/lit/ - Literature

>>14132370
yes in the mind of God

>>14132370
What are forms?

>>14132370

>>14132370
Yes they are. They stay constant accross and outside all minds, while reality is transient and shifting. Forms are more real then physical manifestation.

>>14132396
>she

>>14132370
No

>>14132370
Yes.

>>14132370
Of course not. They are abstractions which are erroneously inferred to be universal on the basis of their vagueness. If you bother to scrutinize any particular instance of such abstractions, you'll find they are just as non-universal as everything else (e.g. no one imagines or draws the exact same circle).

Non-universal tropes are real. Universal forms are not.

>>14132370
The fact that so many brainlets throughout history have taken then as a given should tell you all you need to know.

>>14132429
Kek

>>14132370

More real than the "real" ascribed to Phenomenal things.

>>14132373
correct answer

>>14132370
Plato was retroactively refuted.

>>14132370
It depends on what you mean by real ;))))
t. Jordan

>>14132370
Are abstractions real? There is not, like Plato argue in Republic, blueprints created by god that contain the essence of, for example, beds and that are then called upon by every craftsman that build a bed.

>>14132373
This, but in my mind instead of god's (since god doesn't exist)

>>14132370
In our narrow subjective worldview, they are. At the level of the universe though? No. Everything is one at that level, like water: flowing, gushing forth, receding, crashing together, rippling, whirling together; no distinctions possible, no things discernible, as force throughout, as one body together, as seemingly infinite yet finite. The forms are not separate from this unity, and whatever is has nothing to do with the universe we live in, has no communication or exchange with it, ever.

>>14132722
Thales was a sorcerer

>>14132370
That you don’t see how that very question evokes Kant’s a priori categories means you are either very new to philosophy or don’t care enough about it to do your own readings. Any sufficient answer would be akin to 5 second trailer to a saga

>>14132370
Clearly nah

>>14132370
nah

>>14132429
We’ve seen her vag, robot

>>14133147
>the tranny came back from work
oh no

>>14132434
who the fuck made this and fucking why?

>>14132370
Yeah, the most accurate description of them doesn't come in English, though. But mathematically, the electronic wave function is the phenomena which most elegantly captures platonic forms

>>14132373
FPBP

>>14132370
Yes.

>>14132466
They are not abstractions per se. They are more closely related to possibilities.
Ideas are different from Ideals.

>>14134616
Show me the wavefunction of the Good, the Beautiful, or even the Chair. I'll wait.

>>14133147
Shut up, tranny

>>14132370
Yes, whether they're categories of forms of definiteness or ideas in the divine intellect, something like them exists.

>>14132466
Just calling it a trope doesn't explain the basis of similarity. If no two circles are alike, in virtue of what are they circles?

>>14135767
There are many aspects that contribute to similarity, and calling that a trope is a valid way to categorize the overall effect while — very importantly — stressing non-universality.

Circles are alike because their curved edge remains roughly equidistant from their centre. Upon close inspection though, none of them are identical and they're all deformed from our abstract notion of them in various ways. In the universal sense, circles don't exist... Just like a universal colour red doesn't exist. These are tropes; particular instances of similar (but not actually identical/universal) things.

>>14135545
Not really, since ideals are a subset of ideas (they are a kind of idea).

>>14132886
Honestly, if you have a working understanding of the arguments and terminology it shouldn't be difficult to distill a relatively brief answer. Kant never established transcendental idealism as more probable than transcendental realism btw.

>>14134401
Dunnae know, it's pretty awesome tho.

>>14132370
No, they're imaginary.

>>14135999
Then just call the property in virtue of which it is similar the form, instead of a trope... it just doesn't solve the problem. Maybe clarifies it.

>>14135558
A chair has a wavefunction if all the particles are in a coherent state

>>14136230
But that's a particular chair, not the form of Chairness. Do you disagree?

>>14136095
Calling it a 'form' introduces a worse problem, in that you assume universality. Also, there is no 'property' which makes things similar, rather there are a great many quanta which are arranged and localized in similar ways.

>>14132370

Look inside yourself. The Forms are there deep within.

>>14132434
π look I wrote an infinite number

>>14136342
>Also, there is no 'property' which makes things similar
>rather there are a great many quanta which are arranged and localized in similar ways.

Huh? How isn't this pattern universal?

What did Proclus mean by this?

>>14132373
Based and extremely red pilled.

>>14136071
I could say that ideas are a subset of ideals (as being a kind of ideals). But all this is just ideas trying to reach Ideals ;)

>>14135999
>>14136342
So how do things get what constitute them as being those specific things? How could brute quanta apply to itself non-physical archetypes?
From what comes the difference between the minimum character of such quanta and other physical entities?
How are they ''arranged''? In what specific way? Arranged by whom? By themselves?
They cannot perform a closed system.

>>14132370
Yes, in the same way a word is real

>>14136389
Because no two patterns are actually identical. Do you understand what 'universal' means?

>>14136428
Talking about abstraction. We tend to idealize instances of the concrete we encounter so that we may deal with them heuristically.

>>14136446
No, you couldn't, because you have to be capable of thought (ideas) to further extrapolate ideals. Ideas precede ideals, hence ideals are the subset.

What does it mean for something to be non-physical? What is an archetype but an intentionally vague abstraction? I don't know what you mean by 'minimum character'.

Matter/energy appear to self-organize, in many specific (but ultimately continuous) ways, due to the nature of physical interaction in our universe (physics).

>>14136892
>Because no two patterns are actually identical. Do you understand what 'universal' means?

Then these quanta can't be "arranged and localized" in similar ways. Similarity presupposes some degree of universality.

>>14132373
Yes.

>>14136892
>No, you couldn't, because you have to be capable of thought (ideas) to further extrapolate ideals. Ideas precede ideals, hence ideals are the subset.
Indeed, there is a matter of point of view. In the corporeal manifestation (''empirical reality'') indeed this is the tendency (as if upwards). But in an Ideal, higher realm, Ideas depend on Ideals (for they are subsequent to it in the order/hierarchy of manifestations).

What does it mean for something to be physical?
How is an archetype a vague abstraction if our reality is grounded upon it? Again, what makes things what they are if they are not based on anything extra-corporeal?

How does matter/energy self-organize itself? Whence comes this ''capacity'' of organization? Is it wholly physical?
What even is matter/energy?

>>14132434
I love this

>>14136892
>>14136342
Are you aware of what you're posting? Your whole point is based and assumes universality and Ideas (Forms).

>>14136936
No, it doesn't. How does that follow? 'Degree of universality' is an oxymoron. Please listen to yourself.

>>14137011
Well, you're basically appealing to notions that have never had empirical or even strong logical indication. The physical is what we actually have evidence of (so far, everything you experience)... 'Non-physical' is the negative claim, the entirely vague and non-specific hand waving. If you're just going to assume the existence of prefiguring mysticism without offering strong indications as to why it is probable, then there's little point in debating.

>>14137077
No, it doesn't. If it does, then explain how instead of making a non-specific assertion.

>>14137235
>No, it doesn't. How does that follow? 'Degree of universality' is an oxymoron. Please listen to yourself.

I wish you would listen to yourself, because you can't claim non-universality and then that all circles are unique permutations of a common pattern under which they are all subsumed on account of a particular pattern of quanta... it's just semantics. Call it a Form and be done with it.

yes, but not the platonic ones and especially not anything related to the diarrhea coming from christards

>>14137268
That isn't what I'm claiming. There is no 'common pattern', there are many instances of arrangements; when these arrangements are similar enough, we recognize that similarity (we have capacity for memory recall and abstraction) and group instances into tropes. There is no underlying 'mold', what guides arrangement are the laws of physics (the behaviours of quanta).

You're not even willing to look critically at your assumption. Why is that?

>>14137326
>There is no 'common pattern', there are many instances of arrangements; when these arrangements are similar enough

Similar enough to what?

>>14136389
Because two things that one might consider the same pattern might not be recognized as such by another party.

The more complex the thing in question, the more likely this is to hold true for any given variation.

>>14137342
To a set of criteria within an encultured and usually unique range of parameters, given a label for the purposes of efficient communication.

>>14137273
Is that Sub-zero?

>>14137342
To eachother, obviously. Are you ok?

>>14132466
>(e.g. no one imagines or draws the exact same circle)

>>14132373
So nah

>>14137572
Do you have an argument? When you imagine a line segment, do you truly conceive of infinite points? How do you know a circle is perfect in your mental image of it? 'Circle' is just a trope; a shared definition for a set of similar instances.

>>14137844
>How do you know a circle is perfect in your mental image of it?

>>14132370
Are your concepts of equality, permanence, etc. grounded in sensibility?
Didn't think so.

>>14137853
All concepts are based upon experienced relations.

>>14137377
Circles and colors are social constructs now? How remarkably non-intuitive.

>>14137437
So no two circles are exactly alike, but they're also both circles, because ________

>>14138904
Because they are arrangements of quanta similar enough to eachother to group into at trope. Read the thread.

Also, not that anon, but circles and colours as we refer to them are abstract constructs. Our brains are wired to notice similarities in our experience, so we're very good at generalizing such instances. In doing so, however, we create abstract, idealized notions of those instances which do not describe them in an entirely accurate way.

