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>>17833841
this shit wasn't written for laymen but for mystics

It just puts common sense psychological notions into mystical language, and mouthbreathers go "Duuuude, so deep" for Millenia.
He taught Plato everything he knew.

>>17833841

mahayana buddhism and plotinus are the next step for you

>>17833841
Because it allows us to view multiple true contradicting points as valid. This allows us to move beyond Aristotelian either/or set in stone dogmatic belief for a kind of quantum logic

>But how is this meaningful for our human experience?

It is a aystematic treatise which summarizes Plato's entire ontology (and, depending on your interpretation, his theology too). It's not a dialogue meant to be useful for your everyday experience: for that, Plato wrote literally dozens of other dialogues. You're supposed (unless you're genuinely interested in metaphysics and ontology) to read those other dialogues, and then read fhe last systematic ones (Parmenides, Sophist, Philebus, Timaeus) to put some order to the whole corpus, and understand therefore how all the individual dialogues were linked one to the other.
>>17834249
There is nothing mystical in Parmenides.
>>17834570
Where's the mystic language?

>>17834570
Plato disagreed with Parmenides.

>>17835860
How?

>>17836818
You haven't read both, this is clear enough.
And then there's the Sophist.

>>17835855
>nothing mystic
The apophatic, supra-rational character of the paradoxical ontology posited in Parmenides (and in other dialogues as well) is feature of mystic contemplation. Besides, Parmenides developed his philosophy out of mystic states, this is well known. Metaphysics cannot be severed from mystical contemplation, otherwise it falls apart for they are not distinguished.

>>17834570
Parmenides taught Plato everything he knew? Have you read any thing from them?

>>17835828
>next step

>>17833841
The problems of the Parmenides are summarized at 134e-135c, namely, that human experience is understood in light of speech, and yet speech has an ambiguous character that makes precision, if not impossible, very difficult to maintain.

Plato takes this to be a problem Parmenides understands on account of the fact that Parmenides' poem, instead of being only one part on the Way of Truth, contains another part that that first part says is impossible to say, the Way of Falsehood, that is, Plato takes Parmenides to be aware of the perplexity of asserting either "Be" or "One" and trying to assert "Not-being" or "Not Many" at the same time.

>>17837163
>The apophatic, supra-rational character of the paradoxical ontology posited in Parmenides (and in other dialogues as well) is feature of mystic contemplation. Besides, Parmenides developed his philosophy out of mystic states, this is well known. Metaphysics cannot be severed from mystical contemplation, otherwise it falls apart for they are not distinguished.

Could you actually say something of substance, please? First of all, no, the dialectics contained in Parmenides is not supra-rational, neither is its ontology paradoxical. Also, it is not well known at all that Parmenides developed his thought out of mystical contemplation (his entire philosophy can be presented in a strictly rational argumentative form), nor it would be relevant for the scope of this dialogue.
>Metaphysics cannot be severed from mystical contemplation, otherwise it falls apart for they are not distinguished.
This dialogue proved you wrong.

>>17837291
>Could you actually say something of substance, please?
Indeed I did not go fully into my assertions because I thought you were familiar with Parmenides and Plato.

>dialectics is not supra-rational
They are means to supra-rational contemplation, that is why they fall in the realm of DIA-noia.

>the ontology is not paradoxical
the One is not Being and One, being Two? The One is not above any discursive line of thought?

>Also, it is not well known at all that Parmenides developed his thought out of mystical contemplation
For those who study deeply greek thought, yes it is. See pic related, for example, it is just one among many examples of mystical intuition being rendered in rational, accessible expression (this is one of the main points of Platonism).

>This dialogue proved you wrong
You haven't read it, it seems. Also how do you explain the Good being, as Plato himself writes, OUK OUSIA?

