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10350070 No.10350070 [Reply] [Original]

Is mind-body-dualism generally accepted at this point?

>> No.10350076
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10350076

Embodiment is

>> No.10350094

I would say it is largely discredited, actually.

>> No.10350098

>>10350094
Substance dualism, yeah for the most part

Property dualism is big now iirc

>> No.10350105

>>10350070
>Is that thing which ignores the hard problem of consciousness generally accepted at this point?

>> No.10350109

>>10350098
It's not where the Dennets and Kims are

>> No.10350115

>>10350109
dennet is a retarded old man who wants to hang on to the free will noble lie to keep the masses from getting unruly

>> No.10350123
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10350123

It's getting more popular.

>> No.10350133

everyone knows it is not enough but everyone accepts it due to a lack of a better option

>> No.10350149

>>10350070
Depends what you mean by that. The majority physicists implicitly believe in dualism for example, even though they might claim otherwise when prodded on the point.

>> No.10350152

>>10350149
Physics is a consequence of dualist thought, so they naturally believe in dualism

>> No.10350156

>>10350115
You can't even get two people to agree over what free will is supposed to entail, lie or not, it's not going away that easily.

>> No.10350157
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10350157

>>10350070

dualism is a technique for when monism gets boring

>> No.10350164

>>10350152
You got that exactly backwrds.

>> No.10350167

>>10350164
How so? Perhaps you know the historical context better.

>> No.10350173

Actually, the dualism would be matter-spirit, as mind is a product of this material nature, just like the body

>> No.10350188

Physicalism is true for sure. And I can prove it too. If you poke someone's brain, it causes a change in their soul. I mean their mind, there's no such thing as souls. Therefore physicalism is true.

>> No.10350194

>>10350188

t. a philosophical zombie

>> No.10350199

>>10350156
>it's not going away that easily.
meatcucks are not long for this world

>> No.10350201

>>10350194
Feel free to refute him instead of derailing with insults

>> No.10350202

>>10350201
but anon I did both of those things

>> No.10350228

>tfw phenomenology destroyed mind/body dualism almost a century ago
>people are still posting these threads

when will they learn

>> No.10350231

>>10350228
enlighten us

>> No.10350238
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10350238

>>10350231

>> No.10350282

>>10350228
>>10350238
Cringe.

>> No.10350318

>>10350282
no u

>> No.10350404

>>10350109
Kim is cool with epiphenomenalism

>> No.10350407

>>10350188
daily reminder that physicalists actually think this is a good argument

>> No.10350786

Can someone give me a quick rundown on dualism?

>> No.10350876

>>10350070
It was for millennia but got shot down by Nietzsche. Western society is primarily Nietzschean now.

>> No.10350909

nigga haha an immaterial nonspacial thing has the possibility to extend to your physical body and control it hahah
nigga animals are soulless haha

>> No.10350915

>>10350156
CONFIRMATION

WITTGENSTEIN IS B B B BASEDD DAMN SON WHERED YA FIND THAT

>> No.10351599
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10351599

>>10350076
Redpill me on embodiment, is it just physicalism lite?

>> No.10351641

>>10350188
If you poke someone's arm, it also causes changes to their mind. Or their hand. Or their nose.

Stop being retarded.

>> No.10351694

>>10350070
I think what you meant to say was idealism.

>> No.10351698

>>10351641
if I poke someone's soul, it will cause changes to their body

>> No.10351755

>>10350188
Do you think theologians, psychologists, and philosophers haven't been aware of this fact for well over thousands of years?

>> No.10351778
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10351778

What about the interaction problem?

>> No.10351824

>>10350070
Considering that we haven't found the particles of the mind, I'd say yes.
>>10350076
This is also an approach.

>> No.10351848

>>10350188
If I hammer a radio, I change what the program and its makers are doing.

>> No.10351850
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10351850

Time to experiment on frogs!

>>10350070
What is the phenomenological model where you have a frog, let's call him Pepe, and you want to find out where Pepe's soul lies?

So you take Pepe and you crush his brain a little and suddenly he can't remember recent events immediately before the procedure, or whole periods of his past experience. Then you squeeze him again and now he forgets how to write, and while he can still speak his vocabulary is limited and he has trouble focusing. Cut out a little more of his brain and he ceases to be responsive. Keep going and his body can no longer regulate itself and he ceases to be a living Pepe.

Next question: why do people think the soul is not in the body?

>> No.10351858

>>10351698
if you poke someone's soul, it will haunt you

>> No.10351860

>>10350070
only by fools

>> No.10351862

>>10351850
>pepe lobotomy
>frontal lobe intact

>> No.10351870

>>10351860
what do you think about property dualism?

>> No.10351874
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10351874

What about the Thomistic view of soul and body united to make a complete human?

>> No.10351883

>>10351850
>why do people think the soul is not in the body?
Break the screen in front of you, gradually. The program will still be running, you'll just get a mess initially, and then nothing.

>> No.10351901

>>10351883
So you basically repeated my example. It's a Sorites paradox, with levels of consciousness instead of grains of sand. And the answer is no closer.

>> No.10351919

>>10351874
Feser pls

>> No.10351925

>>10351850
it's not in the body, it is the body without organs

>> No.10351935

>>10351901
We'll find out when we can switch the "screens", if we can. If the human body is a portal, this may be achieved - we may even get multiple screens showcasing the same thing. If the human body is a factory, on the other hand, the product should be merely analyzed more efficiently to understand it.

>> No.10351936
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10351936

>>10351925
I'm beginning to think philosophers have no idea what they mean when they say 'mind' or 'soul'.

>> No.10351943

>>10351874
It's cheating to start from the sensible and intuitive option.

>> No.10351948

>>10351936
>anon is a philosopher
whew

>> No.10351954

>>10351936
Indeed, the idea has them!

>> No.10351995
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10351995

>>10351778
>interaction problem
>"non-physical substance" having agency over a physical body

REAL fuckin' spooky m8.

>> No.10352263

There are only 3 arguments against dualism:
1) the incredulous stare
2) the interaction problem
3) science will probably figure out consciousness bro and when they do it will somehow be exactly what I think it is

Only 2 is a serious objection and it's far from a fatal one

>> No.10352277
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10352277

>>10352263
>the interaction problem
Can you explain how this? A non-physical "mind stuff" being responsible for informing the body makes no sense. It has not and cannot be observed, because it is non-physical. This is as coherent as /x/ believing in ghosts or /k/'s skinwalker stories.

>> No.10352289

>>10352277
epiphenomenalism (no interaction from mind to body)
panpsychism (all matter has a mental aspect, the mind is a quidditie)

Anyways the physicalists need to show how physical properties give rise to consciousness, qualia and other phenomenologies and as far as I'm concerned they've been completely unable to do such things

And if consciousness can't be explained physically then it must not be physical

>> No.10352304

>>10351995
scientists haven't fully explained consciousness, so as far as we know a non-physical substance does have agency over our minds

anyway, you're posting stirner and talking about ">muh spooks" so I recommend not coming back to 4chan until you're 18

>> No.10352312

>>10352277
The interaction problem is not a fatal problem, just because its unclear how the interaction occurs doesnt mean it does not

However I think the zombie and mary's room arguments are fatal arguments against materialism

>> No.10352315
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10352315

>>10352289
Thank you. That seems like a desperate, temporary answer given only because a real scientific one hasn't arrived yet. I'm very confident the processes that create consciousness can be explained chemically and modeled by psychologists. We just don't have the tools to do it yet. The idea that 'here be dragons' is good enough in 2017 throws medicine all the way back to hot cold wet dry humors.

>> No.10352336

>>10352315
>dude science lmao
>the "im right because science will prove me right in the future just wait guys" meme

What would a physical explanation for consciousness even look like? All of them are unconvincing as all hell or don't even start at explaining consciousness, and some of them like IIT manage to be even more "woo" than dualism

>> No.10352337
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10352337

>>10352312
>just because its unclear how the interaction occurs doesnt mean it does not
I have a bit of a problem with the premise that mind and body are separate at all. They are useful terms but not exclusive.

>>10352304
>so as far as we know a non-physical substance does have agency over our minds
And you say *I'm* the one who is underage. A non-physical substance cannot act on the physical. The phrase itself is an oxymoron.

>> No.10352364

>>10352337
>I have a bit of a problem with the premise that mind and body are separate at all. They are useful terms but not exclusive.
I'm just arguing that it's not a fatal argument. I do think it's a good argument, but it's very far from a refutation and the other two are just short of being fucking retarded.