>>14137268
This.
>>14137326
>There is no 'common pattern'
>similariry
areyoufuxkingkiddingme?

For you

>>14139069
>arrangements
by who?

>>14139069
>similar
The very idea presupposes commonalities, and the universality of being is an emprical "factoid"
What now?

>>14132370
Plato refuted the theory of forms himself with the third man argument.

>>14138897
So you've perceived two equal things?

>>14139069
>no universality implied
>but these two circles conform to each other because their quanta are arranged similarly ...

Semantics. "Different figures are classified as similar because of the tropes used to classify them... even though they presuppose the very similarities they are trying to explain." Come on.

>>14136360
And I can write about the Easter Bunny but that won't make him real.

>>14137235
Isn't the physical, in a physical, gross realm, in the universe where even space is physical a universal? what about all the formal conditions that limit all individualities for being precisely physical?

>>14138904
Identity is a consequence of perspective, not a concept ingrained into the fabric of reality. What color is gamma radiation?

So yes, color and circles are social constructs, insofar as you are considering them. Russians are capable of identifying light blues and dark blues faster than other cultures, because they are considered different colors entirely. Circles describe a specific set of geometric ellipses, and are identifiable by that set.

The closest natural analogue to identity is the fermion exclusion principle. The name is not the named. I'm sorry anon. Your experience, at least that in which you are able to communicate, is socially constructed. Seek the path of Nominalist-Conventionalism.

>>14139238
Infinity is not a valid number in a standard mathematical ring. It's why 0.999... = 1.

>>14139438
So the forms are within us? I guess Plotinus was right all along.

>>14132370
Is there a form of forms? Are all forms, alike in their forminess, just imitations of the form of forms?

>>14139438
>Identity is a consequence of perspective, not a concept ingrained into the fabric of reality.
?
Identity is what characterizes individuality which composes our empirical reality.

>So yes, color and circles are social constructs, insofar as you are considering them.
They partake in the same conditions which categorizes them as such. But go on.

>Communication of experience is socially constructed.
wew, really?

>>14139170
You're skipping the rails from similarity to universality. There is no evidence of concrete universals. You're not even bothering to work through the logic, and your incredulity does not constitute an argument.

>>14139183
We've been through this. Self-organizing due to physics, commonalities are not universals. The entirety of existence (being) is not a universal (as there is no 'other' for it to be identical relative to), it is totality.

>>14139222
I've generalized instances as approximately equal, due to my limited perception and my pragmatic requirements.

>>14139224
No, the classification is the trope. Similarities exist — think of existence as a spectrum of quanta. If you take a small segment of that spectrum, you find instances of more similar organization (relative to eachother) without them being identical or discrete from the greater continuity. Your understanding of this topic is very superficial — I suggest you do some research (if you're going to argue for universals, at least do it well).

>>14139273
No, it is a totality. There is no 'other' universe for us to compare with to determine whether they are identical. There may be other universes outside of ours, so potentially they could be compared, but it seems unlikely that information from outside our universe can ever be received. In any event, we can regress the argument to the entirety of existence and see that there's no 'other' entirety to compare it to. It is the totality.

I don't think formal conditions limit instances, I think the natural limitations are what we abstract into 'formal conditions'.

>>14139438
>The closest natural analogue to identity is the fermion exclusion principle.
but not bosons, right?

>>14139579
>I've generalized instances as approximately equal, due to my limited perception and my pragmatic requirements.
Right, and how can you do that without a priori knowledge (forms)? Are you saying the concepts develop adaptively? But how then given you've abstracted from experience which never conforms with the concept.

>>14139579
Nothing you're saying is that complicated, all you're doing to someone whose understanding of the forms ISN'T superficial is re-articulating the intuitions that led men like Plato to propose the theory in the first place. Does the similarity pre-exist the trope or doesn't it?

>>14139579
The anon you replied to (>>14139224) didn't even try to argue, he just showed your incoherence.

Read Phaedo. Things are indeed similar, but how are they similar? What bears and bestows their similarity?

>natural limitations are what we abstract into 'formal conditions'.
call it whatever pleases you, you cannot evade what is implied.

>>14139594
Not him, but we don't really know that particles can be identical. We can treat them as such mathematically, but in the concrete there may be very granular variables which our instrumentation can't detect (until we get down to a base state of existence -- but that is already everything and so can't be compared to something else).

>>14139610
My perception is conditioned by the quantized reality of which it is a part and in which it evolved, not some universal 'forms'. This biological 'conditioning' does give me an instinctual access to some elements of experience, but concepts are not developed until that instinct is combined with actual experience of relations. It is misdirecting to talk about 'form' and 'content' as discrete things, when knowledge is not possible without both, and when it is probable that they are aspects of the same continuity.

>>14139627
I agree, and I didn't say it was complicated — only that your own understanding appears very superficial and dogmatic.
>"Similarities exist..."
Did you miss that part? My answer is there.

>>14139669
They are similar localizations of quanta (in relative terms, as in you can find a portion of a spectrum where instances are more alike in organization to eachother than to the rest of the spectrum, but they are still a part of that spectrum). Physics (behaviours of quanta) is what 'bestows' similarity. This has already been covered.

I'm not trying to evade anything. 'Formal conditions' implies discrete, prefiguring universals (the nature of which is unspecified). 'Natural limitations' implies a continuity in which the organizing limitations are inherited from the base state of existence itself (which is a totality — not a universal — as I've noted above).

>>14139594
As long as they have the same spin, correct. They can only be determined as discrete multitudes when very specific conditions are met, and philosophically speaking are interchangeable even under those conditions.

>>14139577
>Identity is what characterizes individuality which composes our empirical reality.
No. Individuality is a consequence of perspective. Empiricism is a system of thought, it is not reality. It is just as chained to SVO format as any other system of thought. Meaning can only be communicated in reference to other things. A particle has no sense of self or difference from others, singling it out is an epistemological necessity, but not for the sake of the particle being singled out. A thing is everything that it is not.

>They partake in the same conditions which categorizes them as such.
The label describes the whole on the basis of conditions, yes, but the whole is more granular than the conditions which are associated against the label. The parts of the whole are what casts the label, but are also definable by any arbitrary measure of the parts. The whole doesn't actually exist, it's a convenient mental device.

>>14139541
Yes, forms are imaginary. In the sense that anything imaginary exists, it is not the same as forms being "real". At least, not the forms in and of themselves.

>>14139671
And what is not conditioned within a realm in which all things partake in limitative conditions?
>concepts are not developed until that instinct is combined with actual experience of relations.
but concepts are only the cloths of that experience.

>>14139579
>You're skipping the rails from similarity to universality
Stop your bullshit.
Similarity presupposes recurring patterns.
>There is no evidence of concrete universals
There is no evidence for anything.
>You're not even bothering to work through the logic
Only semantics, no logic.
>your incredulity
Ad-hom.
>Self-organizing due to physics
We have no evidence for this.
>commonalities are not universals
Existence is a universal and a commonality though so we have grounds to at least assume that there are other things that are like that.
>The entirety of existence (being) is not a universal
Yes it is, because, everything that exists, exists. Things that don't exist are not things. As such things that exist have at least one thing in common.

>>14139710
>Individuality is a consequence of perspective.
You have that ass backwards.

Point to a form.

>>14139722
Sorry, I don't see your point. The crucial distinction is that these limitative conditions are inherited from the nature of the base state of existence — a totality — not discrete, universal 'designs'.

If you're trying to say that concepts somehow precede experience, you're wrong. Instincts may precede experience (as in biological coding), but no concepts exist until experience occurs. Additionally, that instinctual grasp can be explained without resorting to the vauge notion of 'forms', as I noted above (and which you ignored).

>>14139710
And what makes a perspective individual? Or are all of them supported by a higher, godlike one?
> Empiricism is a system of thought, it is not reality.
You know what is an adjective?

Particles don't need sense of self or difference from other to be what they are.

>Forms are imaginary.
In an atomised perspective of human subtleties, yes. But they are conferred by a what precisely bears them.

>>14139795
''The distinction is that they are inherited from X instead of Y!''

No, I specifically pointed that concepts are only cloths of what they express.

And I didn't ignore anything, you're probably confounding me with other anon.

Instincts as a pattern of behaviour and extension within reality?

>>14139749
>Similarity presupposes recurring patterns.
Can you logically or empirically demonstrate this assertion? Being 'forceful' doesn't make you correct.
>There is no evidence for anything.
Hot take. One must wonder on what basis you plan your quotidian actions.
>Only semantics, no logic.
The most casual philosphic inspection would reveal which of us is trapped by semantics (hint: it isn't me).
>Ad-hom.
Not at all. An ad hominem would be saying that you don't udnerstand because you're a faggot. What I'm saying, is that expressing incredulity is not a form of argument, and I'm correct. This is basic stuff — you aren't inspiring confidence in your critical faculties here.
>We have no evidence for this.
To the contrary, all the evidence we have points to this probability, even if our knowledge is incomplete... And if you believe that evidence is a false standard (as you appear to imply above), them I'm confused as to why you appeal it here.
>Existence is a universal and a commonality though so we have grounds to at least assume that there are other things that are like that.
No, existence is a totality. A universal can only exist relative to something else it could be potentially identical to. How could there be something 'else' which is not contained by existence itself?
>Yes it is, because, everything that exists, exists. Things that don't exist are not things. As such things that exist have at least one thing in common.
It seems like you don't understand what a universal is. I would advise research the 'problem of universals'. A universal would have to have all things in common with something else, and an entirety (which contains all things) is not a universal itself because there is no other entirety to compare it to.