>>17837438
>They are means to supra-rational contemplation, that is why they fall in the realm of DIA-noia
There is no such thing as the supra-rational in Plato and Parmenides. Moreover, when I asked you to substantiate, I specifically wanted some examples (or evidence) of what you're saying.
>the One is not Being and One, being Two? The One is not above any discursive line of thought?
The various hypotheses consider the One and the Many from different standpoints (I.e. the standpoint of the One in and for itself, the standpoint of the determinate One-Idea, the standpoint of the sensible One, etc). Once this is realized no contradiction can be found in the dialogue. This becomes even clearer for those who have read other late dialogues, especially Sophist, Philebus and Timaeus.
>For those who study deeply greek thought, yes it is. See pic related, for example, it is just one among many examples of mystical intuition being rendered in rational, accessible expression (this is one of the main points of Platonism).
I would simply object by saying that a rational, mystical intuition is a contradictio in adiecto (it's basically a fancy way of calling a rational argument).
>You haven't read it, it seems. Also how do you explain the Good being, as Plato himself writes, OUK OUSIA?
As the systematic principle of the ideal world, the Good is not described by any individual idea (nor by a mere aggregate of them), rather it is expressed by the holistic community substantiated by that world, of which the Good is the condition of possibility. It is not supra-rational, in fact it is reason itself.

>>17837661
First of all, I'm not here saying that the paradoxal claims are ''contradictories'' in that they make no sense. They make sense in an intuitive, non-rational, non-discursive way. This is how Proclus in the Elements of Theology will claim that all things are one and not-one, does this make any sense discursively? I'm not even mentioning Plotinus, the best interpreter of Plato, as Platonists affirmed.
But let's get back to Plato. Sice you don't know what OUK OUSIA means, I will quote some passages from the Republic.
In the divided line, the sections are ranked as: first intellection (NOESIN), second thought (DIANOIAN), third belief and fourth imagination. So even supposing that thought was not rational, as you might think, and will throw it at noesis, I ask you what is this dianoia? What is the difference between noesis and dianoia, intellection and thought? Even supposing intellection as reason this will be superseded by the Good, since Plato will say that ''this, then, say I called the offspring the offspring of the good, which the good begot as an analogue to itself; what that [the good] is in the intelligibile place, with regard to intellect and the things that are thought, this [the sun] is in the visible, with regard to sight and the things that are seen''.
This will fit perfectly with what Plato says in the Theaetetus in an analogy to the sight being not sufficient in itself, like ears don't need anything besides themselves to hear, tact nothing else than touch, but sight need not only eyes, but light. As in the Republic and in the Philebus (if I am not wrong) say: ''the good provides truth and being''. How can reason then be or apprehend something out of itself? Can you understand it now?

>(it's basically a fancy way of calling a rational argument)
You don't seem to understand the differences between discursive thought and intellectual, intuitive thought. How can the Good be expressed discursively? You see Plato himself can only address it analogically, and this is the exact way hindu, christian, kabbalistic mystics expose their metaphysics and mystical experiences.

Being more drawn to Plato's agrapha dogmata (not coincidentally Plato preferred not to write his theoria - contemplation) the later Platonists will, unanimously, follow what is known as platonic ladder, the phlosophical excellences, from the natural, civic excellences that are below philsophy, to the contemplative culminating hieratic excellence, or what some would say inspired excellence, being above philosophy. I agree that this is beyond philosophy, but that it would be the position of Parmeniedes and Plato, it can be discussed, however this is not the issue here.

>>17837932
>>17837661
>I agree that this is beyond philosophy, but that it would be the position of Parmeniedes and Plato, it can be discussed, however this is not the issue here.
To add to this point. If there is a rejection of its being above philosophy, then it will be the culmination, the aim of philosophy itself. However, this will only give Philosophy its original sense, given by none other than Pythagoras.

>>17837661
>>17837438
>>17837291
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>>17837163
>OH NO NO NO NO

This is why I prefer reading eastern philosophy, everyone generally agrees what is being talked about and it doesn’t descend into back and forth arguing about definitions