Anyways if you think that they aren't "seperate" - keep in mind I switch between epiphenomenalism and panpsychism and I don't really think that per se.

For your ideas to work you need to show how the mind can be reduced to the physical aspects of the body and I don't think this is possible at all.

>A non-physical substance cannot act on the physical
Who's to say? Define physical and get back to me first.

>> No.10352373

>>10352315
>I'm very confident the processes that create consciousness can be explained chemically and modeled by psychologists.
Why do you think this? What processes do you think are at play?

>The idea that 'here be dragons' is good enough in 2017 throws medicine all the way back to hot cold wet dry humors.
fuck off STEMlord

>> No.10352374
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10352374

>>10352336
>What would a physical explanation for consciousness even look like?

NB: *human consciousness.

Study anthropology and read Plato. Hegel I feel is especially close to the mark. Our consciousness is a constant procession of information. We have advanced from staring at literal caves and the dreamtime to metaphorical caves and 4chan. Now follow the thread of consciousness further back, to non-primates and non-mammals. The veil of maya those subtle body believers talked about wasn't far from the truth.

>> No.10352380

>>10352374
You may be right but I wouldn't call that anything like reductive physicalism

I haven't read Whitehead yet but I get the feeling that all of this will make sense to me after I do

>> No.10352386

I'm legitimately curious: are there any arguments for reductive physicalism that aren't memes?

>> No.10352414

>>10352373
>Why do you think this? What processes do you think are at play?
Chemistry, mostly. *Maybe* some tricky quantum physics shit that philosophy will be grappling with in twenty years. Inject me with nanites and let them record my braincase and environs right now.

>>10352364
>you need to show how the mind can be reduced to the physical aspects of the body and I don't think this is possible at all.
I don't. STEMfags do. I'm as lost as you are, but I'm certain that philosophers of today looking seriously at a hocus pocus spirit-stuff "explanation" is actively delaying the answer. They are retarding science out of hubris and professional fear.

>Who's to say? Define physical and get back to me first.
Non-physical physical is a self-evident contradiction. Correct your sloppy terms and get back to me first. Non-physical means just that: not observable by any means we have. Unconfirmable. Even shit with zero mass like photons and gluons are observable and "physical."

>> No.10352433

>>10352414
>Chemistry, mostly. *Maybe* some tricky quantum physics shit that philosophy will be grappling with in twenty years. Inject me with nanites and let them record my braincase and environs right now.
literally how the fuck would the behavior of molecules and nerve firings cause something as genuinely novel as consciousness? I'm lost on this one. I don't doubt that there's a connection though - no one does. Again, following Chalmers, there's no logical entailment from any known physical fact about the brain to the very existence of consciousness, let alone it's features.

>I don't. STEMfags do.
What if they can't? Why are you soooo sure that science is going to figure this out?

>I'm certain that philosophers of today looking seriously at a hocus pocus spirit-stuff "explanation" is actively delaying the answer.
Honestly, I'd be genuinely curious about a physicalist explanation of consciousness. I don't think such a thing is possible - read Epiphenomenal Qualia by Frank Jackson and The Conscious Mind by David Chalmers for more about this.

>Non-physical physical is a self-evident contradiction. Correct your sloppy terms and get back to me first. Non-physical means just that: not observable by any means we have. Unconfirmable. Even shit with zero mass like photons and gluons are observable and "physical."
By physical I mean describable by the laws of physics. I want you to correct YOUR sloppy terms and get back to me. "Anything we observe is physical" is an incredibly weak statement - the Cartesian Soul would be physical under your definition.

>> No.10352437

>>10352433
I'm going to strengthen my definition here - If a property or thing is exhausted by its physical description and logically entailed by the laws of physics, then it is physical.

>> No.10352467
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10352467

>>10352433
>literally how the fuck would the behavior of molecules and nerve firings cause something as genuinely novel as consciousness
Remember that consciousness is only a part of experience. Your brain is always on. Jung's model of the Self is my favorite. You have an unconscious mind -- obviously seated in the brain and not whooshing through the light fixtures -- that is speaking constantly, but the you that you think of as "you" doesn't hear it in the waking hours. Individuation helps, but like ourselves it is a process that is never complete. There are too many competing inputs, constantly challenging for pole position: from fingertips and hands and feet and legs and arms to torso and muscle groups and so on. The exact nature of transmission I can't tell you, but it is present and I make no cat-brained claims about it being of a certain nature. Just unknown.

>read Epiphenomenal Qualia by Frank Jackson and The Conscious Mind by David Chalmers
Thanks for the recommendations.

>"Anything we observe is physical"
That's not what I said. Anything we CAN observe. Not merely conceived but those things which can be scientifically measured by an instrument.

>What if they can't? Why are you soooo sure that science is going to figure this out?
Because it is inevitable. Our bodies are not so complicated, really. And if you want to be a negative nancy I'll tell you with a straight face we are still infants at science. We've understood DNA for what... several decades? And the scientific study of nature only began a few hundred years ago. We have modeled our minds using only words for millennia, and we are JUST NOW beginning to record our discoveries in impartial language that exists outside of connotation and misunderstanding.

>> No.10352495

>>10352467
>Because it is inevitable. Our bodies are not so complicated, really. And if you want to be a negative nancy I'll tell you with a straight face we are still infants at science. We've understood DNA for what... several decades? And the scientific study of nature only began a few hundred years ago. We have modeled our minds using only words for millennia, and we are JUST NOW beginning to record our discoveries in impartial language that exists outside of connotation and misunderstanding.
I don't think that explaining the way the body works physically will any more physics fundamental chemistry than what we already have. Honestly I think we have all the tools, but I don't see any possible way that this entails consciousness.

For example, let's say the entire population of the globe is given a telephone and a rulebook. If you get a certain call on a certain line for long enough, you call someone else. Little do you know, you are actually simulating roughly 200 neurons and managing thousands of connections. Scale this up and imagine the system as a whole. Would this system have the same vivid inner state as we do? If you decide to pull a prank and call the wrong person, would it be possible that you'd be torturing this "person" in the same way that you would feel torture? I don't think that there's any existing physical laws, or really any possible ones, that couldn't be modeled in such a way.

As I can see it, there's three options around this:
1) Argue that consciousness isn't what we think this is. I don't find this convincing at all, since "the appearance is the reality in question" as John Searle said
2) Bite the bullet and admit that the system in question would be conscious. Of course, this requires an explanation of how the system becomes conscious, and which systems are and which systems are not conscious.
3) Admit that something else is necessary, that isn't entailed by the physical facts.

>> No.10352511

>>10350167
Not who you responded to. Physicalism is a monist theory, namely that all things are physical. This includes things like forces. Most scientifically inclined people are physical monists.

>> No.10352517

>>10352414
>Chemistry, mostly
You don't shit about chemistry, you think the feeling of being 'high' is the same as euphoria or contentment?

>> No.10352532

>>10352495
I don't think that explaining the way the body works physically will require any more physics or fundamental chemistry than what we already have*

>> No.10352567
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10352567

>>10352495
I like this post. It accepts that consciousness is not an easy definition. I believe reality is represented in option 2. Option 1 is a deflection, yes. 3 is resignation. The vivid inner state you mention is the composition of the whole seen by us from orbit, not the daubs of paint on the phone. To assign "them" a themhood, or the qualities of observation we have, is a failure of language. Or maybe I misunderstand.

>I think we have all the tools
Not yet. To continue your metaphor, wiretapping does not exist yet. We can only watch from orbit and see general bursts of activity in the megalopolises. We can't identify callers, or know the contents of a discrete chemical message. Recording this data is what I'm waiting for. We're an electro-chemical stewpot that is continually forgetting and recalling the past and telling itself a story in the present. History is a treadmill, from individual lifetime to span of empire. Have you read Ricoeur? I'm interested in his ideas about memory.

>> No.10352598
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10352598

>>10352495
Woops, I understand your comparison now. Chalmers' example in the Conscious Mind. If we understood consciousness as a class of thing and replicated it with, say, tomato cans and string, would it still be a consciousness? What about silicon? To me this is a bad example. Chalmers is addressing the resolution of the problem correctly (ie, scale), but his question is a restatement of the Sorites paradox. If you move bits of hay, pitchfork by pitchfork, from one pile into another... when is a haystack no longer a haystack? When there's only 15 pieces of straw left? 5? 2? 1? The important thing is it is a haystack, not a pile of sulphur. Yellow is not hay, and brains are not anything else.

>> No.10352605

Who else believes in mind-body-lifeforce (or soul) trinity? The mind is an entity which is controlled by a lifeforce or soul.