>>14139874
The x and the y here are very different models. Do you dispute that?

I don't understand "cloths of what they express". Do you mean 'clothes'? In any event, please be more specific. I'm not sure what relevance this has towards the existence of universal forms.

>>14139238
Pi is not equal to pi_infinity, whatever the hell that is. Pi is defined as the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. The guy in your picture, Normburger, is a bit crazy.

>>14132370
And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a single idea, parting it off from other things.

What difficulty? he said.
There are many, but the greatest of all is this:-If an opponent argues that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must remain unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who denies their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge, and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.

What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.
In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they cannot exist in us.

No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.
True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that name when we partake of them. And the things which are within our sphere and have the same names with them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which have the same names with them, but belong to themselves and not to them.

What do you mean? said Socrates.
I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:-A master has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.
And will not knowledge-I mean absolute knowledge-answer to absolute truth?

Certainly.
And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being?

Yes.
But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Certainly.
But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?

No, we cannot.
And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the absolute idea of knowledge?

Yes.
And we have not got the idea of knowledge?
No.
Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

I suppose not.
Then the nature of the beautiful in itself, and of the good in itself, and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely, are unknown to us?

>>14139941
>>14132370

It would seem so.
I think that there is a stranger consequence still.
What is it?
Would you, or would you not say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of the rest?

Yes.
And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?

Certainly.
But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?

Why not?
Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not valid in relation to human things; nor human things in relation to them; the relations of either are limited to their respective spheres.

Yes, that has been admitted.
And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things of men.

Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.

These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few of the difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we determine each one of them to be an absolute unity. He who hears what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them-and even if they do exist, he will say that they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now, will be very difficult to convince; a man must be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself, and having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to others.

I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much to my mind.


>where were you when Plato himself had Parmenides retroactively debunk Socrates?

>>14139950
Where can I read more about this? I know no thing about forms and Greeks
inb4 start with the grik

>>14139904
No they don't because whatever way they are expressed they are referring to the limitations. I don't care if you have dogmatically centered yourself on a fantastical (physicist) theory, what is in question is the ''programming'' of those limitations.

No, I do mean cloths. Check a dictionary, I don't know how could I help you with that.

>>14139941
>>14139950
Can you give a tl;dr

fucking no that was some bizarre greek bullshit like what the fuck plato like actually what the fuck are you smoking

>>14139970
start with the greeks unironically nigger

>>14139977
Wow, easy there little guy.

The distinction is very releveant to the topic at hand, which is the existence of universal forms. In what way do universal forms necessarily follow from the existence of limitations (if a different provenance of these limitations can be supposed)?

Okay, cloths it is. You could help by being more specific about your point, instead of pretending that your vague analogy is somehow significant.

>>14140240
A specific thing to be what it is must be within the conditions that characterizes that thing as that specific thing. Each kind of things are grouped and categorized according to their states, they all are within a set of limitative conditions which establish them as things.
How are these states/modalities bestowed upon the very representations of them?
It is clear that, preceding their actual existence (within modes and conditions) there are Possibilities to their blooming (realization).
Multiplicity of things pressuposes multiple Possibilities of multiple modalities of realization.
And, if you ignore the Forms, they are possible according to what?
Model of realization - Possibility of realization - Realization.

>>14132370
Depends on how you define reality

>>14139476
>0.999... = 1.
Not even wrong.
https://sites.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/Opinion146.html

>>14139476
>It's why 0.999... = 1
No, 0.999... = 1 because of how we define real numbers (as converging sequences of rational numbers) and how we define equality on real numbers (as the sequence of differences between them converging to zero).

>>14140474
All things exist within the limitations of existence itself, so far so good. A 'kind' -is- the grouping, there is no universal 'kind' in the concrete. If you instead define 'kind' as a set of instances which approach (but do not arrive at) homogeneity in their particulars, then yes 'kinds' — or similarities — exist. What establishes something as a 'thing' is existing at all, not the minutae of that existence.

>How are these states/modalities bestowed upon the very representations of them?
They aren't. Our abstract representations of concrete things are not entirely accurate. If by 'representations' you instead mean 'appearances', then I would say that appearances are things as well (I'm a transcendental realist) and so obtain their arrangement from the behaviours of quanta, as do all things.

>It is clear that, preceding their actual existence (within modes and conditions) there are Possibilities to their blooming (realization).
I agree, but I aver that this potentiality is due to the variation inherent to base existence itself (e.g. quantum fluctuation), from which more complex arrangements emerge (like constructive interference -- complex variations building up from simpler ones).

What specifically do you think a form would be (feel free to speculate)? They must be things themselves, since you say they exist. So what are they? In what way do they maintain their discreteness from other things?

>>14139438
>Circles describe a specific set of geometric ellipses
how the fuck are geometric ellipses not forms

>>14140486
Depends more on how reality defines you.

>>14140654
lol this
We are witnessing Godly levels of pilpul here

>>14140641
>What establishes something as a 'thing' is existing at all
So then existence is a universal form, thank you.

>>14139814
>And what makes a perspective individual?
As in what makes individuality arise within the perspective? The perspective itself.

As in what makes a certain perspective identifiable? The uniqueness of space that it occupies, but only insofar as it may be referenced in a simplistic way. It's a property of the imaginary vs the real.

>You know what is an adjective?
Yes, and I was criticising your usage. "Empirical" does not agree with "reality".

>Particles don't need sense of self or difference from other to be what they are.
Exactly. The core of the real is neither individual, nor is it NOT individual.

>But they are conferred by a what precisely bears them.
Which only exists in the mind that beholds this object, and has assigned meaning to perceived patterns. A rock does not exist because of the cosmic blueprint of a rock any more than the sine wave exists because of a singular elementary operator. A sine wave exists according to a series of multiple true elementary operators. Platonism and forms are at best primitive versions of emergence, what's missing from platonism is an idea of atomic self-reference.

>>14140760
So your forms are immanentized, but they still exist.

>>14140849
They exist in the same way that any thought exists. Existing does not preclude being imaginary.

>>14140719
No, existence is the entirety; it can't be universal since there is no other entirety for to relate to. Existence isn't a 'form' for things, it -is all things-. What's wrong? Does not compute?

>>14140989
>No, existence is the entirety; it can't be universal since there is no other entirety for to relate to. Existence isn't a 'form' for things, it -is all things-.

Being is very much a form, or in any case the condition for forms, for at least Proclus. There's nothing either you or I can say to each other besides "nuh-uh", so unless you give me a reading list for your position and I give you for mine, this'll be pointless

>>14141010
Being is the form, becoming is the condition.

>>14140760
>As in what makes individuality arise within the perspective? The perspective itself.
Yes because its invidivuality presupposes its perception of itself as individual.

>As in what makes a certain perspective identifiable? The uniqueness of space that it occupies, but only insofar as it may be referenced in a simplistic way. It's a property of the imaginary vs the real.
I have no clue of what you are trying to say here.

>"Empirical" does not agree with "reality".
It does only within the merits of empirism. I didn't mean the ultimate reality, lol.

>The core of the real
can't be apprenhended because it itself apprehends everything. It can't be covered by any category.

>Which only exists in the mind that beholds this object, and has assigned meaning to perceived patterns.
The patterns exist only in the mind of an observer? Or are they a universal, cosmological pattern, regardless of individual perspectives?

I don't know what you mean when you use imaginary. I understand it to be something equivalent to fantastical. The human ability to perscribe ''images'' to phenomenal representations is fragmentary and imperfect (being exactly because they're ''translations of the mind''). The reason is that the center of perspective directs the images to the ever-changing screens of reality (or another higher reality). When in fact, this point of consciousness (center of perspective) should be shifted to these images to the Protean nature of the noetic emergence.

>sine wave exists according to a series of multiple true elementary operators.
Could you explain further?
To me sound waves are immediate developments (or sensible propagations) of the birth of movement itself: aetherial isotropism.

>>14140989
>>14141010
>>14141083
Being is the Divine Intellect itself and Becoming is the Receptacle which contains Totality, The All, Multiplicity.

there is only form, no forms

>>14132685
>solipsism

>>14141150
>Yes because its invidivuality presupposes its perception of itself as individual.
It's a misinterpretation of a more complicated notion. Hence why it's better to think of a thing, rather than in the terms of itself, in the terms of every other thing.

>I have no clue of what you are trying to say here.
Points within dimensions, both spatial and temporal, are unique, but not the points themselves. There's a big dialectical fuss to be made about whether planes can be considered entities in the first place, but I'd really rather not spend time on that.

>can't be apprenhended because it itself apprehends everything. It can't be covered by any category.
>I don't know what you mean when you use imaginary.
"Everything" includes more than the real, it also includes the imaginary. "The core of the real" is another way of saying "the building blocks of the material".

The distinction between "real" and "exists" is the point I've been trying to drive home. There is more than just the real. Imaginary things exist, but they are not real. That which you hold in your mind is the imaginary, that which you hold in the hand is the real. The neurons that make up your mind are the real. The understanding that the neurons are real is imaginary, but the white matter and action potential that this manifests as is the real (reductively speaking).