>>17837932
First of all, if we are talking about Plato I'd rather leave later commentators (Proclus and Plotinus) out of the picture, and to not assume that they get everything right. If they did, it would be more helpful to us to reach independently these conclusions once again. I'm not familiar with their interpretations anyway, so any reference to them would be lost on me.
Secondly, I must admit that I do not know Greek, and that as such I should have been a bit less arrogant: sorry for that. That said, I assume that 1000 years of Italian scholarship managed to produce sufficient translations of platonic dialogues, and if that's the case, my readings might be sufficient to get the gist of points of Platonic philosophy as central as these. I'm not sure why you think my response should make you think that I don't know what OUK OUSIA means (ok, I technically I didn't know what it meant, but I still checked the related passages in translation): my answer explicitly explained why it is not supra-rational to say that the Good is not characterized by an essence, and why it is beyond it. I thought it was pertinent.
>So even supposing that thought was not rational, as you might think
That's exactly what I denied. How could you get that from me denying that any part of Parmenides is supra-rational, while also denying any possible irrational source? My point was that even the Good can be accounted for in a completely rational manner, and the same can be said about the ontology delineated in Parmenides. No mysticism is required to reach the conclusions found in those text: this is my position.
As such, I genuinely don't understand the point of the questions that follow.
>How can the Good be expressed discursively?
I didn't say "discursively", I said "rationally" (and I meant it specifically in opposition to mysticism).
The Good can be accounted for rationally through the use of the dialectical method, insofar as every Idea entails the rest of the Ideal world, and this entailment entails an unitary principle of self-sufficient coherence (or harmony), which is what we refer to when we talk about the Good. For example, the Idea of Being is not self-sufficient, insofar as its essence requires a number of other Ideas (e.g. identity, difference, wholeness, oneness, etc.), and the same will apply to every other idea. Ultimately, every Idea is necessarily related to every other possible Idea (for example, every Idea will be related to every other Idea through the Idea of Difference), so that the annihilation of a single Idea would entail the annihilation of the entire World of Ideas. This order, as I have described it, can be contemplated in a purely rational manner. We might still talk up to a certain extent about intuitions (I have never denied that), but it would be an intellectual (or rational) intuition, not a mystical one, and said intuition would be derived from entirely rational means (namely, by engaging in philosophical dialectics)

>>17835828
The Neoplatonists horrendously misunderstood this dialogue though.

>>17835855
>the Parmenides is just like any other ontology bro, nothing mystical about it at all!
I'm sorry anon, but you either don't know what the word 'mystical' means, or you didn't understand it.

>>17833841
>Everything is nothing and nothing is everything, they are all the same yet also completely different, it's both the longest from the center but also is the center it's both graspable but equally ungraspable

Plato's Parmenides. Which for all its abstractness, ultimately shows the most human and perfectly in-touch character with the regular and everyday.

It is an extremely brilliant, beautiful and complex dialogue, a work of philosophy and literature as Plato always is, and not some meaning devoid logic test, as it is often portrayed. The story of Antiphon is fit for a painting!

>The third passage of the Parmenides is the most profound point to which Occidental metaphysics has ever advanced. It is the most radical advance into the problem of Being and time—an advance which afterwards was not caught up with [aufgefangen] but instead intercepted [abgefangen] (by Aristotle)
- Heidegger
>If the second half of his [Plato’s] Parmenides would be performed anew with today’s methods (and not Neoplatonically), then all bad metaphysics would be overcome, and the space would be open for a pure hearing of the language of Being.
- Karl Jaspers in a letter to Heidegger:

>Let this therefore be said, and let us also say the following, as it seems appropriate. Whether or not there is a unity, the unity itself and the manifold otherness, both in relation to themselves as well as to each other—all this, in every way, both is and is not, appears [phainetai] and does not appear. —This is most true [alēthestata].
- Final passage of the Parmenides

>Maximal truth has been attained when appearance and Non-being have been included within truth and Being. The dialogue literally leads to Nothing [Nichts]. . . . Thereby the question of Being has been transformed, everything is now otherwise. The on is both hen and polla, and it is hen, insofar as it is polla and vice versa. The One and the Many are only insofar as they are in themselves negative [nichtig].
- Heidegger's conclusion of his seminar on the Parmenides

>>17838451
I have explained my interpretation, you're free to substantiate your objection, and to make explicit what you mean by "mystical".

>>17838558
Did Jaspers and Heidegger ever expressed more thoroughly this opinion of theirs?

so was Plotinus a pseud

>>17838558
Starting to really wish the nazis put Heidegger in a camp where he belongs, with his jewish whore

>>17833841
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>>17836903
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>>17837661
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>>17837955
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>>17838269
>>17838445
>>17838451
>>17838519
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>>17836903
Reality is One..... So pigs squeeling in shit is One with God. Stupid monists

>>17838269
I am not saying other platonists got everything right, I even showed you how they even probably diverged from Plato about Philsoophy itself! I just wanted to show that such people, which are no small ones, are on my side here.

