unity is an imperfection.
>Knowledge: Knowledge is caused and cause implies composition.
>Life: The soul is the principle of life and a separate principle implies composition.
>Will: The will is caused and cause implies composition.

>>23409512
If Sanskrit is on-topic, then I highly recommend A Sanskrit Grammar by Manfred Mayrhofer.
As far as I know, there is no Sanskrit equivalent to this outstanding nature method textbook:
>French: (Le français par la méthode nature)
>http://b-ok.cc/book/2884211/99cec2

Classical Greek and Roman thought is unintelligible without first studying Indian thought. There are many parallels between Orphic cult ritual, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle and the Upaniṣads, Nāgārjuna, and Vasubandhu. The dualism of form and matter (and of good and evil in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism) and the metempsychosis of Orphic cult ritual almost certainly originates from India.
>bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2017/2017.01.08/
>Guillaume Ducoeur, Claire Muckensturm-Poulle, La transmigration des âmes en Grèce et en Inde anciennes. Institut des sciences et des techniques de l'Antiquité (ISTA). Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2016. 127. ISBN 9782848675459. €19.00 (pb).
>Uncontested textual parallels with Indian literature have been discovered in both cases. For Orphism, see J. Mendoza, “Un itinerario al Más Allá: Laminillas órficas de oro y Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 1.46- 50”, in Orfeo y la tradición órfica: un reencuentro, Madrid 2008, pp. 933-961; for Pythagoreanism, see A. Bernabé and J. Mendoza, “Pythagorean Cosmogony and Vedic Cosmogony ( RV 10.129). Analogies and Differences”, Phronesis 58, 2013, pp. 32-51.
The six Hindu darśanas correspond to the schools of Greek philosophy:
>Sāṃkhya–Yoga
>Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika
>Mīmāṃsā–Vedānta
The parallels are so obvious in each case that the Greeks must have depended on the Indians. The Romans and Christians all depended on the Greeks, so ultimately any honest scholar will say that Western civilization is ultimately Indian.

>>23394317
>>23394369
Classical Greek and Roman thought is unintelligible without first studying Indian thought. There are many parallels between Orphic cult ritual, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle and the Upaniṣads, Nāgārjuna, and Vasubandhu. The dualism of form and matter (and of good and evil in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism) and the metempsychosis of Orphic cult ritual almost certainly originates from India.

>>23364225
All the dharmas that arise arise by reason of the five causes and the four conditions that we have just explained. The world does not proceed from a single cause that is called God, or Purusa, or Pradhana, or any other name.

How do you prove this thesis?
If you think that the thesis is proven through arguments, you betray your doctrine that the world arises from a single cause.

64d. Not from God or from any other cause, since there is a succession, etc.
That things are produced by a single cause, by God, Mahadeva, or Vasudeva, is inadmissable for many reasons.

1.) If things were produced by a single cause, they would arise all at the same time: now each of us knows that they arise successively.

[The Theist:] They arise successively by virtue of the desires of God, who says, "May this arise now! May this perish now! May this arise and perish later!"

If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause, since the desires (of God) are multiple. Moreover these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous, since God, the cause of these desires, is not multiple, and things would all arise at the same time.

a. [The Theist:] The desires of God are not simultaneous, because God, in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes.

If this were so, then God is not the single unique cause of all things. And the causes that God takes into account are produced successively: they depend then on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes: an infinite regression.

[The Theist:] It is admitted that the series of causes has no beginning.

This would admit that samsara does not have an origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause and return to the Buddhist theory of causes (hetus) and conditions (pratyaya).

b. [The Theist:] The desires of God are simultaneous, but things do not arise at the same time because they arise as God wishes them to arise, that is, in succession.

This is inadmissible. The desires of God remain what they are. Let us explain. Suppose that God desires "May this arise now! May that arise later!" We do not see why the second desire, at first nonefficacious, will be efficacious later; why, if it is efficacious later, it will not be so initially.

What advantage does God obtain from this great effort by which he produces the world?

[The Theist:] God produces the world for his own satisfaction (ptiti).

He is then not God, the Sovereign (Isvara), in what concerns his own satisfaction, since he cannot realize it without a means (upaya). And if he is not sovereign with regard to his own satisfaction, how can he be sovereign with regard to the world?

>>23361655
All the dharmas that arise arise by reason of the five causes and the four conditions that we have just explained. The world does not proceed from a single cause that is called God, or Purusa, or Pradhana, or any other name.

How do you prove this thesis?
If you think that the thesis is proven through arguments, you betray your doctrine that the world arises from a single cause.