To best understand what I am saying by this, I recommend throwing out preconceived subtleties tied to these words. They will only bog you down and confuse the point. Imaginary is not a declaration of non-existence, but it is also not real. It can extend to an entire solipsist "reality", but does not truly ever intersect with the real in an intuitive way. The actual intersection of imaginary and reality is extremely, extremely complex, so if you are confused about that aspect that's completely understandable.

>The patterns exist only in the mind of an observer? Or are they a universal, cosmological pattern, regardless of individual perspectives?
The former, which is a component of my point. Consider my example of Russians earlier in the thread, who will regard dark blue and light blue as completely different colors, which results in them being able to identify them more quickly than other cultures. When I say "completely", I mean it to the fullest extent of the word. They are not considered mere shades or hues of a unifying color, rather they are as different to each other as "red" is to "violet".

>Could you explain further?
>To me sound waves are immediate developments
Not sound waves, sine waves. The trigonometric identity of sine. "Sine" is not an elementary operator as it is commonly taught, but rather it is a mathematical operation that can be expressed through sigma notation with simple arithmetic, so long as n may equal infinity.

>>14141193
Being is the receptacle of the results of the becoming.

>>14141010
So it's arguments from authority now? So weak. You can't specify what a 'form' is, what distinguishes it from all other things.

>>14141193
I don't begrudge you your faith or mysticism, but it doesn't satisfy any logical standard.

>>14142364
>So it's arguments from authority now? So weak. You can't specify what a 'form' is, what distinguishes it from all other things.

No, it's the fact that your positions have been more or less anticipated by these thinkers, and even if they weren't they'd likely have a ready answer for it because they spent decades refining their thought.

>I don't begrudge you your faith or mysticism, but it doesn't satisfy any logical standard.

I don't begrudge you your logic and rationality, but it satisfies nothing, just re-states the problem in contemporary language. Take the Russian example, for example. It makes little difference whether humans consider all shades of blue members of a single set, so long as a Russian would agree that two instances of a particular shade are the same. Whence this similarity?

>>14142364
It is funny how you hardcore rational physicists deck out phenomena and all manifestations with improbability, oscillation, discontinuity, and, obviously, as the pillar of such a fantastical scheme, quantification. Language and vocables are thus adapted and invented to conform rigidly to the design. Division after division and still not a single worthy expression of what ultimately lies underneath and sustains all of that. A sterile attempt to bypass ineffability.

>>14142511
He will accuse you of a shallow and inane understanding of his pet field, and then pat himself on the back for having handily refuted hundreds of years of Neoplatonic thought.

>>14142364
you can't consider what distinguishes things ultimately, only assume "whatever it is" and point it out with a physical theory while denying there is anything to point out. You also assume it must be "thoughts" but deny the physical theory is pointing to "thoughts". The evidences that allow us to develop a physical theory are the evidence of what you call merely thoughts. Any discreteness or identity you make use of in the theory is not a creation of the theorist's ex nihilo. The alternative is that we imagine everything and there is no real. The problems that come up when we deny that we are merely imagining infect so to speak everything including equally our physical theory. Naturally that doesn't stop physicists from doing their work, but neither does it make someone who reminds us of the consequences of our trying to understand wrong.

>>14142511
>>14142518

>>14143118
>t.seethe

>>14136349
>>14136428
what book?

>>14142432
Either they detailed their relevant arguments or they didn't. If you understand those arguments, it shouldn't be an issue for you to utilize them in debating with me. So you think I'm wrong, because a philospher you admire had a different general position (or more likely, because a position you're emotionally invested in is supported by that philosopher), but you don't understand the specifics? Does that seem reasonable to you?

If logic and rationality don't satisfy anything, then what is the point of debate? What common standard could we appeal to? Is it not obvious that you are attempting to wield logic (poorly) in your responses to me?

Again, similarity derives from things which approach homogeneity of their organization (on a spectrum), but never actually reach a point of being identical. The similarity is therefore not arbitrary, but the places where we draw the lines between 'kinds' (taxonomy) is somewhat arbitrary, since we are dealing with a spectrum (no hard boundaries). This is all covered in trope theory.

>>14142511
It's what we actually have evidence for — what confers predictive power. It's quite clear that anti-physicalist positions rely much more heavily upon vague abstraction and negative claims. Physicalists are far less prone to perpetuating purely imagined dichotomies/distinctions. I've been far more specific, critical, and concerned with the concrete than my interlocutors in this thread; I think you're projecting somewhat.
What if the truth is 'sterile', relative to your bias? What then?

>>14142672
I don't see how extreme sketpicism is an honest position. There may be a technical certainty in all but the most apodictic truths, but no one actually lives this way. We all cleave to what we deem most probable, or what is psychologically appealing to us.

If everything is imagined, why aren't we omniscient? Why does the faculty of our imagination appear to be modulated by what are ostensibly only imaginings (e.g. psychoactive drugs, or a transcranial magnetic stimulation helmet)? Even if we take a more reasonable position, such as Kant's transcedental idealism (which affirms that there is an objective reality), what makes trascendental idealism more probable than transcendental realism? It seems to entail more assumption and convolution to make idealism work, so on what basis is it the preferred theory?

>>14143803
I still can’t understand how tropes substitute universals. If some things are similar to each other, they are similar due to something (a quality, essence, what makes a thing that thing).
Any substance will never be identical to another one of the same kind, but they are of the same kind because of something else.

>>14141845
>It's a misinterpretation of a more complicated notion.
What notion?
>it's better to think of a thing, rather than in the terms of itself, in the terms of every other thing.
But the thing itself is an individual thing.
Like you said: ''Points within dimensions, both spatial and temporal, are unique, but not the points themselves''. I agree. An individual thing within space and time can be analogous to an individual point.
But what do you conceive a point as? They are much closer to metaphysical abstractions which you attack than to subatomic particles.

>The distinction between "real" and "exists"... the actual intersection of imaginary and reality is extremely complex.
I wouldn't even say that neurons, cells, are real. They are as temporarily real as anything I fantasy now. If you say that cells, and what materially holds them are more real becuase of their more prolonged existence, and/or because they are more concrete, tangible, it is insignificant.

I don't hold anything. What makes me hold what I am, and what I imagine? What is that unchangeable point that makes me perceive myself as something and years later as something else, completely different? What actualizes cells to group together and perform what they do? Is it something imaginary? Of course we can only conceive That in an imaginary way, just like we understand that neurons are real and do what they do in an imaginary way. Gross/Corporeal manifestations and Subtle ones are the same, they are intertwined, they both exist and cease to exist equally.

>The former, which is a component of my point.
And isn't the pattern that a pattern exists only in the mind of an observer a (different) pattern?

>Russians regard dark blue and light blue as completely differente colors.
But they still see them as colors. And dark blue and light blue can easily and fundamentally be seen as different colors, regardless of sharing more similarities between each other than to other colors.
You can easily understand this looking on your screen right now.

>Not sound waves, sine waves.
Yeah. Aren't sine waves perceptual propagations of sound waves?

> "Sine" is not an elementary operator...
Yes, but they derive from an elementary movement. Doesn't it? A sine would be the most exterior and extended manifestation of that element (aether).

>>14143803
>What if the truth is 'sterile', relative to your bias
Because things are not sterile, they are not a homogeneous mass of matter that randomly god knows by what way, movement or force, organizes itself and inspires all information and sensation you have acquired during the period you have lived.
Whence comes the shaping principle that not only characterizes a compound of matter but imposes priorly its Idea, Form, upon that compound of matter?

>>14132370
Tell me this, are there many things, or merely the One?

>>14144011
And yet you'll have trouble defining exactly what a 'quality, 'essence' etc. is... These are essentially negative claims, since you can't relate them to anything in the concrete. Alternatively, when I posit that similarity is derived from a natural self-organization of quanta, this is something specific we can analyze and test. The quanta explanation lines up very well with what we observe; we don't see actually identical things in the concrete, we see variation in a spectrum of quanta (some arrangements more alike to eachother than to the rest of the spectrum). If it were universal qualia acting as a 'design' for things, why aren't they identical and/or ideal?

I think you could understand, if you wanted to.

>>14144257
Well, first of all I don't view self-organization as sterile (hence referring to your bias). Secondly, why not? Why is self-organization according to some natural limitations of existence such a hard pill to swallow? Don't you have a sense of the anthropocentric conceit creeping into your arguments, as you try to imbue the pre-emergent (universe) with the traits of the emergent (us, our capacity for abstraction)?

>>14145063
the problem qualitative essences as they are and can ONLY BE expressed contingently is the heart of platonism. it isn't a refutation. essences co-emerge with becoming. "natural self-organization of quanta" then the problem becomes THAT quanta naturally organize into broadly similar patterns. universal, self-evident ideality has never been the claim of a sophisticated platonism.

>>14145063
No I can't because you are stubbornly avoiding to consider some concepts (as images, representations of something in existence), judging them as ''negative since we can't relate them to anything in the concrete'' (what is absurd) and at the same time insisting on a supposed self-organization of particles coming and assuming their own forms out of nowhere.
How can ''quality'' and ''essence'' be put aside if you are considering natural processes? It is not only the material aspect we observe in matter, particles, or whatever you want to call it
They need a Form (completing its shape, its essence), because what does it mean for quanta to be quanta?
Things are not identical because if they were they wouldn't be things, but a thing. And precisely because they are and form other compounds, they are different yet similar for that very reason.