>No mysticism is required to reach the conclusions found in those text: this is my position.
Reading a text is not a mystic practice, buddy. Nor did I claim such a thing. They are, in Parmenides, in Proclus, in Plotinus, expressed rationally, discursively, because this is what language implies, first of all. Like Plato and the platonists, reason, discursivity, is a means for contemplation. This is my point. Mysticism is not the reading of texts, it is not the discussion of ideas, but their contemplation, that is, their end.

>the Good can be accounted for in a completely rational manner.
Go on! Do what Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Iamblichus did not.

>I didn't say "discursively", I said "rationally"
discursive
2. (philosophy) Using reason and argument rather than intuition.

I have no doubts anymore that you don't know what the terms mysticism, rationality, intellection, discursivity and others mean.

>Idea entails the rest of the Ideal world, and this entailment entails an unitary principle of self-sufficient coherence (or harmony)... the idea of Being is not self-sufficient, insofar as its essence requires a number of other Ideas and the same will apply to every other Idea.
Yes, perfect, except none of this dialectical movement applies to the Good. The harmony or wholeness that is given to the Ideas (remembering the Good is above Ideas) is one of the expressions of the Good itself - recall here the analogy of the Sun's light on the things in the world. The light of the sun is not the sun itself, or you could say that it is and it is not the sun - and here there is a very interesting parallel with that part in the Republic where Plato talks about the things in the world and appearances, A reflection, an image reflected, is both the thing reflected and not the thing reflected, the instances are both the forms and not the forms and the forms are both the instances and not the instances.

>This order, as I have described it, can be contemplated in a purely rational manner.
Again, this has nothing to do with reason. Reason is the means to this contemplation, but this contemplation eludes reason and because of that cannot be expressed.

>intellectual intuition
I just showed you how FUCKING PLATO HIMSELF separates both intellection from reason, thought. For fuck's sake. Intellectual intuition is not reason itself, that is why it is also intuitive.
>not a mystical one
Not for you who have no conception of what mysticism is (from MUOS, meaning to shut, that is, contemplate).

>said intuition would be derived from entirely rational means
If you give primacy to reason because of its point of departure you not only gets thing inversed but defiles the very nature of its use, the foundations that is spirit/intellect.

(1/2)

>>17839374
>So pigs squeeling in shit is One with God.

>>17838269
>>17839389
Reason is an elective power. It is the point of departure in the MIDDLE (again, DIA-noia, learn the basic of the language in which the thing you study is written, holy shit) between the instances and the intelligible world. Directing to the former it is empirical, to the latter, intellective. This accounts for the middle positioning between PROODOS (the procession) and the EPISTROPHE (the return) - yes, return, as Plato writes in almost all dialogues how the soul must return to its source, its highest place that is its home. Your rationalistic take of Plato is an inversion of the very structure of man (putting reason above spirit/intellect, when it is the middle point), it is an utter degeneration, that not even some of late Platonists (like Olympiodorus, Proclus, Damascius) did.


(2/2)

>>17839389
>Reading a text is not a mystic practice, buddy. Nor did I claim such a thing. They are, in Parmenides, in Proclus, in Plotinus, expressed rationally, discursively, because this is what language implies, first of all. Like Plato and the platonists, reason, discursivity, is a means for contemplation. This is my point. Mysticism is not the reading of texts, it is not the discussion of ideas, but their contemplation, that is, their end.
That comment of course applied to Plato and Parmenides too: they too did not require mystical influences in order to reach those positions.
If by mysticism you just mean things like "contemplation of Ideas" then we are not in disagreement. I assumed that, given your references to Proclus, you were talking about more determinate forms of mysticism (e.g. religious ones, mysteries, rites, etc).
>discursive. 2. (philosophy) Using reason and argument rather than intuition.
Okay, but again, I never used the term "discursive", nor I see why would you assume that the inverse of that proposition is true (namely, that all that is rational is also discursive). I think it was evident from my post that I was treating reason as if it was compatible with intuitions.
The comment that comes immediatly after is uncalled for. I have tried to be fair so far, and I refrained from treating you like an idiot. I ask you to do the same.
>Yes, perfect, except none of this dialectical movement applies to the Good.
Which is why I have been careful to separate all the individual passages, so that I could point out that the Good is not a mere aggregate of Ideas, but rather it is the necessary, trascendent, holistic principle of the whole ideal system. In fact, had I not been explicit about it I would have ended up assigning an essence to the Good. As such, I think we are in agreement on this point too, and that the dispute was purely terminological (and in that case I am willing to concede that probably I was the one misusing terms - although I would still claim that the meaning of what I wrote was perfectly clear given the context)
>I just showed you how FUCKING PLATO HIMSELF separates both intellection from reason, thought. For fuck's sake. Intellectual intuition is not reason itself, that is why it is also intuitive.
Give me a break, I used the term in the sense that has been meant since Kant formulated it. This is also why I put under brackets "or rational", I hoped that would clear it up even more. I get it, maybe my terminology is a bit over the place, but there is no reason to be so aggressive about it
>Not for you who have no conception of what mysticism is (from MUOS, meaning to shut, that is, contemplate)
As I said earlier, we are probably using very different definitions. What do you think mysticism is, exactly?