>> No.10352616
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10352616

>>10352605
What is the difference between mind and soul? And where does one end and the other begin? They are the same, I think.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WTHoKEd-Gjo

>> No.10352624

>>10352616
I think the mind is that which is generated by the brain, and then the soul or lifeforce is at the seat of the brain as the pilot of the mind and body. You can control your body, and you can also control your mind by active thinking.

>> No.10352659
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10352659

>>10352624
>you can control your body
>you can also control your mind

Sounds like you've got two words for the same thing there m8. :^)

>> No.10352670

>>10352659
I like the way repeated words sound sometimes. The repetition was intended to put emphasis on these being distinct from / piloted by the lifeforce or soul.

>> No.10352671
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10352671

>>10352659
>that pic
Mind is pattern from nothing, like a pearl from a grain of sand.

>> No.10352780
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10352780

>201x
>not accepting dialectical monism

Ascend and see your semantics burn

>> No.10353015
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10353015

>>10351824
>particles of the mind
holy shit

>> No.10353070

>>10352780
would you mind explaining this diagram?

>> No.10353189

READ MERLEAU-PONTY AND DAMASIO

>> No.10353266

>>10350915
But my point is not to inhibit discussion of free will like Wittgenstein did, but for it to happen. If the absence of a "free will" is such an unsettling notion for professional philosophers, of all people, it would be helpful to have something resembling an understanding of what would be missing, or how could something gain it, so we could know what is it that unsettles people, and we would also have claims to investigate. In other words, go fuck yourself.

>>10351599
Not lite, done right. Read the book.

>> No.10353275

>>10353189
READ HEGEL; HE IS THE ALPHA AND OMEGA. HE IS THE RED PILL WE NEED; open your eyes /lit/.

>> No.10353289

>>10353275
YES BUT READ MERLEAU-PONTY

>> No.10353339

>>10350070
Oh, bio-chemical reactions in my body, its another "Lets male a highly romanticised theory based on imperfect scientific explanation". While it may be fun for underage b8 or populist philosophy and makes a compelling plot element in fictional characters, the concept itself is shit as a standalone point of discussion.

>> No.10353389

>>10352433
>literally how the fuck would the behavior of molecules and nerve firings cause something as genuinely novel as consciousness?
Oh i wonder how the world formed from stardust to its current form. Why is it so hard to accept the basic notion of Emergence?

>> No.10353584

>>10352277
>It has not and cannot be observed
It is literally the only thing susceptible of being observed in existence. The unprovable made-up concept is physical stuff, not your immediate access to experience.

>> No.10353589

>>10353289
YES BUT READ CASTORIADIS

>> No.10353592

>>10352336
IIT is not even a physicalist reduction of consciousness, it just takes it as a given and builds a system of correlates. It is essentially dualist

>> No.10353638

>>10350199
Hi Alex. Neither are you, that's for sure.

>> No.10354138

seriously though OP, no. most philosophers are physicalists according to this: https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP

but the attitude towards dualism has gotten progressively better and better since the the 90s (chalmers helped). dualism was literally laughed at in the 50s and 60s. and obviously property dualism is more favored than substance dualism

>> No.10354150

Okay but whats the roman catholic church's stance on this?
Nothing else matters to me.

>> No.10354156

>>10354150
I would assume it's >>10351874

>> No.10354237

>>10354150
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p1s2c1p6.htm

>> No.10354277

The interaction problem defeats dualism.

The hard problem and the measurement problem defeat materialism.

Therefore idealism is true.

>> No.10354366

>>10354138
think all the work in reductive physicalism in the 50s and 60s

and then think about how little came out of it

>> No.10354429

Accepted as illusory.

>> No.10354435
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10354435

>>10352780

also

>> No.10354746

>>10352312
>P-zombie
logically impossible
>Mary's room
physics, biology and mathematics(as in the theories and subjects) are extensions of our senses and tools to understand the world with which we further process information, from our senses as a starting point they can only operate injectively, obviously not surjectively. So it is impossible to reverse engineer to the senses with only knowledge acquired via these tools with certainty unless you have experienced the senses.

>> No.10354899

>the mind is not a function of the body, but a whole separate thing

>> No.10354900

people like dennett are actually retarded though. consciousness itself is an illusion? descartes BTFO

>> No.10354910

>>10354746
>logically impossible
no, physically impossible. it's clearly not logically possible, because i can think of one, and it makes sense as a concept. logically impossible is like a round square. literally inconceivable (except as a sentence)

>>10354746
>So it is impossible to reverse engineer to the senses with only knowledge acquired via these tools with certainty unless you have experienced the senses.
exactly. so you agree that it proves materialism wrong

>> No.10354920

>>10354910
>it's clearly not logically possible

shit, i meant logically impossible, obviously

>> No.10354943
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10354943

>>10354900
illusion is kind of a shitty metaphor even if consciousness doesn't exist. if consciousness doesn't exist there's nobody to misinterpret or be deceived by consciousness in the first place

>> No.10355023

>>10354910
P-zombie is kind of is like the round square thing, it contradicts itself, something physically exactly the same would necessarily have consciousness, as consciousness comes from only physical things like everything else. A p-zombie would be physically different some way if only because there is no interaction between the non-physical and the physical to faciliate consciousness.
. Anyway I was more on about Mary's room.
And I explained Mary's room with materialism, that was the point of that section.

>> No.10355027

>>10355023
>comes from only physical things like everything else
if you are a physicalist*
The bext sentence is about dualism

>> No.10355033

>>10355023
>P-zombie is kind of is like the round square thing, it contradicts itself, something physically exactly the same would necessarily have consciousness, as consciousness comes from only physical things like everything else
youre begging the question here

and you have to go into detail about where this contradiction lies

>And I explained Mary's room with materialism, that was the point of that section.
no you unambiguously contradicted yourself try again

>> No.10355042

>>10355027
>bext
next*

>> No.10355045

>>10355033
No I'm not begging the question see my correction, the following sentence is about dualism
> no argument on why I contradicted myself

>> No.10355053

>>10355045
that was a very bad-faith argument

anyways the zombie argument doesnt pose a problem for interactionist dualism

zombies are physically identical but not necessarily completely physical - there could be something else that "holds the pieces together" in lieu of consciousness

anyways the problem remains for yall

>> No.10355057

>>10355045
on mary's room - if qualia is physical then by definition they can be explained by physical laws - but you admitted such a thing isnt possible

>> No.10355060

>>10355053
So they are in a different physical state as in a conscious person has interacted with the not-physical while the p-zombie is in the state of not having interacted with the non-physical, so they are physically different

>> No.10355074

>>10355057
I was talking about physics biology and mathematics as in the academic subjects through which things are understood, they are tools but they are not reality itself, they come from humanity, Mary only learns about these tools and the world understood through these tools, and these tools can relative to the senses as starting point only operate injectively

>> No.10355075

>>10355060
>So they are in a different physical state as in a conscious person has interacted with the not-physical while the p-zombie is in the state of not having interacted with the non-physical, so they are physically different
I just argued that p-zombies can interact with something nonphysical, as long as its not a nonphysical mind. The problem remains

Also if you can't dissolve the argument on other grounds than appealing to interactionism youre implicitly establishing either epiphenomenalism or panpsychism

>> No.10355080

>>10355074
you should try actually reading the paper youre arguing against instead of saying retarded shit like this

>> No.10355088

>>10355074
okay maybe but if no physical explanation is possible then it follows that consciousness is not physical

>> No.10355104

>>10355075
Then they are in the state of not having interacted with the non-physical mind
>>10355080
Nice non-argument asshole

Just for clarification though, I'm only arguing against dualism as an exercise, I don't necessarily have a firm position

>> No.10355116
File: 586 KB, 592x592, 20171203_093525.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10355116

>>10350070
Not by this daddy

>> No.10355228

>>10355023
>as consciousness comes from only physical things like everything else

you're begging the question

>I explained Mary's room with materialism

no, you said that things in physics textbooks could never show you what your senses do. that proves that there are non-physical facts, and that materialism is false

>> No.10355249

>>10355104
>Nice non-argument asshole
you missed the whole point of both the zombie and the marys room arguments

are you an old fat bearded guy from massachusetts by any chance?

>> No.10355255

>>10355104
>Then they are in the state of not having interacted with the non-physical mind
is that a physical state? what kind of physical facts would correspond to this?

>> No.10355277

>>10351874
The one that made him say that fetuses aren't humans?
>>10350152
How?