>>14145063
What I meant with that part of my post was precisely that organization itself is not something sterile, yet you make it to be because you don't explain what lies behind it. You assume randomness, variations that come out of nothing.

>Why is self-organization according to some natural limitations of existence such a hard pill to swallow.
I don't know how you cannot see what I am trying to convey. More than not negating ''natural limitations of existence'' I have been claiming in several posts of mine in this thread that it is precisely because of these limitations that things are what they are and assume their respective forms, essences and are set to organization (not self-organization, because for a thing to come to be does it come to be by itself?).
>Don't you have a sense of the anthropocentric conceit creeping into your arguments, as you try to imbue the pre-emergent (universe) with the traits of the emergent (us, our capacity for abstraction)?
Yes. Because our own consciousness and capacity for abstraction vouchsafe us to perceive, that what lies behind everything is precisely what moves within us that very capacity.

>>14145393
This man is right. Roads are material things, but the patterns in which road ways can be organized are obviously immaterial.

>>14145227
>>14145404
This seems to me like a kind of 'naive dualism'. You can't seem consider that the arrangements and behavioural limitations of quanta are linked in a continuity. If quanta organize according to natural limitations (physics), and these same limitations are present throughout the universe, then why would it be odd to find that quanta self-organize into similar instances? How is relying upon negative claims (essence) and unestablished dichotomy a more elegant/probable solution?

>>14145393
If we don't how make an effort to relate our abstractions to the concrete, then how are we assured of their relative accuracy? How is such a standard of sensibility absurd?

I'm very willing to consider any concept, and I have considered the concepts you mention at length (as it was necessary in coming to my current position). There are no universal 'forms' to assume, and organization doesn't 'come out of nowhere' — see above. Again, what are 'quality' and 'essence'? What is the 'quality' of blue? What are you specifically talking about? If it is difficult to explain what qualia are, then I submit that their non-existence is a parsimonious conclusion.

What it means for something to be quanta, is to be a physical thing. There are as of yet no strong indications of the existence of anything non-physical. You're trying to flip things around because you can't elaborate upon qualia, but it remains the case that quanta are what we observe and test, while qualia is nothing more than a negative claim which you will excuse at every juncture.

Why would universality preclude the existence of things? If so, doesn't this suggest that universality (and hence forms) is not possible? To contrast, the quanta explanation holds that there are no truly discrete things, that all is part of a continuity, and that what we naively view as indivdual things are in fact localizations on a spectrum of potential organization. This is far more specific and elegant than the logical knots you're tying while trying to justify the notion of qualia.

Randomness is not nothing. Whether random or deterministic, my position is that natural limations are due to the nature of base existence itself (e.g. a fluctuating quantum field or something), and that this base existence itself is causeless and timeless (it's nature has always been, it has always been). Eventually you do have to get down to that base-state, or you run into a problem of infinite regression.

>Yes. Because our own consciousness and capacity for abstraction vouchsafe us to perceive, that what lies behind everything is precisely what moves within us that very capacity.
You assert this, but you don't logically demonstrate it. We don't assume that each instrument of an orchestra contains the capacities of an orchestra. It is not until the various instruments constructively interfere that a more complex capacity emerges.

>>14146141
>If quanta organize according to natural limitations (physics), and these same limitations are present throughout the universe, then why would it be odd to find that quanta self-organize into similar instances?

because the problem has never been "disproving" physical limitations, they are the very condition for forms in the first place. forms just are these patterns instantiated by quanta according to immanent laws/becoming.

>What is the 'quality' of blue? What are you specifically talking about?

that in virtue of which our knowledge of blue-ness is confirmed by our experience of blue

>This is far more specific and elegant than the logical knots you're tying while trying to justify the notion of qualia.


It isn't elegant, because you can't give a satisfactory account of under what principle we localize these phenomena in the ways that we do in the first place, and since you're skeptical of a qualitative solution, what's left?

>>14146170
>because the problem has never been "disproving" physical limitations, they are the very condition for forms in the first place. forms just are these patterns instantiated by quanta according to immanent laws/becoming.
Why add the extra steps and abstraction? There appears to be a simple link between physical limitations and how quanta organize, so why complicate with additional concepts? You risk perpetuating a dualist perspective (as we see in this thread) that doesn't seem probable.

>that in virtue of which our knowledge of blue-ness is confirmed by our experience of blue
In other words, it's a non-specific concept which we can only describe obliquely by how it ostensibly relates to other things. Again, unecessary complication and assumption; trope theory provides a far more elegant explanation for similarity.

>It isn't elegant, because you can't give a satisfactory account of under what principle we localize these phenomena in the ways that we do in the first place, and since you're skeptical of a qualitative solution, what's left?
I've given you a far more specific accounting than you've given me; if you find it unsatisfactory, then I wonder at how you can find your own 'explanation' to be sufficient.

>>14132685
your mind is god

>>14146292
>In other words, it's a non-specific concept which we can only describe obliquely by how it ostensibly relates to other things. Again, unecessary complication and assumption; trope theory provides a far more elegant explanation for similarity.

No, it's a specific concept that we define only relative to itself. qualia are qualia precisely because we do not refer to other things to explain them, they are irreducibly themselves. it is what it means to be qualitative

>I've given you a far more specific accounting than you've given me; if you find it unsatisfactory, then I wonder at how you can find your own 'explanation' to be sufficient.

if reality is continuous, under what law do I distinguish this localized region of infinite points from this other one? do your quanta patterns tesselate? do they overlap? if we could zoom in on the gradations between these patterns, do they continue on forever? then on what do they depend on?

>>14146141
>If we don't how make an effort to relate our abstractions to the concrete, then how are we assured of their relative accuracy? How is such a standard of sensibility absurd?
What you are saying here is exaclty my point concerning ''negative claims''.

>I'm very willing to consider any concept
No you are not. You are only repeating yourself over and over again. I already understood your point and I agree they have place in partial reality, but you are not willing to consider further than what is concrete and tangible.

>organization doesn't 'come out of nowhere'
Yes I know it and you can see that my point is that you don't seem to realize it.

>What are 'quality' and 'essence'.What is the quality of blue?
I don't think you're being seriously honest at this point.

>What it means for something to be quanta, is to be a physical thing.
And what it means for something to be a physical thing? Let me guess, it is to be a quantum? Self-refuting aporia.

>Why would universality preclude the existence of things.
Just read my posts above, jesus christ.

>If so, doesn't this suggest that universality (and hence forms) is not possible?
I have no idea how you could have inferred this from the previous statement.

>continuity
and is this physical? is this a negative claim? What it means for continuity to be continuity? If the very possibility of continuity was not possible, would it be present and ''act'' upon things?

>potential organization
and how are potentialities actualized?

>Randomness is not nothing.
Did I say it? I merely suggested that since you refuse to explain anything it seems that everything is organized by randomness, arbitrary sets of self-organizations within any and every single particle.

>natural limations are due to the nature of base existence itself (e.g. a fluctuating quantum field or something).
What is ''base existence''? To be a physical quantum? lol.

>and that this base existence itself is causeless and timeless (it's nature has always been, it has always been).
lmao this is lamentable.

>Eventually you do have to get down to that base-state, or you run into a problem of infinite regression.
You are already in a problem of infinite regression considering blindly only physicality. Can you not perceive it?

>>14137268
I have no side in the discussion, but I think the issue comes down to whether the "indivisible article", labelled a trope or a Form or whatever else, is either strictly mental, or corresponds to something remaining without cognitive construction.

For me for example, I class "color" as a universal. I am not sure whether each of the colors we presently delineate into our common understanding of the spectrum (red, blue, yellow, etc) are "sub-universals" or merely approximate groupings of our minds, but nonetheless "color" itself is a distinct, indivisible category of phenomena. It as no comparable, and I also do not believe our minds are simply "separate" from our environment such that any understanding of it would merely be "our own, but not true for the phenomenal environment itself". Rather, I'd say that our minds can only have a recognition of color as a distinct class of phenomena, which to the sense-apparatus is merely an unintelligible deluge, because there is some extent to which object and subject are one, with color being a true universal recognizable only because the color and the mind perceiving it are inextricably connected. I would say the same for shape, applying the same criteria of skepticism to whether specific shapes are sub-universals or generalizations).

It's up to you whether you take the "minimally indivisible entity" to be a convenient mental abstraction or a distinct phenomenal category.

It would seem the quanta-anon is arguing for it being the former, and the other anon the latter.

>>14144939
Being qua being doesn't have plurality but many things still exist.

>>14146375
>I have no side in the discussion, but I think the issue comes down to whether the "indivisible article", labelled a trope or a Form or whatever else, is either strictly mental, or corresponds to something remaining without cognitive construction.

I think this is succinct.

>It would seem the quanta-anon is arguing for it being the former, and the other anon the latter.