I don't understand what you mean in the last part and in this post >>17839413. Specifically, I don't understand wether you still think that I'm claiming that the Good can be treated discursively (I'm not)

>>17839570
>they too did not require mystical influences in order to reach those positions.
>If by mysticism you just mean things like "contemplation of Ideas" then we are not in disagreement
How can one write about what one has not experienced? Do you think, for one, Plato started writing solely based on reason and then he reached his contemplative conclusions? This makes no sense. There are, however, countless sources on how non-rational experiences are the foundations of the main influences of Plato (Parmenides, Pythagoras, the Mysteries). I already commented about it but again try reading about the agrapha dogmata.

>you were talking about more determinate forms of mysticism (e.g. religious ones, mysteries, rites, etc).
Yes, they do not differ in any way. Try thinking (or reading for the first time, since you seem very ignorant of this part of Plato) about why Plato references the mysteries, priests, influences, all the time in his dialogues.

> I never used the term "discursive".
So what? This is how rationality will express itself. The very meaning of discursivity implies reason, stop playing dumb.

>I was treating reason as if it was compatible with intuitions.
Empirically stating that there is nothing but what we see and matter can be said to be rational as well, that is, denying intuition altogether. (Side remark: I think we could even say that intuition is the process of self-reversion, characterizing intellect itself, Plato says a lot about it in knowing our true selves, recollecting, turning to ourselves, the moving soul - when it is lost moves to outer things, when it is intellectual, moves onto itself, Proclus will write exactly this in a very rational manner, but see that he is describing a non-rational process rationally!).

>there is no reason to be so aggressive about it.
I'm sorry but it is that I really did not want to be having this discussion, I am busy, but you know, being familiar with Plato's writings, there is a kind of madness that impels me to talk about things of this nature and to help other to see the same, and this, in situations like this, disturb and make me mad. But we know we must not worry about it and let none disturb us or frighten us with the clam that we should prefer a friend who is in control of himself to one who is disturbed.

>>17839702
>Do you think, for one, Plato started writing solely based on reason and then he reached his contemplative conclusions?
I think this intuition is not identical to a discursive practice, rather, it is a necessary consequence of a certain discursive practice (I'm here specifically talking about engagement with the dialectical method). I think there's a number of purely rational arguments (for my interpretation to work I just need the doctrine of reminescence, and Sophist pretty much in its entirety) which lead necessarily to certain philosophical conclusions, and once the philosopher has an inkling of the rationale underlying them, he has a basis he can use to reminisce and contemplate the Good. In this sense, discursive rationality is just a necessary step towards the contemplation of the Good. I'm pretty sure I've botched this explanation, but this is pretty much my interpretation.
>Yes, they do not differ in any way. Try thinking (or reading for the first time, since you seem very ignorant of this part of Plato) about why Plato references the mysteries, priests, influences, all the time in his dialogues.
I know this might be a bit too bold of a claim, but I'm somewhat convinced that even if mysticism played a role in Plato's thought, that would have not been a necessary influence. By that I mean that Plato could have in principle reached the same conclusions without having to resort to any mystical influence. In fact, if this were not to be the case I would take his philosophy to be invalid.