>> No.10355289

>>10355249
>are you an old fat bearded guy from massachusetts by any chance?
kek

>> No.10355307

>>10350238
my nigga

>> No.10355308
File: 172 KB, 1920x1080, bd.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10355308

>>10350070
It is less accepted than it used to be. Pic related.

Cognitive Science, beginning with Phineas Gage have time and time again demonstrated a structured, ordered, physical dependency between consciousness as a phenomena, personality as a trait, and the biological host brain which constitutes the material generation of the aforementioned phenomena (consciousness, personality).

But because metaphysical explanations are unfalsifiable by the very means of invoking inaccessible, immeasurable, immaterial realms exterior to reality in which our variables and literals and class definitions can be stored, I'll go ahead and humor you and say, yes, it is still possible and always will be possible that mind-body dualism is true.

>> No.10355314

>>10355228
Again I'm not begging the question I already clarified why earlier
Also with mary's room I just pointed out the problem that she can't reverse engineer to one specific sensation because the sensation relative to the scientific understanding(which comes from a tool)isn't both injective and surjective
>>10355249
you didn't argue as to what I miss again.
>>10355255
Why would it not be?

>> No.10355317
File: 17 KB, 1066x132, mind body dualism is old.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10355317

>>10350070
>>10355308

I used the wrong yet the right pic,

>> No.10355323

>>10355308
>Cognitive Science, beginning with Phineas Gage have time and time again demonstrated a structured, ordered, physical dependency between consciousness as a phenomena, personality as a trait, and the biological host brain which constitutes the material generation of the aforementioned phenomena (consciousness, personality).
They've been successful at finding correlations and correlates. They have been completely fucking unsuccessful at doing a reduction. I don't think this reduction is possible, so consciousness must not be physical.

>> No.10355331

>>10355317
cognition =/=/=/=/=/=/=/=/=/=/=/=/=/=/= phenomena

depending on physical things =/=/=/=/=/==/=/=/=/=/=/= being physical

were you your mother for 9 months?

>> No.10355464

>>10355314
I agree with your objection to Mary's room. For me, the biggest issue with that thought experiment is the idea that Mary can learn all there is to know about color through language. I don't see why I have to accept the premise that "Mary knows all there is to know about color when she leaves the room." I don't think it's a stretch to just say that it's not possible to learn certain physical things through language. Can someone respond?

>> No.10355668

>>10352598
This doesn't even begin to address the phenomenon. Your fixation with the Sorites paradox is irrelevant, unless you're assuming that matter has mental proprieties that are brought out through a certain kind of material interaction, and the reason why we say humans have minds while rocks do not is because the necessary type of interaction occurs more often in humans.

But this is just (quantitatively qualified) panpsychism.

>> No.10355677

>>10355464
If there's no logical entailment from the physical facts to the mental ones, then I think this is enough to consider mental things to be nonphysical

What am I missing lads

>> No.10355717

>>10355677
come back in around 9 hours then I will say if I don't forger

>> No.10355728

>>10355717
>forger
forget*

>> No.10355734

>>10355677
Not all physical facts can be communicated through language because it is a limited medium. Some facts are experiential.
I.e., the pattern of neurons in your brain that is the physical experience of color cannot be caused by communication through language, it can only be caused through the interpretation of light by your eyes.
What's wrong with this?

>> No.10355765

>>10355734
Nothing wrong with it. The problem is your own confusion. The view implicitly assumes mental properties in all matter. It's panpsychism-in-denial.

>> No.10355805

>>10355765
So it's a valid response?

>> No.10355809

I sure hope the thread is still up 9 hours from now so I can explain

>> No.10355816

>>10355805
"Yes", if you have a platonist definition of physicality, "no" if you have a modern definition of physicality.

>> No.10355877

>>10355734
>Not all physical facts can be communicated through language because it is a limited medium. Some facts are experiential.
see what you did there? you divided all the facts of the world into two

maybe we could call your idea two-ism?

>> No.10355894

>>10355816
Fuck, I really want to understand, but I feel like I'm shooting in the dark here.
>>10355877
So you're saying that experiential facts must be non-physical?

>> No.10355901

>>10355894
>So you're saying that experiential facts must be non-physical?
Well I guess it sort of comes down to what your definition of physical is.

In my view, "physical" means necessarily entailed by force, mass, gravity, charge and the like

>> No.10355922

The interaction problem is a problem for non-eliminativist physicalists as well.

If the physical world is causally closed, then how come high-level biological creatures such as humans can teleologically do things like split atoms and collide particles?

>> No.10356387

>>10355314
>Again I'm not begging the question I already clarified why earlier

you saying it over and over doesn't make it more true

>>10355314
>Also with mary's room I just pointed out the problem that she can't reverse engineer to one specific sensation because the sensation relative to the scientific understanding(which comes from a tool)isn't both injective and surjective

this sentence is meaningless. be more clear. your use of words from mathematics doesn't make your point more clear

>>10355464
if it is entirely physical, why wouldn't you be able to explain it through language?

>> No.10356509

>>10356387
Why should you be able to explain it through language? What makes language so special that every physical thing can be explained with it?

>> No.10356511

>>10356509
Because we know all the physical laws that govern the brain

>> No.10356520

>>10356509
First premise of the argument doesn't even have to involve language. Just assume she knows all of the physical facts about color. This is Jackson's formalization of his argument:

1. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about other people.
2. Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about other people (because she learns something about them on her release).
3. Therefore, there are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist story.[6]

>> No.10356642

>>10355277
Aquinas' views on fetuses were entirely based on his views of physical science, not his metaphysics. He'd support the current Catholic position if he knew about modern science.

>> No.10356647

>>10356520
I think I understand. Is it that if some knowledge is concerning some physical thing, then we must be able to describe that thing in physical terms; but since we cannot describe the experience of color in any way, it cannot be physical?

>> No.10356686

>>10356647
Not that anon but color can be described in angstroms or kelvins and those with knowledge of physics will recognize what you mean. Just because an uneducated person cannot conceive of a thing in one moment does not mean they will forever be without the vocabulary to imagine it.

If I asked you, with no knowledge or understanding of atmospheric radio wave propagation, to imagine what the electromagnetic spectrum in your neighborhood looks like you'd have no idea. You could not see the broadcast towers glowing bright through the grey veils of carrier waves bouncing from ground to sky like pond-ripples. You could not envision the braindead EM noise of a desk fan, or your computer's processor, or the explosions in a combustion engine driving down the street. The lighthouse beacon and death ray that is a quasar. It's all there, you just don't think about it because you lack the words.

>> No.10356735

>>10356686
But the point is that there is no way to describe the experience of color to a person who has never seen it, educated or not, physicist or layman.

>> No.10356748

>>10356647
>Is it that if some knowledge is concerning some physical thing, then we must be able to describe that thing in physical terms; but since we cannot describe the experience of color in any way, it cannot be physical?

yeah, that's really close. the key word there is "experience". because like the anon right above me mentioned, when Mary learns about electromagnetic radiation (which she cannot see, obviously), she learns the same thing that she would when she learns about color (frequencies, wavelengths, whatever).

BUT, when she leaves the room she sees red. which can't be explained by any text, it seems. it seems like it can't even be explained if we had a complete physics. it's somehow ineffable.

it's worth noting that there are two main ways philosophers have objected to this. the first is to claim that mary doesn't actually learn anything new, she just gains an "ability". the ability to recognize red, not a new fact about red. some say that mary becomes acquainted with red when she leaves the room (doesn't learn something new).

some physicalists like dennett just say that if she knew all the physical facts about red then she would be able to imagine what red looks like in the black and white room (this seems ridiculous to me).

it's also worth saying that some philosophers have taken the stance of one of the anons above and said that linguistic physicalism is different than metaphysical physicalism and that the former is way more improbable. somehow even if everything is physical you still wouldn't be able to express it in words? i think this begs the question.

either way, most philosophers (even physicalists) are really tempted to admit that mary DOES learn something when she leaves the room

>> No.10356808

>>10356748
Thanks a lot Anon, that really helped. Do you actually study philosophy or physics?

>> No.10356817

>>10356735
I've never seen EM waves either. But I know how they behave and just described them to you in credible terms.

The experience of color is essentially poetic. For passing information, angstroms will suffice. Maybe the sighted are not tuned for emotional response in this field.

For sharing the (presuming you mean ineffable/emotional) experience of a color, one can only share their subjective experience. Short of feeding-through brain activity from one to another, poetic words must suffice.

>> No.10356825

>>10356808
finishing up a philosophy BA next month, i'm taking a philosophy of mind class this semester so that's why it's all fresh in my mind.

might write my final paper on this actually, this thread has sparked my interest in it again

>> No.10356934

>>10356825
That's awesome, I'm just finishing up my first semester of philosophy. How do you find it? Where are you planning to take it? Any advice for someone just beginning?