Not so fast, whether forms are constituted internally or externally is beside the point that forms ARE BEING CONSTITUTED. if time is the soul distending eternity into its own self-identical continuum, why not Forms? compared to an "externalist" Platonic account, this might not fly if you want to assert the soul generates its reality by itself, but in this sense it is definitely an orderer of creation, a co-demiurge

>>14132370
Say Plato’s forms are real. How would one go about acquiring knowledge of the forms? Has contemplating the forms ever produced any kind of knowledge?

Protip: mathematical objects are not Platonic forms if you ever read anything by Plato or his followers. They possess a lower ontological status than the forms.

>>14146356
>No, it's a specific concept that we define only relative to itself. qualia are qualia precisely because we do not refer to other things to explain them, they are irreducibly themselves. it is what it means to be qualitative
And you don't see a problem with self-referential definition when trying to ascertain truth?

>
if reality is continuous, under what law do I distinguish this localized region of infinite points from this other one? do your quanta patterns tesselate? do they overlap? if we could zoom in on the gradations between these patterns, do they continue on forever? then on what do they depend on?
They way organization presents varies according to the quanta in question and the scale at which we are inspecting. No, I don't think we could keep zoomin in forever, as I've already stated it seems most probable that there is a base state of existence (and it is the nature of this base that determines limitations/potential for quanta). I don't mind answer you're questions, but it would be nice if I didn't have to keep repeating myself. Also, please note that you are either unwilling or unable to answer my questions in similar detail (you just haul out the old self-referential 'qualia' and so evade calls for specificity).

>>14146366
>What you are saying here is exaclty my point concerning ''negative claims''.
Oh ok. Could you make that point in your own words then, because we seem to still disagree on how to evaluate abstraction.
>No you are not. You are only repeating yourself over and over again. I already understood your point and I agree they have place in partial reality, but you are not willing to consider further than what is concrete and tangible.
I'm repeating myself because you keep reverting back to the same questions after I answer them in detail. If you would provide fresh objections, or counter with specific alternatives of your own, then this rehashing would be unecessary. If you have a more specifics relating to your intangible alternatives, I would be glad and most refreshed to consider them.
>Yes I know it and you can see that my point is that you don't seem to realize it.
Could you elaborate? I have posited an explanation for where organization 'comes from', and it isn't nowhere, it is the result of an extant continuity.
>I don't think you're being seriously honest at this point.
Quite serious. Many philosophers have been critical of such notions, such skepticism isn't outlandish or unjustified. I guess it's easier to deflect than answer though.
>And what it means for something to be a physical thing? Let me guess, it is to be a quantum? Self-refuting aporia.
The physical is what behaves in accordance with the laws of physics (which appears to be everything).
>Just read my posts above, jesus christ.
I have, and you haven't demonstrated any logical necessity in this regard.

cont'd

>>14146593
>And you don't see a problem with self-referential definition when trying to ascertain truth?

Because the self-referentiality is not a bug, but a feature. It doesn't trouble the mystic. Ultimately, all rationality is circular and tautological. Why are things the way they are? Because they are.

How could I explain phenomenal properties quantitatively to your satisfaction, to anyone's satisfaction? I can't. They are themselves.

>>14146593
>>14146366

>I have no idea how you could have inferred this from the previous statement
Because if universality precludes the existence of things, and yet you maintain things exist, how would universality (and forms, which are ostensibly universal) be possible? Pretty simple.

>and is this physical? is this a negative claim? What it means for continuity to be continuity? If the very possibility of continuity was not possible, would it be present and ''act'' upon things?
Continuity is a description of the nature of physical existence, so yes it is physical. If continuity wasn't possible, I don't think existence would be either.
>and how are potentialities actualized?
Via constructive interaction of the base variations (fluctuations/excitations). Emergence theory.
>What is ''base existence''? To be a physical quantum? lol.
If the nature of base existence is the provenance of physical 'laws', then I think it's reasonable to suppose that it is physical itself, yes.
>lmao this is lamentable.
Could you be more specific? Or even better, posit your alternative?
>You are already in a problem of infinite regression considering blindly only physicality. Can you not perceive it?
If am, then why only assert it? Why not demonstrate it logically? I would add that I don't see how we can actively consider non-physicality if nothing specific can be said about its nature.

Answer me >>14146469

>>14146652
I know it doesn't trouble the mystic, but it is troubling for the purposes of logical discourse — which you are attempting here. I can also say that things 'just are' the way I claim them to be, do you find that acceptable? Also, certain truths can be accepted on the basis of tautology (e.g. existence exists), but it doesn't necessarily follow that this is the case for all claims.

>>14146747
It does, because your claim that these forms are accounted for by quanta, doesn't account for what is qualitative in them, which is the real heart of the problem. How do you plan to explain what is self-referential by motioning externally? The problem isn't how qualities can be reduced to physics, but how they co-emerge, because qualities self-evidently exist (or else you have to ask yourself, what is it you are even reducing?)

>>14146788
I don't assume that 'qualitative' is a thing, you do. You are building this assumption into the examination of whether such universals exist by asking us to account for the qualitative. In other words, you are begging the question.

The problem is whether 'qualities' exist in the first place. I maintain that qualities do not self-evidently exist, rather they are an abstract artifice of convenience. What we are reducing is our abstract notions of quanta (which are useful in dealing with the world, but not necessarily accurate).

>>14147045
you just claimed previously that ''it is the nature of this base that determines limitations/potential for quanta'' and you are still talking about qualities and abstractions being merely artifice of convenience.

>>14146593
>I'm repeating myself because you keep reverting back to the same questions after I answer them in detail.
What a joke. Competlely drained all my will to partake in a discussion with you. You are the one who doesn't answer any questions and whenever is pressured to explain limitations and continuity (and all other abstractions you claim to constitute physicalism) you just resort to the same things ''nature of the base of existence'', ''physical nature of things''.

>I don't see how we can actively consider non-physicality if nothing specific can be said about its nature.
Because it is what specify physical things themselves as what they are.

Summing up, explain all the abstractions on which you support your physicalism:

>variations
>fluctuations
>continuity
>interaction
>organization and movement
>behavior and ''laws of physics''
>nature of this base of determination of existence
>existence

>>14147045
A qualitative is not a thing per se but is something only when constituting something qualitatively according to that particular quality and on the other hand that thing can only be that particular thing because of that quality. They coexist and in this realm depend on each other.

I take it that Plato fags have no answer for >>14146469

I guess Aristotle was right.

>>14147454
read plotinus, he explains better than i could at the moment

>>14147330
No, abstractions are things (thoughts are things). 'Quality' is an abstraction (a concept), but if the particular concept of 'quality' does not describe something concrete (which is my claim) then it is only real in the sense of being a particular thought. It is only imagination.

>>14147417
I've made every effort to respond to your questions and objections, even though you don't afford me the same consideration (instead cherry-picking what you respond to and relying upon a bad-faith assertive mode of argumentation as opposed to logical demonstration).

>Because it is what specify physical things themselves as what they are.
Another assertion. If I press you on this, you just pretend that self-referentialism is acceptable demonstration in this case (which it is not, because other possible interpretations exist).

I acknowledge that those descriptors are abstract to some extent, but the crucial difference is that they are not -only- abstract. They describe and predict relations which we can test (or at least potentially test), to ascertain accuracy/probability of said descriptions (and refine accordingly). 'Qualia' appears to be nothing but abstraction, a negative claim which can't be addressed directly (a status which should — I think — pique one's skepticism).

>>14147445
I'd say anything that exists is a thing. Qualia is either extant or not. Why invent a co-dependent for quanta if their presentations can be explained by physics? Doesn't your explanation strike you as unecessarily convoluted?

>>14147454
Yes, their evasion is telling.

>>14147659
Why invent a co-dependent for quanta if their presentations can be explained by physics?
Because “physical” is what qualifies them (their being instances of physical).

>>14147713
But 'physical' isn't a qualia, it's just a descriptor for anything that behaves in accordance with the laws of physics. It is the nature of quanta which informs our categorizations, not our categorizations determining nature.

>>14132370
Fuck no, it's just a massive cope, we don't know anything about reality because we are trapped inside our brains, the stuff we are able to learn through the scientific method is the closest thing we would ever get to the so called reality.

>>14132370
yes, i've seen them

this thread is a demonstration of how "science doesn't think"

>>14148057
Yeah it isnt, but it is what condition them to be what they are

>>14146469
Plato was a faggot but isn't what you're describing already a problem once you assume that essences or substances exist? If we assume something exists absolutely in-itself, it would seem it's impossible to know anything about it, since all knowledge is based on universals. You can say a nigger is black, but something being black and it being a nigger is not the same thing. True niggerness, if it exists in-itself, has to be something it doesn't share with anything else, thus it can't be described by any universal terms and can't be "known" beyond that it's something that just is, in-itself. Forms are trying to solve this problem. Real objects imitate and partake in these Forms and that's how we can know anything at all, since the material world itself is forever impermanent, in a constant flux. It's a magical ad-hoc solution but to me it's the most simple and elegant one, if you want to believe substances exist.

Yes. Mathematical Metagenetics of space and matter

>>14144184
Top quality post
>>14145063
>self-organization
Literally doesn't exist.
Look up what entropy is. Any system requires energy to be put into it or the measure of disorganization increases. You claim that self-organization is a thing, but you don't account for the energy required for the organization. You must prove that we can have organization, without external energy being invested.
Basically your line of thought will return to the infinite regress argument, because you can't have a system that is self-contained and doesn't inevitably collapse into chaos.