64d. Not from God or from any other cause, since there is a succession, etc.
That things are produced by a single cause, by God, Mahadeva, or Vasudeva, is inadmissable for many reasons.

1.) If things were produced by a single cause, they would arise all at the same time: now each of us knows that they arise successively.

[The Theist:] They arise successively by virtue of the desires of God, who says, "May this arise now! May this perish now! May this arise and perish later!"

If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause, since the desires (of God) are multiple. Moreover these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous, since God, the cause of these desires, is not multiple, and things would all arise at the same time.

a. [The Theist:] The desires of God are not simultaneous, because God, in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes.

If this were so, then God is not the single unique cause of all things. And the causes that God takes into account are produced successively: they depend then on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes: an infinite regression.

[The Theist:] It is admitted that the series of causes has no beginning.

This would admit that samsara does not have an origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause and return to the Buddhist theory of causes (hetus) and conditions (pratyaya).

b. [The Theist:] The desires of God are simultaneous, but things do not arise at the same time because they arise as God wishes them to arise, that is, in succession.

This is inadmissible. The desires of God remain what they are. Let us explain. Suppose that God desires "May this arise now! May that arise later!" We do not see why the second desire, at first nonefficacious, will be efficacious later; why, if it is efficacious later, it will not be so initially.

What advantage does God obtain from this great effort by which he produces the world?

[The Theist:] God produces the world for his own satisfaction (ptiti).

He is then not God, the Sovereign (Isvara), in what concerns his own satisfaction, since he cannot realize it without a means (upaya). And if he is not sovereign with regard to his own satisfaction, how can he be sovereign with regard to the world?

>>23358510
>>23358607
>>23358613
>>23358860
>>23358921
All the dharmas that arise arise by reason of the five causes and the four conditions that we have just explained. The world does not proceed from a single cause that is called God, or Purusa, or Pradhana, or any other name.

How do you prove this thesis?
If you think that the thesis is proven through arguments, you betray your doctrine that the world arises from a single cause.

64d. Not from God or from any other cause, since there is a succession, etc.
That things are produced by a single cause, by God, Mahadeva, or Vasudeva, is inadmissable for many reasons.

1.) If things were produced by a single cause, they would arise all at the same time: now each of us knows that they arise successively.

[The Theist:] They arise successively by virtue of the desires of God, who says, "May this arise now! May this perish now! May this arise and perish later!"

If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause, since the desires (of God) are multiple. Moreover these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous, since God, the cause of these desires, is not multiple, and things would all arise at the same time.

a. [The Theist:] The desires of God are not simultaneous, because God, in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes.

If this were so, then God is not the single unique cause of all things. And the causes that God takes into account are produced successively: they depend then on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes: an infinite regression.

[The Theist:] It is admitted that the series of causes has no beginning.

This would admit that samsara does not have an origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause and return to the Buddhist theory of causes (hetus) and conditions (pratyaya).

b. [The Theist:] The desires of God are simultaneous, but things do not arise at the same time because they arise as God wishes them to arise, that is, in succession.

This is inadmissible. The desires of God remain what they are. Let us explain. Suppose that God desires "May this arise now! May that arise later!" We do not see why the second desire, at first nonefficacious, will be efficacious later; why, if it is efficacious later, it will not be so initially.

What advantage does God obtain from this great effort by which he produces the world?

[The Theist:] God produces the world for his own satisfaction (ptiti).

He is then not God, the Sovereign (Isvara), in what concerns his own satisfaction, since he cannot realize it without a means (upaya). And if he is not sovereign with regard to his own satisfaction, how can he be sovereign with regard to the world?

>>23340421
All the dharmas that arise arise by reason of the five causes and the four conditions that we have just explained. The world does not proceed from a single cause that is called God, or Purusa, or Pradhana, or any other name.

How do you prove this thesis?
If you think that the thesis is proven through arguments, you betray your doctrine that the world arises from a single cause.

64d. Not from God or from any other cause, since there is a succession, etc.
That things are produced by a single cause, by God, Mahadeva, or Vasudeva, is inadmissable for many reasons.

1.) If things were produced by a single cause, they would arise all at the same time: now each of us knows that they arise successively.

[The Theist:] They arise successively by virtue of the desires of God, who says, "May this arise now! May this perish now! May this arise and perish later!"

If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause, since the desires (of God) are multiple. Moreover these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous, since God, the cause of these desires, is not multiple, and things would all arise at the same time.

a. [The Theist:] The desires of God are not simultaneous, because God, in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes.

If this were so, then God is not the single unique cause of all things. And the causes that God takes into account are produced successively: they depend then on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes: an infinite regression.