>> No.10356939

>>10356817
No amount of poetry can even begin to convey the experience of color to one who has never experienced it for himself.

>> No.10356986

>>10356748
>some physicalists like dennett just say that if she knew all the physical facts about red then she would be able to imagine what red looks like in the black and white room (this seems ridiculous to me).
It only seems ridiculous to you because you can't stop thinking in terms of our limited methods of communicating information. The idea of Mary's room would be ridiculous to a species that communicates entirely in changing flashes of colors.

>> No.10356995

>>10356986
>The idea of Mary's room would be ridiculous to a species that communicates entirely in changing flashes of colors.
no idiot


imagine a deaf neuroscientist that knows all the physical facts about how the brain interprets sound....

>> No.10356999

>>10356934
>I'm just finishing up my first semester of philosophy.
oh awesome. how do you like it so far?
>How do you find it?
honestly? i think it's one of the most exciting subjects i've tried studying at college. i tried english for a bit and i enjoyed it but i wasn't stimulated (academically, i guess). tried some science classes and was good at them but i just didn't feel stimulated by the work. and when i took some philosophy classes i felt really energized by that type of debate and discussion. taking logic classes was super fun and interesting to me. idk i just have always enjoyed this type of thinking
>Where are you planning to take it?
I'm still thinking about that now. I've thought about law school but for now my immediate plans are just to get any job after this and see how I like it. I'm hoping to do some sort of writing, I'm not exactly sure yet.
>Any advice for someone just beginning?
yeah, it'd say that if you're studying philosophy your main goal when writing papers is to be CLEAR. i'm just capitalizing the words because it really is the most important thing. i had a professor who told me that the best thing to imagine your audience as is as someone who is smart but uninformed, yet also very critical. so you need to explain what you're saying extremely clearly and accurately, but also so that anyone who wants to read your paper could conceivably read it. this means to at least explain any jargon you're going to use throughout the paper, etc.
https://imgur.com/a/XL6hp

there is a really good guide to writing philosophy papers

>> No.10357015

>>10356934
https://imgur.com/a/ljAYD

and another good one. Michael Heumer (although I may not agree with some of his views) is definitely one of the best philosophy writers I've come across

>> No.10357037

>>10356995
So they'd know all the brain states created by sounds being heard AND know how to make their own brain take on those state i.e. they could imagine sounds.

Mary's room is a clumsy attempt at sidestepping the interaction problem and it falls apart under close examination.

>> No.10357051

>>10357037
you actually think that a deaf person could read a neuroscience textbook and imagine what sound actually sounds like? that is wrong.

>> No.10357065

>>10357051
This isn't about knowledge acquired through reading. Quit making this blunder.

>> No.10357085
File: 802 KB, 1492x1997, PSM_V63_D081_Helen_keller_and_miss_sullivan.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357085

>>10357051
You are a brainlet who doesn't like to think too hard.

>> No.10357087

>>10357065
even if you KNEW all the brain states associated with sound you would not HAVE the brain states associated with sound. it isn't possible

for instance, apparently some insects can see the ultraviolet spectrum. it's possible that i could know everything about how their eyes work and still not know what it's like to see the ultraviolet spectrum. to say that it's possible seems like it's begging the question

>> No.10357093

>>10357037
>>10357087
leave completely misunderstanding the point of complex philosophical theories to you

Do you happen to be an 80 something one-hit-wonder philosopher with yellow fever?

>> No.10357101

>>10357085
nice non-answer

>> No.10357105

>>10357093
who did you mean to reply to? we're making opposite points

>> No.10357106

>>10357037
ok imagine a robotic version of mary then, would sexbot mary be able to figure out what red looks like?

How about you try dissolving the argument instead of poking at semantic details?

>Mary's room is a clumsy attempt at sidestepping the interaction problem and it falls apart under close examination.
you do realize that the paper that brought up mary's room explicitly argued for epiphenomenalism, don't you?

>> No.10357109

>>10357105
oh sorry I mean to reply to:
>>10357037
and
>>10357065

>> No.10357112

>>10357087
Being unable to take on the brain states that you know of is just a human limitation issue. A computer can hear the image of a sine graph even if it has never possessed a microphone.

>> No.10357116

>>10357109
lol i hoped so. i think he's misunderstanding the argument or being purposefully obtuse

>> No.10357119

>>10355331
>were you your mother for 9 months?
In a sense, yes.

All phenomena is characterized by the interpreter. The phenomena is not itself without the interpreter — it is something else that can no longer be spoken of.

The mind is part of the body. The body is all there is. The limits of the body are the limits of the mind.

Supposing that the mind is separate from the body is the whole "soul" nonsense all over again. You are not beyond the flesh.

>> No.10357121

>>10357116
Why do materialists always pick around at details?

It's annoying seeing redditors like that guy do it but it's a fucking travesty when "serious" philosophers like John Searle and Dan Dennett do it

>> No.10357122
File: 148 KB, 2500x1645, 1487236989386.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357122

>>10357112
>A computer can hear the image of a sine graph even if it has never possessed a microphone.
lmao what? i genuinely don't even know how to reply to this

>> No.10357124
File: 61 KB, 608x485, smug brainlet.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357124

>>10357119
"I'm right because I'm too much of a brainlet to conceptualize your argument"

>> No.10357127

>>10357122
he is a zombie

>> No.10357128

>>10357121
>Why do materialists always pick around at details?
i honestly don't know. i think they genuinely have such a strong intuition towards materialism that they think everyone arguing from dualism is arguing in bad faith or something. that they're just using "word games" to prove reality wrong.

they don't seem to ever be able to admit that there seems to be something unique about consciousness

>> No.10357131

>>10357124
The brainlet is the one that has lost his sense of self and believes he can conceptualize what others do. We ultimately experience ourselves and nothing more.

>> No.10357133

>>10357127
sometimes i think dennett is a genuine p-zombie in the flesh. i'm gonna use that to prove that it's not only logically possible, but actually possible and real

>> No.10357137
File: 49 KB, 645x729, wojak(you).jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357137

>>10357124
"I'm right because we don't know what causes mind, heck heck heck we don't even know what is real like omg how can it be real if our eyes aren't real? therefore mind is caused by ghost-stuff."

>> No.10357138

>>10357131
>We ultimately experience ourselves and nothing more.
DUDE that's deep

try actually engaging in the discourse and not dismissing those who you disagree with

>> No.10357142

>>10357128
legit I was a materialist up until about 7-9 months ago when I started actually getting into philosophy of mind.

I'm not on the lookout for an immaterial soul or the like but materialist arguments (besides the interaction problem and causal closure) are just so consistently terrible that it's getting hard for me to take it seriously as a position. I realize it's the dominant position, but holy shit they can do a lot better than this....

>> No.10357145

>>10356748
If she learns something, isn't that just another brain change that could have been made to occur through different means?

>> No.10357147

>>10357138
>DUDE that's deep
It was maybe a couple hundred years ago. Not anymore.

>try actually engaging in the discourse
What about it do you think I'm not engaging with?

>> No.10357150
File: 37 KB, 586x578, 1512404754760.png?__cf_waf_tk__=111945002cjuACqA7mrTp-fnRSPfnhyxtlQw.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357150

>>10357137
>everything has to be just stuff because it all just looks like stuff!!! how can there be more than the stuff i see in front of me! (even though theres a ton of evidence)

>> No.10357151
File: 6 KB, 225x225, david chalmers3.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357151

>>10357133
>sometimes i think dennett is a genuine p-zombie in the flesh
Chalmers actually said this in a debate iirc

>> No.10357158

>>10357142
it's the dominant position, but only slightly. i posted a meta survey earlier in the thread. it's like 56% i guess.

and i mean i'm no substance dualist, but i think arguments for property dualism are very strong. they're stronger than the materialist arguments imo. but i guess at this point it really is just an opinion. i am very hopeful for neuroscience and cognitive science in the future, thats for sure

>> No.10357162

>>10357121
I'm not a materialist. I have more certainty than anybody in this thread that consciousness is not just a bunch of routines in the brain.

>> No.10357163
File: 52 KB, 671x473, wojak(you)too.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357163

>>10357150
>tons of evidence for a non-physical mind that drives man by the brain

Post it, genius.