>>14147417
>What a joke.
>pilpul fails
>"waaaah why didn't you take my bait!?!"
lol

>>14149409
Based niggerposter

>>14149409
Except it isn't a solution at all, a it's self-referential hand waving away of the problem. It's only 'elegant' if you uncritically accept it as an assertion; if you look for logical justification, then you find that many assumptions and vague leaps of relation and duality are entailed. Trope theory provides a specific solution, one which preserves continuity and requires no 'magical' concession: Blacks are sufficiently genetically alike (but not identical) so as to produce similarities in behaviour, which we incorporate into a trope of 'niggerness'.

>>14149456
Perhaps you should look it up, as you're only presenting half of the story. Local reductions in entropy are fine, so long as they are offset by entropic increase in the overall environemnt (universe) such that total entropy increases. This appears to be the case, and most self-organization proponents do indeed suppose that thermodynamic equilibrium (or chaos, as you so melodramatically refer to it) is the fate of our universe.

>>14149528
>similarities in behaviour, which we incorporate into a trope of 'niggerness'.

That's just a word we use. Yeah we see commonalities and come up with words to bunch different yet similar things together all the time. But the word isn't what the thing actually is, words and their definitions change all the time. The point was, if there is beyond the word "nigger" a thing-in-itself, a separate, absolute niggerness, you won't be able to think or communicate anything about it in any universal, intelligible way because it doesn't share its true essence with anything else. It sounds like you just don't beleve in substances, that's where your beef is.

>>14149727
Right, but isn't the whole question here whether or not a descriptor like 'niggerness' refers to a concrete thing-in-itself, as opposed to being an abstract generalization of particular things-in-themselves?

>>14149804
If there is a thing-in-itself that exists beyond individual different viewpoints, how could any human word ever describe it exactly? For most words they probably point at the general direction but every word has some cultural/contextual connotations, and personal interpretations vary. So I think every platonist ever would say the true essence of the thing is beyond any literal human language.

>>14149964
Then on what basis do we assume that 'essence' exists? It is one thing to aver that things-in-themselves must exist (as all appearances must be produced by something), but it is quite another to assume that an additional 'essence' — and not even a singular essence, by many discrete universal essences or 'forms' — exist. Doesn't that seem a bit redundant and dualistic?

>>14149587
>or chaos, as you so melodramatically refer to it
chaos is just shorter to write down, stop projecting you faggot
>>14149587
>Local reductions in entropy are fine
They are only fine as long as the degree of chaos isn't overwhelming. Past a certain point, there can't be any higher degree or lasting order, as such, a self-organizing universe is a contradiction in terms, not only in the distant future, but also in the distant past. Order was either imposed (from the outside!) once and is degrading ever since and every following imitation of order is just livng off of the energy of the original event, or if chaos can be defeated it is done through the intervention/assistance of a force outside the universe. Even self organizing should (if it existed, which it does not) work certain principles otherwise it couldn't even be called organization.

>>14150000 (check the blessed quartet of zeros, truth has been spoken)

>>14132521
>>14134777
>>14136433
>>14136978
samefag

>>14149996
>>14149996
>on what basis do we assume that 'essence' exists?
Because we encounter individuals that fit a pattern and we see that pattern as a form and we give that form a name. Niggers in this case share a certain quality that is characteristic to their being. This characteristic is a pattern that we can experience as observers in the sense that niggers share this characteristic. We can also say that indeed being a nigger is a specific subcategory of being black.

>>14150018
Only 1 of those is me lmao.
Salty faggot

>>14149996
>Then on what basis do we assume that 'essence' exists?

Tough question, I don't know if I believe in essences. My point was only that that guy I was responding to criticizing Forms didn't seem to understand the problem they're trying to solve. It seems to me like you also are just trying to superimpose them on a kind of nominalist/particularist worldview where, because all human names for things indeed are just pragmatic placeholder words that bunch soem things together, that's all human knowledge can ever hope to reach, so of course Forms sound like redundant useless nonsense. They presuppose absolute essences and some way we can partake in it. Yes, it is dualistic, what do you mean by that? Isn't all platonism?

>>14150110
desu it's only redundant useless nonsense for prolactin-pumped urban rats who will never come close to experiencing anything like plato's weltanschauung

>>14150000
They are not equivalent terms. That is why the practice of relating entropy to a naive conception of disorder is falling out of favour; as in relative terms, a uniform equilibirum is quite orderly. But you're posing pseud, so you wouldn't know that.

Did I say that organization is static? I don't think I did. If you subscribe to the science of entropy, then you must realize that it describes a history from a high-energy state to a low-energy (dispersed) state. How then is self-organization a contradiction in terms, when it is in fact a predictable result of transition between these states? I think it's quite likely that our universe and the energy which drives it emerged from a more fundamental state of existence, but we can simply regress self-organization to that state (i.e. it is the inherent variation in the causeless base-state which potentiates organization of quanta). Your last sentence is utter gibberish.

>>14150031
Do we encounter individuals though, in a strict sense? Or just localizations in a continuous entirety? Again, asserting that there are shared qualities is merely begging the question.

>>14150110
no, it is not ultimately dualist, it is only superficially. platonism and neoplatonism is a non-dualist tradition. there are different realms of manifestations.

>>14150233
>Do we encounter individuals though, in a strict sense? Or just localizations in a continuous entirety? Again, asserting that there are shared qualities is merely begging the question.
but there is shared quality of becoming, of being subject to a ''continuous entirety'' that is also a becoming

>>14132370
nah

>>14150110
I do understand the problem, but if we're honest about it, 'forms' are not even an attempted solution, they are just a mental tool — a pragmatic convenience. Form theory doesn't actually pose an explanation for how similarity arises, it says "Similarity just is and we'll call it qualia." Trope theory actually posits an explanation.

As for the human knowledge stuff, no I don't think complete knowledge is possible, but nor do I think that the impossibility of complete knowledge precludes the possibility of some knowledge (some degree of truth must be conveyed in appearances).

I mean that we should probably avoid dualism unless it is strongly indicated to be the case, as it requires more layers of assumption to work. We generally perfer parsimony, since increasing the number of assumptions increases the number of potential falsehoods.

>>14150245
If existence is all things, then is it really necessary to additionally imbue all things with a 'quality' of becoming? It seems redundant, and again you beg the question.

>>14150310
>Form theory doesn't actually pose an explanation for how similarity arises, it says "Similarity just is and we'll call it qualia."
lol no. similarity exists because they reflect the forms

>I mean that we should probably avoid dualism
theory of forms is not dualist, they coexist and one is dependant on the other (just as possibilities are what entails instances of those possibilities)

>>14150234
>different realms
>non-dualist

>>14150334
existence is not what is (''is'' as unchanging) existence is the primordial universal pattern of all qualities that follow in multiplicity; what exists changes, is pure potentiality, is actualized, comes to be, ceases to be, moves and is moved...

>>14150362
different realms, different manifestations, but sustained by one ''thing'' immanently and transcendently

>>14150354
>lol no. similarity exists because they reflect the forms
This is bare assertion. What is your logical demonstration? What is a 'form'?

>theory of forms is not dualist, they coexist and one is dependant on the other (just as possibilities are what entails instances of those possibilities)
What if possibilities are instances themselves? That is to say, if the fundamental state of reality is something like a fluctuating field, couldn't that fluctuation be possibility itself? Why is inventing an oblique co-dependent (that can never be referenced directly) a more appealing model?

>>14150369
>existence is not what is
Big if true.

I'm pretty sure existence itself contains everything, and that flux is simply the nature of existence.

What indicates to you that the primordium is patterned? How can the primordium be universal if it is an entirety? Is there some other primordium to compare it with?

>of all qualities
Begging the question.

how to reconcile the theory of ideas with evolution? Shouldn't forms remain fixed, independent of time? But we know that everything that exists "came to be" and is impermanent

>>14150608
essences are emergent, but within a "pre-defined" phase-space

>>14150428
You don’t understand that everything around you (including your physical constitution) only temporarily is, and not truly is?
And flux itself is conditioned to be what flux is. And it is condition and differentiation that impart manifold qualities on to things, including quanta.

>>14143281

From two sources.

'Ancient Philosophy of the Self'

I don't remember the second one.

>>14151039
Only the organization is temporary, as far as we know. Matter/energy is not destroyed, it transforms. When you die, the quanta that constitute you don't actually cease to exist, it just takes on a different arrangement. Even though we can say the specific arrangement that was you has ceased to persist, has it really ceased to exist? After all, if we look at the entirety of the system, you still exist backwards in time. Your notion of flux seems somewhat naive and archaic.

If the nature of something is always conditioned by something else, don't we run into infinite regression? What conditions the conditioner? Why must a 'condition' be necessary as opposed to an inherent 'nature', and what exactly is a 'condition' (what distinguishes it from nature)?

>impart manifold qualities
>conditioned
Still begging the question.

>>14132434
>Have you ever calculated an infinite sequence of digits
*Le stoic face*
Yes

>>14150233
>Do we encounter individuals though, in a strict sense?
YES!!!!

>>14150233
>They are not equivalent terms.
Chaos is lack of order, entropy is the process, when the degree of disorganization is growing.
They are very much related terms you fucking retarded pseud.
An equlibrium implies a balance, but in entropy there is no balance, it's a process. If you want balance you need a countering process, aka, energy entering the system to impose order.