[The Theist:] It is admitted that the series of causes has no beginning.

This would admit that samsara does not have an origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause and return to the Buddhist theory of causes (hetus) and conditions (pratyaya).

b. [The Theist:] The desires of God are simultaneous, but things do not arise at the same time because they arise as God wishes them to arise, that is, in succession.

This is inadmissible. The desires of God remain what they are. Let us explain. Suppose that God desires "May this arise now! May that arise later!" We do not see why the second desire, at first nonefficacious, will be efficacious later; why, if it is efficacious later, it will not be so initially.

What advantage does God obtain from this great effort by which he produces the world?

[The Theist:] God produces the world for his own satisfaction (ptiti).

He is then not God, the Sovereign (Isvara), in what concerns his own satisfaction, since he cannot realize it without a means (upaya). And if he is not sovereign with regard to his own satisfaction, how can he be sovereign with regard to the world?

>>23311912
Genealogy. There are many parallels between Orphic cult ritual, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle and the Upaniṣads, Nāgārjuna, and Vasubandhu. The dualism of form and matter (and of good and evil in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism) and the metempsychosis of Orphic cult ritual almost certainly originates from India.

>>23310976
Vasubandhu conclusively refutes theism in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. For years, I studied classical Anglican theism, and after reading the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, I realized that the incoherent nonsense of theism relies on nothing more than logical fallacies and the common tricks of sophists.
>Infinity: The infinite cannot be distinct from the finite. If God is infinite, then God is identical to created things.
>Immutability: An omniscient God would know mutable things, but the immutable cannot know the mutable.
>Eternity: An omniscient God would know temporal things, but the eternal cannot know the temporal.
>Oneness: Unity is an imperfection.
>Knowledge: Knowledge is caused and cause implies composition.
>Life: The soul is the principle of life and a separate principle implies composition.
>Will: The will is caused and cause implies composition.

Vasubandhu conclusively refutes theism in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. For years, I studied classical Anglican theism, and after reading the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, I realized that the incoherent nonsense of theism relies on nothing more than logical fallacies and the common tricks of sophists.
>Infinity: The infinite cannot be distinct from the finite. If God is infinite, then God is identical to created things.
>Immutability: An omniscient God would know mutable things, but the immutable cannot know the mutable.
>Eternity: An omniscient God would know temporal things, but the eternal cannot know the temporal.
>Oneness: Unity is an imperfection.
>Knowledge: Knowledge is caused and cause implies composition.
>Life: The soul is the principle of life and a separate principle implies composition.
>Will: The will is caused and cause implies composition.

>>23260249
All the dharmas that arise arise by reason of the five causes and the four conditions that we have just explained. The world does not proceed from a single cause that is called God, or Purusa, or Pradhana, or any other name.

How do you prove this thesis?
If you think that the thesis is proven through arguments, you betray your doctrine that the world arises from a single cause.

64d. Not from God or from any other cause, since there is a succession, etc.
That things are produced by a single cause, by God, Mahadeva, or Vasudeva, is inadmissable for many reasons.

1.) If things were produced by a single cause, they would arise all at the same time: now each of us knows that they arise successively.

[The Theist:] They arise successively by virtue of the desires of God, who says, "May this arise now! May this perish now! May this arise and perish later!"

If this were the case, then things do not arise from a single cause, since the desires (of God) are multiple. Moreover these multiple desires would have to be simultaneous, since God, the cause of these desires, is not multiple, and things would all arise at the same time.

a. [The Theist:] The desires of God are not simultaneous, because God, in order to produce his desires, takes into account other causes.

If this were so, then God is not the single unique cause of all things. And the causes that God takes into account are produced successively: they depend then on causes which are themselves dependent on other causes: an infinite regression.

[The Theist:] It is admitted that the series of causes has no beginning.

This would admit that samsara does not have an origin. You then abandon the doctrine of a single cause and return to the Buddhist theory of causes (hetus) and conditions (pratyaya).

b. [The Theist:] The desires of God are simultaneous, but things do not arise at the same time because they arise as God wishes them to arise, that is, in succession.

This is inadmissible. The desires of God remain what they are. Let us explain. Suppose that God desires "May this arise now! May that arise later!" We do not see why the second desire, at first nonefficacious, will be efficacious later; why, if it is efficacious later, it will not be so initially.

What advantage does God obtain from this great effort by which he produces the world?

[The Theist:] God produces the world for his own satisfaction (ptiti).

He is then not God, the Sovereign (Isvara), in what concerns his own satisfaction, since he cannot realize it without a means (upaya). And if he is not sovereign with regard to his own satisfaction, how can he be sovereign with regard to the world?