>> No.10357165

>>10357147
I think you're not taking the dualist arguments seriously. saying that qualia is ridiculous because we "only experience ourselves" is ridiculous. you KNOW that you have a conscious experience

>>10357151
holy kek please provide a link

>> No.10357166

>>10357151
Based Chalmers wins again

>> No.10357169

>>10357150
How can there be evidence for something that is unknowable? By definition, it's impossible to have knowledge about something you have never perceived at any level.

>> No.10357170

>>10357133
Having proof of a p zombie would disprove p zombies.

>> No.10357180

>>10357165
>you KNOW that you have a conscious experience

Not that anon but: do we know? Jungians say conscious reality is rooted in a dream. A Marcionite would say sensation is our mediocre grasp on the infinite. For non-denom Christians, it's part of a plan.

>> No.10357182

>>10357165
>I think you're not taking the dualist arguments seriously.
I am, I'm just coming at it from a different angle, based on observation of the observer.

>qualia
Phenomena that does not have clear roots but does not at all suggest it doesn't have any. Absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. There is far more directly indicating that perception has its roots in the body.

>> No.10357183

>>10357163
http://www.uva.nl/en/content/news/press-releases/2017/01/split-brain-does-not-lead-to-split-consciousness.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_realizability

>> No.10357186

>>10357163
oh here we go. i post arguments and you say "oh that's not evidence, post REAL SCIENCE" even though no third-personal evidence could prove something like this

you just need to accept that introspective evidence is evidence

>>10357169
it's the most knowable thing to any of us. the only thing we can be sure of is that we are conscious and thinking. but if what you're saying is that you can't know that OTHER people are conscious, then i suppose you're right in an absolute sense. but it is logical to assume that everyone has a similar conscious experience as you. and in that case it's the best evidence you can imagine.

when you're in pain, just ask yourself: am i in pain right now? saying yes is the best evidence against dennett-like theories

>>10357170
i was kidding. but how is that true? if a robot existed that responded EXACTLY like humans did in every scenario yet lacked qualia, that would just prove dualism, not disprove p-zombies

>> No.10357187
File: 69 KB, 370x338, chalmersredpill.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357187

>>10357121
They don't give a fuck.. their debates with know nothings like Deepak Chopra are bogus too.

>> No.10357194

>>10356999
>>10357015
I'm really enjoying my studies. There's just something about studying philosophy that gives me a unique thrill that I can't get from anywhere else. I also really enjoy literature, but the English class I took this semester turned out to be a bit of a letdown. The lectures were all over the place, none of the readings were especially interesting, and I don't feel like I drew any valuable knowledge about literature from anything we talked about.
I'm actually also planning to go to law school, but recently I've been reconsidering what I want to do. I have this half-formed dream of being a philosophy professor/academic...
Thanks for the advice, I'm really working on my writing right now.
Is there any specific kind of philosophy, or are there any philosophers that you are especially interested in?

>> No.10357201

>>10357180
>do we know?
if i stab you, are you experiencing pain? if so, you're experiencing qualia. that's the best evidence there is.

>There is far more directly indicating that perception has its roots in the body

okay, but there are many arguments that fight against the idea that pain is just identical to whatever neurons in the brain fire when we feel pain (c-fibers, specifically in humans)

>> No.10357204
File: 68 KB, 800x533, dandennett.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357204

>>10357186
>oh here we go. i post arguments and you say "oh that's not evidence, post REAL SCIENCE" even though no third-personal evidence could prove something like this
but, dude...

SCIENCE

>> No.10357207
File: 474 KB, 972x1647, david chalmers2.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
10357207

>>10357187
>he says no redpills
>he redpills everyone in the audience
what did he mean by this

>> No.10357209

>>10357186
>the only thing we can be sure of is that we are conscious and thinking.
There is no concept of consciousness without something to compare it to.

This has always been the problem with "the problem of consciousness" that others talk about for me. The thing-in-itself lurks in the shadow of the concept. Things-in-themselves are a dangerous idea that do not hold up to reality. Consciousness is understood like hotness is understood: by comparison with something else, such as coldness.

I'm not saying that there aren't other things out there, I'm saying that

1. Knowledge as a concept is deceptive.
2. Phenomena requires an interpreter and is interconnected with its interpreter. The phenomena and interpreter are essentially one, mirrors of one another.

>but it is logical to assume that everyone has a similar conscious experience as you.
Based on my experience I'd say it's not logical to assume that at all. Everyone interprets things in their own way. This is why different value systems appear on the planet across the world.

>> No.10357218

>>10357209
Can you stop rattling off random philosophical buzzwords that you learned from the school of life or whatever and try to make a coherent point?

>> No.10357223

>>10357209
Different Anon, but how is consciousness not entirely self-evident?

>> No.10357227

>>10357223
because anything that conflicts with his worldview needs evidence (tm)

WAIT NO NOT THAT KIND OF EVIDENCE THAT'S NOT GOOD ENOUGH STOP

>> No.10357229

>>10357209
>>10357209
none of what you're saying really applies to the discussion at hand. just answer one question: when you feel pain, does it hurt?

if you answer "yes" then clearly you are having a qualitative experience. i'm not sure why all of this talk about deception and interpreters matters in this debate

>> No.10357236

Why am I me, and not somebody else?
Am I really only me?
How do I know if I'm not also somebody else?
I don't know what I am, so how do I know what I am not?
If I was everything, I wouldn't even know it.
Can I learn everything about something and say with certainty that it is not me?
Or does something become part of me when I learn about it?
If I can never say that something is not me, does it mean that there is nothing that is not me?
What am I holding when I grasp onto me?
When I look into it, what do I see?
It's all there.
I have never witnessed it change.
No matter how much I learn, no matter how much I change, it has just remained everything.
I can't see it anymore.
I can't get it back.
It's gone.

>> No.10357237

>>10357223
>how is consciousness not entirely self-evident?
Is 1+1 self-evident? But this is all human language, human interpretation. Other lifeforms do not share our language. 1+1 is not "self-evident" to all of them, there is not necessarily a perceived "1" for all of them. Are they not alive then?

They are. It's a matter of not losing your sense of self and projecting your humanness onto the world in places where it doesn't belong. That's how you encounter fallacies and paradoxes.

>> No.10357240
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10357240

>>10357237
>Is 1+1 self-evident? But this is all human language, human interpretation.
STOP

>> No.10357244

>>10357237
what the fuck are you talking about? 1+1 IS self-evident. you can call anyone who denies it insane, mentally deficient, or non-human. stop hiding behind this whole "if animals don't understand it then it's not real"

>> No.10357250

>>10357244
hey I think he might be Jacques Derrida

>> No.10357254

>>10357229
>when you feel pain, does it hurt?
What is pain? We all have our own unique "emotional" pains and our own tolerance threshold. We all seek something different, and sometimes some of us may interpret pain as a stimulus, not just as pain. As far as physical pain goes, we do all share common ancestors from some time ago, and our bodies do share some resemblance. There being resemblance doesn't mean we are really capable of KNOWLEDGE of what the other experiences.

>> No.10357258

>>10357237
Yes it is entirely self-evident, and all animals also see it as self-evident as well.

>> No.10357264

>>10357186
>just ask YOUrself: am i in pain right now?
>if i stab YOU, are you experiencing pain?

Define "you." If you mean me the waking organism, of course I'll probably feel pain. Even lobsters feel pain. Pain is one of the best and oldest methods of self-preservation. I'll concede this point and only say that my examples were psychological/religious (that is, exclusively human) and on the outside edge of the dualist model. Do you know if your unconscious feels pain? That part of your brain which is extant and firing but not accessible to the conscious experience. What I mean to say is there are parts of us that are not conscious in the way we commonly understand the term, and this part of our brain (and its effect on the waking mind) cannot be ignored.

>> No.10357266

>>10357254
i don't even know what to make of any of this, it's too convoluted. clearly when you're in physical pain, like when someone stabs you, you want it to STOP because it hurts. that is the only thing i'm concerned with. we all have that same experience. that is a qualitative experience.

stop asking stupid fucking questions like "what is pain?"

you know exactly what i mean when i say "pain", and despite your irrelevant bullshit, you know i'm right

>> No.10357269

>>10357258
>all animals
What about plants, bacteria? Creatures without faculties to perceive entities as we do? They aren't lifeforms? Are we not yet a type of lifeform when we are in an embryonic state?