>>14151291
do quanta have shape or are they shapeless? If they have shape they are conditioned, by whom? by themselves? If they are shapeless how do shapeless + shapeless + shapeless +... constitute form, shaped things?

what condition them to form, transform, disform, organize, disorganize? Their nature? Then their own inherent constitution. Doesn't this mean that they are conditioned by this constitution (or that their nature express their condition)?

>Your notion of flux seems somewhat naive and archaic.
I didn't even extend myself about flux. I just said that it is conditioned (because of its nature), like everything else.
and no, the conditioner is conditioned to condition by his own will

>>14144184
>What notion?
The idea that a thing is itself.

>But the thing itself is an individual thing.
No, for no singular thing is capable of existing and having meaning by itself. For something to be individual, it must have meaning in the absence of other things. This is why I keep repeating "a thing is everything that it is not", the idea that individuality exists isn't true in the naive sense. It sort of does, and it mostly doesn't.

>But what do you conceive a point as?
Nothing. It's a made up idea that's formed from measurement.

>They are much closer to metaphysical abstractions
The idea of elementary particles as forms is an idea that I would agree with, insofar as something so atomic and uniform cannot be otherwise described. The idea of macroscopic forms however, is not.

>than to subatomic particles
What's funny is that all elementary particles are smaller than a Planck length. They have no meaningful volume, they are essentially singular points. Yet despite that, many don't exist within a concrete point, but as probability density functions.

>I wouldn't even say that neurons, cells, are real.
They aren't, which is why I tacked on "reductively speaking". This conversation could not be carried on if it was reduced to referring to the interactions of gluons and the transferance of quarks and electrons, related to the macroscopic concept of cells insofar as these cells were neural connections that formed the "meaning" I wish to convey. This is why we use forms to perceive and communicate, it's much more efficient so long as socialization and experience has conferred enough meaning in the mind.

>I don't hold anything.
I didn't mean to imply you did, only covering the bases. High information entropy as covered above is still unavoidably lossy.

>And isn't the pattern that a pattern exists only in the mind of an observer a (different) pattern?
Yes in the sense that these form axiomatic bases for cognition. If you gave a caveman a computer, it would think it was an ornament. If you gave it an electric kettle, it would think it was a bowl. Yet a computer and electric kettle are very closely related, and if the form hypothesis was true, this would be evident in the existence of these individual things.

>But they still see them as colors.
The mind perceives it as such. Is gamma radiation a color? By all means it's a specific wavelength of light, and yet you have no mental basis to give it a color. Logic tells us it should be violent, and yet if you are to be in the presence of a source of gamma radiation, it gives no such color. (1/2)

>>14144184
>And dark blue and light blue can easily and fundamentally be seen as different colors
Only insofar as one is encultured to see them that way. The way we think and perceive the world is highly influenced by the language we learn as children. This is why I mentioned it, even after imparting this knowledge to you, thought you may try your best, you would not be able to differentiate between the two faster than a Russian (generally speaking)

However are they different colors, or shades and hues of the same color? These are not dictated by the same phenomenology, and are in fact radically different.

>You can easily understand this looking on your screen right now.
I have exceptionally strong differentiation and detection between shades, hues and tints of the entire visible spectrum. Through testing, I found I could reliably distinguish around 90% of 32-bit depth colors (No, I did not mean to type 24-bit), which is just under 4 billion unique intensities and wavelengths of light. If 2 sufficiently different video codecs are used to compress a video, I can differentiate them based on the compression. I am in the very top of the 1 percentile of color acuity. Observationally, my spectrum of experience would contain more forms, yet functionally everything is the same.

Despite this, I cannot identify light blue faster than a Russian.

>Aren't sine waves perceptual propagations of sound waves?
No. Sine waves are the graphical representation of the set produced by measuring the ration of the hypotenuse of a right triangle to the side opposite of the right triangle's angle plugged into the sine "operator".

It's called a wave because it looks like a wave when graphed.

>A sine would be the most exterior and extended manifestation of that element
No. The triangle's proportions would, and even that is dubious, because a set of ALL proportions must be measured to graph the sine wave. The series however, is axiomatically complete in and of itself, and in the basest arithmetics in sigma notation, communicates a relation between circles and triangles, and the geometric significance of euler's theories that is otherwise unjustifiable.

>>14151977
>The idea that a thing is itself.
>it must have meaning in the absence of other things.
>a thing is everything that it is not
Wait, I think we agree more than we thought. I didn't mean by individuality to describe a sort of The One, but particular differentiation (in a certain degree because yes everything is ultimately The One). Plato described an Idea very similarly: adding to being it is also ''Identity'' (Sameness) resulting that it is that which is not what itself is not, and ''Other'' (Alterity) representing everything that it is not itself.

>The idea of elementary particles as forms is an idea that I would agree with, insofar as something so atomic and uniform cannot be otherwise described. The idea of macroscopic forms however, is not.
They imply Forms (or Ideas) naturally. And I wouldn't say the Forms stand either macorcopically or microscopically. I deem it to be a question of category of auxiliary imagery. But that inevitably leads to a bound between intellection and intelligibles.

>This is why we use forms to perceive and communicate, it's much more efficient so long as socialization and experience has conferred enough meaning in the mind.
What I still don't understand is how are gluons differentiated and, moreover, how cohesive interaction between differentiation of these particles holds together, is supportable. There is already plural conditioning differentiations.

> graphical representation of the set produced by measuring the ration of the hypotenuse of a right triangle to the side opposite of the right triangle's angle plugged into the sine "operator".
So they are quantified representation of sound waves?

Forms are a cognitive tool for mental categorization

>>14152845
>but particular differentiation
I'm more than familiar with platonism, as a hobbyist programmer it's an ideology that's permeated the design of many, many languages I'm familiar with. The problem is that while the differentiation between entities of the same 'form' exists on a micro-level, the actual entity itself does not. This lends itself to circumstances where working from forms themselves isn't exactly useful to utilizing those things. You either end up in a very large regress where forms are relegated to the role of elementary axioms (which is NOT Platonism, and reduces macro forms to more or less an epistemological tool rather than an ontological blueprint, which is what I have been advocating for), or you end up not being able to do anything as there's no intuitive grasp of function.

>What I still don't understand is how are gluons differentiated
Quantum chromodynamics are extremely interesting, but also extremely complex. Gluons and quarks have extremely, extremely strange ontological properties, and decay immediately outside of extremely specific circumstances. I'm not even going to attempt to try and water it down, because my grasp is paltry in the first place.

>how cohesive interaction between differentiation of these particles holds together
The better question to ask is "how is there force", because gluons and all vector bosons are simply the bases representation of force that exist. For gluons, it's the strong-force, a property that arises out of chromodynamics. How they hold together is what we call the color charge, think of it like electromagnetism, or gravity. A lot is still being investigated.

>There is already plural conditioning differentiations
4 forces, 3 spatial dimensions, 1 temporal dimension. The results of these factors are what lay before you. Are there more? Possibly. Man could live to the end of the observable universe, be born again at the beginning of a new one with all knowledge gained previously, and by the time that one died too, there would still be unknowns to contend with.

>So they are quantified representation of sound waves?
No. Sine waves are very specific, their phenomenology is arithmetical in origin, and aren't actually waves. It's just a solution set.

>>14151590
Order is a relative term. The uniformity of thermodynamic equilibrium will be an order unto itself, and a much less chaotic one than presently is the case. You can look up what I said about describing entropy in terms of disorder/order falling out of favour, you don't have to take my word for it. If I'm retarded, you should be mortified that I have to keep correcting you.

Equilibirum implies a -degree- of balance, not absolute balance, at least when we're talking about thermodynamic equilibrium of our universe. As energy in the universe disperses, temperature will eventually become so uniform that no macroscopic state-changes can occur anymore (work). At this point, the universe is said to have reached thermodynamic equilibrium (maximum entropy), even if the temperature continues to decrease (or even increase, theoretically) in a uniform, microscopic fashion.

You simply aren't as well informed on these topics as you think you are. Bringing up entropy only helps my argument, as self-organization is an observed component of entropy and chaos theory (Conway's game of life for instance, or any number of emergent processes such as wave interference, crystallization, etc.).

>>14151807
My explanation — once more with feeling — is that the manifestation/organization of quanta derives from a base state of existence, which is itself causeless (this way we avoid infinite regression). If variance is inherent to this base state, then it seems reasonable to suppose that fluctuations could constructively interfere with eachother to produce more complex quanta, and so on as we scale up to the macroscopic. Furthemore, the limitations inherent to this base state (not an external conditioning, just its inherent nature) would determine how quanta organize (e.g. speed of light).

If what determines organization is inherent, I don't see why we'd add the additional layer of 'conditioned by constitution'. My view is that the constitution and condition are one in the same. pointing to 'condition' is like pointing to 'qualia' — an appeal to some kind of vague externality or duality, when organization can more parsimoniously be explained by the inherent nature of a continuity.

>>14132370
define real

>>14137851
nah he got a point, non euclidean geometry makes stuff like two parallel lines not touching false cause earth's electrostatic field is in a certain way to make space curvature a certain way to make all that jazz obsolete yo