Anyway I'll read the agrapha dogmata for sure. Is there any other literature you can suggest concerning the mystic influences and tendencies of Plato?

>>17839413
>it is an utter degeneration, that not even some of late Platonists (like Olympiodorus, Proclus, Damascius) did
You know that reading the text itself and interpreting based on what it actually says is always an option instead planting your tongue in the asses of Neoplatonists yeah?

>>17840484
>I think this intuition is not identical to a discursive practice, rather, it is a necessary consequence of a certain discursive practice.
I agree. But we have to remember that this is because the intuition is the natural, necessary way back to its own development. This is what is meant by a return to source, etc. and is what phenomenology will hint at with the most deep subjective ground. This constitutes the basic voyage of all mystics (Eckhart, Plotinus, for example, are loud here).

>doctrine of reminescence
What do you take it to be? This is a very ''dangerous'' metaphor Plato employs, like the one of ''world'' of forms, for they are poetic analogies. The reminescence and the immortality of the soul coincide.

>Sophist
Yes, indeed here dialectics is explored with a powerful rationality in its expression. I think however there are clear tokens of going beyond it: ''that which is is both the unchanging and that which changes''; ''but now that which is appears to fall outside both of them''; ''change is the same and not the same'' ''change is resting'', ''it is different and not different''; ''so even that which is, is not'', for example. But see also how ignorance hovers all the time over their conclusions, this is a literary device that should not be ignored, as Szlezak, Mitchell show how the literary role in the dialogues are very important. The dialogue in the end is affirming that which will appear in Timaeus about the constitution of soul (sameness, being and difference).
There are passages also that makes it clear that reason is the means to contemplation, saying that it is 'through reason' that they achieve the form of being, or in another translation, that they use reason 'to stay near the form being'.

It is reason but at the same time eludes reason itself. So yes, reason plays its part by helping one to ascend above it.

>even if
you don't need to suppose, it was a major influence in Plato as is recorded by his repeated direct and indirect references to it (eleusinian, egyptian, bacchic and orphic and poetic), his philosophical influences as I cited before, the histories about his initiation and the agrapha dogmata (I really don't know why you keep ignoring the most blatant evidence of his own initiatic doctrines given orally to selected ones - does it not make you see the obvious feature of a mystery here?).

>that would have not been a necessary influence.
Just like reason is a necessary step to return to it, it is the necessary end (and beginning) of reason.

>I would take his philosophy to be invalid.
Then you can start by burning his writings right now. What an asinine mentality of yours, most unphilosophical clearly shows how unfit you are for anything in life even.

>>17840943
I have the feeling you missed my point completely. What did you understand by that part of my post.

>>17835855
>There is nothing mystical in Parmenides.

>>17837661
>There is no such thing as the supra-rational in Plato and Parmenides.

Pic related, a sample.

>>17834015
Never do this.

>>17834570
>into mystical language
wrong. that's the only language he had available. just because you don't share his terms in common speak doesn't mean they are someone not as perfect as could be.

>>17833841
sounds like a bunch of fluff m8

>>17833841
This sounds like he's talking about Brahman and Atman.

>>17833841
This is not a quote directly from the dialogue, is it? I dont remember a passage like this one.

>>17841510
Tard

It's just monism. Everyone likes monism. That's about it.

Bump

>>17843423
qualified monism is based

>>17843423
>"being is both one and many"
>dude it's monism

>>17845943
Shut the fuck up, it's monism because I say it is, and I'm ashamed to be of the same substance as you.

>>17845963
no u

>>17840972
>yOu DoN't UnDeRsTaNd
>sEe, I wAs JuSt sAyInG tHaT i CaN't InTeRpReT pLaTo wItHoUt ToTaLlY dEfErRiNg To NeOpLaToNiStS wHo ReAd HiM iN a WaY tHaT nOt EvEn PeOpLe WhO kNeW hIm LiKe SpEuSiPpUs, ArIsToTlE, oR tHeOpHrAsTuS wOuLd ReCoGnIzE aS lEgItImAtE
>nOw Do YoU uNdErStAnD?

>>17841028
What a fucking stretch, the influences are Homer and Hesiod, read more critically with the fucking brain

>>17847311
Did you actually type all of this?

MAJOR yikes.