>> No.10357278

>>10357264
>Do you know if your unconscious feels pain? That part of your brain which is extant and firing but not accessible to the conscious experience. What I mean to say is there are parts of us that are not conscious in the way we commonly understand the term, and this part of our brain (and its effect on the waking mind) cannot be ignored.

i could respond to this in depth, but who fucking cares? literally who cares? the only thing that matters is that YOU as person feels pain sometimes. that's it. if you feel pain, you have conscious experience. i have absolutely no clue why it's taken this long to explain this simple concept to you.

is this what continental philosophy is like? fuck that. you say "don't you experience pain?" and they say shit like "what do you mean by YOU??"

jesus christ

>> No.10357282

>>10357266
>clearly when you're in physical pain, like when someone stabs you, you want it to STOP because it hurts.
Depends on the situation. Maybe I feel guilt towards the person who stabbed me out of hate and I feel a sense of relief that I am being stabbed. Also, can muscle burn during workouts be considered a type of pain? We don't want that to stop though, no matter how uncomfortable it is, because we know the benefits. There can be benefits to many types of pain, all kinds of societies have built rituals around pain as a rite of passage because they understood this.

>stop asking stupid fucking questions like "what is pain?"
But the question is important. If you don't want to explore the words you're using, you have no right to the conversation of consciousness, perception and mind.

>> No.10357288
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10357288

>>10357278
"I'm going to ignore the fact that the human mind is not merely the conscious human mind, and the term "you" might be in need of revision. I'm going to ignore evidence because I really can't be bothered to consider it for two seconds."

The term you are using is incomplete, or rather you have an incomplete understanding of "you." Read Julian Jaynes. Read Jung.

>> No.10357293

>>10357282
>Depends on the situation.

It doesn't. Just imagine a neutral situation. Maybe you have no memories or you're a baby. Maybe you have no emotions. The only thing that exists is the PHYSICAL pain. It's not hard. I don't get why you're needlessly convoluting it.

>But the question is important.
I assure you, it is not. Exploring the definitions of words will never allow you to actually discuss the concepts you want to discuss. Pain means what pain means when we use it in everyday language.

>> No.10357304

>>10357288
the "you" just isn't relevant to the arguments anyone is making ITT. please explain how a different interpretation of the self could change how the arguments are interpreted itt

>> No.10357311
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10357311

>>10357304
>the "you" just isn't relevant to the arguments anyone is making ITT
Agreed. I never suggested pain was a bad measure of qualia, only that your reply was short-sighted and careless for rejecting criticism out of hand.

>> No.10357314

>>10357311
i guess i'm not understanding how your criticism applies to any of the arguments in the thread. if you want to have a separate discussion of what qualifies as the "me" or what the self consists of i'm fine with that, but how does it relate? does it change any of the arguments itt?

>> No.10357331
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10357331

>>10357314
>but how does it relate?
It doesn't, and not wanting to derail the thread I didn't take it any further. Defining the components of the self is a psychological question, not an epistemological one. It is important to define terms we are using I think, and you is one that needs updating. I believe it is not necessarily axiomatic that conscious experience can be proven exclusively by pain response. Local or general anaesthetic being one counterexample. Psychosis another. And lucid dreams another.

>> No.10357338

>>10357331
sure, i agree with what you're saying. but then again, i wasn't trying to just prove consciousness through pain response. i was trying to prove consciousness through pain response all things considered.

in other words, obviously you could be deceived by an evil demon, be in the matrix, be psychotic, etc, but ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, when you feel pain it hurts. assuming you're awake, conscious, not in the matrix, etc.

>> No.10357359

>>10357119
/thread

>> No.10357531

>>10357359
Don't /thread your own posts.

>> No.10357539

Worst thread on /litl/

>> No.10357551

>>10357539
Worst post on /litl/

>> No.10357559

>>10356387
>you saying it over and over again doesn't make it more true
Yes that's why I explained it rather than just claiming it, I am not going to spoonfeed you
>this sentence is meaningless, be more clear
It is perfectly meaningful

>> No.10357563

>>10355677
Ok I just explained mary's room within the axioms of materialism so that it has no further implications

>> No.10357585

>>10350149
>The majority physicists implicitly believe in dualism
Observation in QM means interference, not consciousness

>> No.10357610

Suppose a population of tiny people disable your brain and replicate its functions themselves, while keeping the rest of your body in working order; each homunculus uses a cell phone to perform the signal-receiving and -transmitting functions of an individual neuron. Would such a system be conscious?
-SEP

>> No.10357616
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10357616

>>10357610
>implying this network of tiny homunculi operates on a strictly in-out call scheme, and there are no spooky quantum mechanics involved

your premise's reach exceeds its grasp

>> No.10357619

>>10357616
>Muh quantum mechanics
Suppose there aren't.

>> No.10357632
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10357632

>>10357619
Assuming such a system replaced and replicated the host brain perfectly then that waking brain could indeed be classified as conscious. But it would not be natural, and to be honest Giles and Buffy, or Sarah Connor, should probably be called to shut it down.

>> No.10357634

>>10357610
No, because functionalism is wrong.

>> No.10357635

>>10357632
What if each tiny person instead used a notepad and shouted messages to the others. Would such a system be conscious?

>> No.10357637

>>10357635
Or passed notes to the others; not that it makes much of a difference.

>> No.10357653

>>10357635
>>10357637
>not that it makes much difference
My confidence in your ability to analogize is falling rapidly.

>instead used a notepad and shouted messages to the others. Would such a system be conscious?
If this difference is still an accurate reproduction of the brain and its operations as supposedly perfectly modeled just a moment ago, then yes. But given that this needless complexity has been introduced, that is doubtful. Where are you going with this, brainlet?

>> No.10357655

>>10357635
>>10357637
>>10357653
imagine I made a software that simulated every function of a human heart, literally down to the tiniest molecule. Could I transplant that heart into a human? No, because simulating something isn't the same as making a copy of it.
It's literally the same with every organ we have, but when we get to the brain functionalists sperg out and say "YES IT WOULD BE A PERFECTLY FUNCTIONING BRAIN".

>> No.10357666

the answer is very simple: physicalists don't actually have internal experience therefore things that appear intuitive to us in the arguments against it don't appear so to them. they are, in fact, p-zombies

>> No.10357668

>>10357653
Lad, I'm just abstracting the example to make it appear stranger to claim that the brain is conscious. I know that as a functionalist, you'll claim that any such system is conscious. It's just fun making you dance.

>> No.10357669
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10357669

>>10357655
>software in a computer simulation
vs
>being the same as a magical microscopic homonculi who populate your braincase and replicate its function perfectly

You can't even grasp a hypothetical correctly, anon.

>> No.10357675
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10357675

>>10357668
>Lad,
>brain is conscious
>It's just fun making you dance.

I see it is the hour when the brainlets come to /lit/. I've never claimed a brain is conscious. I did accept that consciousness is a process that arises from the brain however. You should read more and post less.

>> No.10357677

>>10357669
It's literally the same thing. Software or homunculi it doesn't matter, under functionalism both are valid because all that matter are the relationships between its causal states. Of course, that is preposterous.

>> No.10357678

>>10357668
The "brain" being the system run by Lilliputians. Say, if we bred enough humans and passed notes to each other, could we spontaneously produce a collective single consciousness? Assuming we ran a giant robot body or some shit.
>>10357675
Oh, so we aren't conscious? Holy shit lads, a real life p-zombie!

>> No.10357680
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10357680

>>10357677
>strawmanning this hard

Okay, fella.

>> No.10357684

>>10357680
>We literally aren't conscious and humans suck xD
Of course, if I was you, I'd have a hard time determining that I was conscious too.

>> No.10357686

>>10357680
That's the definition of functionalism, moron.

>> No.10357687
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10357687

>>10357678
>The "brain" being the system run by Lilliputians. Say, if we bred enough humans and passed notes to each other, could we spontaneously produce a collective single consciousness?

No, you complete fucking retard. The Liliputian humans themselves would be subject to human moral and physical frailties. Your dumb example is no longer a credible replication of a human brain. Really, your post is so stupid I'm about to kms. This is your last (You). Don't bother to reply with more of your carelessly proposed nonsense.

>> No.10357691

>>10357687
>He can't think hypothetically
This is literally the same thing as going "BUT MARY WOULD SEE HER OWN SKIN" when confronted with the problem of Mary's room.
It's been fun chatting with a p-zombie, I'm gonna go jack off to gay porn now. It feels pretty good.

>> No.10357695

>>10350149
>>10350152
please stick to the books and don't comment on science.

>> No.10357731

>>10357585
Where in that post did I say anything about QM ?

>> No.10357830
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10357830

Trouble with empty-heads making dumb brain-in-a-jar / Matrix hypotheticals is this: they neglect that consciousness could be more complicated than they imagine. It arises not solely from the wrinkly lobes but also input from the body, voluntary and involuntary. Pseuds.