>>17847311
Yes, dozens of people who dedicated their lives to the sole activity of studying Plato's philosophy for their whole life, for many generations of philosophers, who, modern scholars affirm authoritative on many accounts and having access to the known agrapha dogmata literally got everything wrong!
You are so dumb that you didn't even notice I stated I had my own discordances with some of them.

>>17847318
What is a stretch there? Just read what is written, it was not the opinion of a single on scholar. Any decent study on Parmenides will show how he was influenced by mystical experience, his theophanic poem proves you wrong from the beginning.

>>17846999
no u, no i, just me

>>17839374
do you know how i can tell you're from /pol/?

>>17847328
>yikes
Back to twitter, faggot

>>17847377
Nigga if you're swallowing shit telling you Parmenides' poem has Babylonian religious influence because he described doors, you're fucking retarded

>don't make fun of muh neoplatorinos who make shit up
Oh noooo, sooooo sooooorry

>>17833841
They stole everything from the Persians and then just utterly shat all over it. Why, the "Greeks" of course.

!!!!!!!!!!

>>17833841
You fucking idiots

Parmenides was famous for presenting the first LOGICAL argument in recorded history. He wrote on Nature as a response to Heraclitus and other philosophers that talked in cryptic metaphors that could be interpreted any which way. That's what is meant by the Way of Truth,
Things are or they aren't
Being is and nonbeing is, is not a logically valid statement.
For if nonbeing is, then how could it be known
A is and A is not can be represented semantically in a sentence
But we also know that A is not and A, is not logically valid

>>17848801
pro tip: everyone that replies to this post after me is of the Way of Opinion

>>17847318
>>17847758
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_madness

Now slit your wrists for embarrassing yourself

>>17848801
>>1784775
>Parmenides’ proem is no epistemological allegory of enlightenment but a topographically specific description of a mystical journey to the halls of Night. In Hesiod, the “horrible dwelling of dark Night” (Th. 744) is where the goddesses Night and Day alternately reside as the other traverses the sky above the Earth. Both Parmenides’ and Hesiod’s conception of this place have their precedent in the Babylonian mythology of the sun god’s abode.

Read the fucking poem. Read a fucking book on greek culture. Read M L West’s East face of helicon. Read pic related.

Where is Parmenides’ logical presentation? We only have his poem, sure it can be logically analysed, as Plato will do in Sophist proving that nonbeing IS just as being is, but this is another issue. The fact is that the logical and rational analysis is supported by and derived from supra-rational experiences. Even mainstream academic sources confirm that as I posted above.

>>17845931
In truth, all monism is qualified, only non-dualism, which is not monism, is unqualified

>>17849914
Why, can you elaborate a bit more on that?

>>17839374

>So pigs squealing in shit' is One with God?

Yes.

>>17849901
Wrong

>>17851274
Since I’m not giving a subjective opinion, but throwing factual proofs at your face, tell me, why is objective reality wrong?

Hold on
who deleted this in the aarvoll discord?
I wrote this a few days ago but now it's gone

>>17851293
stfu

>>17851762
>>17833841
hmm maybe wrote it on /lit/
Thanks OP for saving this from last thread, I forgot.

>>17851100
>>17839393
based

>>17848801
>Being is and nonbeing is, is not a logically valid statement.
Logic is within Being.
But eitherway, Non-being doesn't have isness or being but yet it isn't Nothing.
>VISITOR: Do you understand, then, that it’s impossible to say, speak, or think that which is not itself correctly by itself? It’s unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable, and unformulable in speech.
And there are 'two' "categories" of non-being, at least from the perspective of Being; everyting we say about is solely through Being's relation or non-relation to them.

>>17851784
I copied it from someone, but can't remember if it was from /lit/ or /his/.

>>17848801
Didn't The Sophist btfo Parmenides?

>>17833841
It means to stop overanalyzing everything because it is all contigent. You’re never gonna come across a more indubitable truth than what is. Therefore, just live your life and know that even if you philosophize, its all just fun and games in the end. But it can never be an absolute truth.

>>17854083
lmao holy shit

>>17851986
How is that based?

>>17852617
>Non-being doesn't have isness or being but yet it isn't Nothing
>Non-being isn't Nothing

what is It, then? What is something that is not?
Argument is semantically impossible to make