>> No.10357832

>>10357687
Having a body like that should be illegal.

>> No.10357834

>>10357832
*mandatory

>> No.10357901

>>10357834
That's what i meant, excuse me.

>> No.10357903
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10357903

>> No.10357912

>>10357293
>The only thing that exists is the PHYSICAL pain.
Alright, suppose we narrow down the situation specifically to one that suits your argument. This changes absolutely nothing, if you understood this line that I already said:

>There being resemblance doesn't mean we are really capable of KNOWLEDGE of what the other experiences.

>Exploring the definitions of words will never allow you to actually discuss the concepts you want to discuss.
It's not quite the "definitions" of words you need to explore, but the meanings they hold to those that use them.

>> No.10357956

if(lim(a[[(2*n)-2]]+a[[(2*n)+1]]-a[[2*n]])=0 as n->infinity)

>> No.10358311

>>10357293
>it's an anon pretends to have Wittgenstein to try to win arguments episode
fuck off

>> No.10358748

>>10357244
>you can call anyone who denies it insane, mentally deficient, or non-human.
So you admit that non-human organisms can perhaps not perceive 1+1 as self-evident, but then act like 1+1 is objectively self-evident. Which is it?

Most people who try to discuss the thread topic tend to lean towards a subject-object differentation that was squashed long ago by Nietzsche:

>The intellect cannot criticize itself, simply because it cannot be compared with other species of intellect and because its capacity to know would be revealed only in the presence of “true reality,” i.e., because in order to criticize the intellect we should have to be a higher being with “absolute knowledge.” This presupposes that, distinct from every perspective kind of outlook or sensual-spiritual appropriation, something exists, an “in-itself.”— But the psychological derivation of the belief in things forbids us to speak of “things-in-themselves.”

>That a sort of adequate relationship subsists between subject and object, that the object is something that if seen from within would be a subject, is a well-meant invention which, I think, has had its day. The measure of that of which we are in any way conscious is totally dependent upon the coarse utility of its becoming-conscious: how could this nook-perspective of consciousness permit us to assert anything of “subject” and “object” that touched reality!—

>I maintain the phenomenality of the inner world, too: everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through— the actual process of inner “perception,” the causal connection between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, are absolutely hidden from us— and are perhaps purely imaginary. The “apparent inner world” is governed by just the same forms and procedures as the “outer” world. We never encounter “facts”: pleasure and displeasure are subsequent and derivative intellectual phenomena—

>There exists neither “spirit,” nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no use. There is no question of “subject and object,” but of a particular species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; above all, regularity of its perceptions (so that it can accumulate experience—

>”Everything is subjective,” you say; but even this is interpretation. The “subject” is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is.— Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis. In so far as the word “knowledge” has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.— “Perspectivism.”

This shit is way before QM, mind.

>> No.10358760

>>10358748
>Most people who try to discuss the thread topic tend to lean towards a subject-object differentation that was squashed long ago by Nietzsche:

>NEETzsche

>> No.10358770

>>10358748
>This shit is way before QM, mind.
how does this have anything to do with Quantum Mechanics? Do you know what you're talking about? Do you ever read books?

>> No.10358775

>>10358770
>how does this have anything to do with Quantum Mechanics?
You'll see.

>> No.10358792

>>10358748
I dunno lad, that all seems like a stretch. Even the excerpt you posted presupposes that 1 + 1 = 2 and that consciousness is something we are aware of. Why should I believe someone that tells me that my consciousness is a lie, or that the "subject" that I am doesn't exist, when these things are far more evident to me than things like the existence of animals, other beings, or evolution, which is what he based his claims on. I don't see a rational or systematic way of arriving at that point. It seems like it's just something you believe if you want to believe it. It's unfalsifiable.

>> No.10358884

>>10358792
I'm not saying your consciousness does not exist at all. Your consciousness as a thing-in-itself does not exist aside from as an interpretation.

>I don't see a rational or systematic way of arriving at that point.
Nietzsche doesn't always draw it out, but he does speak more on this in order to illustrate the flimsy nature of the belief in the thing-in-itself. I'm at work so I'll share more later.

>> No.10358891

>>10358884
Who interprets it?

>> No.10358909

>>10358891
In the strictest sense, that is unanswerable, because it is unknowable.

>> No.10358943

>>10358909
So is that the "self"?

>> No.10358987

>>10358943
Precisely

>> No.10358991

>>10358987
Can you elaborate on what you think the difference is between the self interpreting consciousness and the self being conscious? Or am I misunderstanding you?

>> No.10359006

>>10358770
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Observer_effect_(physics)

>> No.10359063

>>10359006
Ok you don't understand quantum mechanics OR philosophy of mind

good day sir

>> No.10359091

>>10359063
QM is young, I'm not saying it's directly connected yet. But there will be future developments and you'll see how it ends up tying in. A precursor glimpse can already be seen in these early experiments.

>> No.10359106

Is it possible for someone not in the field of physics to become sufficiently acquainted with things like quantum mechanics by studying it in his free time? Or is this shit just hopelessly Bryony the layman?

>> No.10359122

>>10358991
There is no difference strictly speaking. The self is unknowable and all things are the self, and all knowable things are knowable in so far as they do not actually touch on the reality of the self, i.e. we cannot know anything of reality really, for reality implies an opposite, but the self is all we experience. These concepts "knowledge" and "reality" and "truth" are just tools of the imagination with the sole purpose of gaining power, they do not point to "reality."

>> No.10359132

>>10353015
I was trying to say that the body and its parts has absolutely no qualities that explain experience of the mind.

>> No.10359479
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10359479

>>10359106
Seems so. Can you explain how this is off?

>But the Will to Power has no point of view, because the Will to Power is not something which considers or evaluates the nature of the universe from the outside. Like quantum mechanics, the Will to Power is not something based on local and mechanistic concepts. The Will to Power is not something. The Will to Power is the universe. Thus it is like Darwin's evolution-devolution, like an out-of-equilibrium or dissipative system which operates on every level from the mineral to the moral. Surely we would not be mystified if Darwin had refused to name various aspects of biological evolution good or evil. Evolution is not easily labelled good or evil, even though we find it easy to throw those terms about. No, the Will to Power is not like Darwin's evolution, it is evolution -- an overarching evolution which in the absence of Substance includes the moral as well as the inorganic and the biological. The universe is evolution; it is flux. It is thus similar to Schopenhauer's holistic World as Will, except for Nietzsche it is not a thing to be rejected and escaped, but rather a joyous thing to be embraced. Unlike the Buddhist wheel of life and death from whose unhappy rotation one must escape through Nirvana, one embraces joyously time and time again the Will to Power as it manifests itself in the Eternal Recurrence. Thus, he who would reject the Will to Power would reject himself and founder in the ultimate danger of nihilism.

>> No.10359550

>>10359479
That barely even references quantum mechanics you moron, it's nowhere near enough to judge the author's understanding of QM

>> No.10359556

>>10359106
Yes. It's gonna take you a couple of years at best.

>> No.10359625

>>10359550
https://books.google.com/books?id=rYxWA5yNW5cC&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147

Page 147, 46: Summary of Nietzsche and Quantum Mechanics. Thoughts?

Jump to 157, 49: Moles, Space, and Quantum Theory. Thoughts?

>> No.10359648

>>10350070
nah, everyone is diasagreeing on it

>> No.10359676

>>10359625
>Thoughts?
no thanks, I'm good

>> No.10359734

>>10355308
Took a bit but this is the proper reply. As we find how more and more things change "who" we are (even your gut bacteria have an effect on your cognitive behavior), to continue to make arguments of a separation between body and mind (or soul) ascribes fewer and fewer observable traits to what a "mind" is than the "essential something" that makes us human. Just consider that dualists today are arguing that a much smaller set of traits can be ascribed to the mind than they would have claimed 100 years prior.

The need for mind-body dualism comes out of sentimentality and a fear of death, nothing less. There's no more reason to believe a person has a soul than a chair does.

>> No.10359784

>>10350070
>mind-body-dualism thread
>Ctrl+F "Davidson"
>0 matches
/lit/, you disappoint me

>> No.10359819

>>10359784
"Nevertheless there would be a difference"

yeah how about no

>> No.10359908

>>10359734
>The need for mind-body dualism comes out of sentimentality and a fear of death
Nonsense. Physicalists are every bit as prone to believing blatant bullshit just because it promises them eternal life. That's what the whole Singularity shit is about.

>> No.10359970

>>10359908
How does calling someone a physicalist even make sense when these so-called physicalists do not even perceive a realm outside of the physical?

>> No.10360039

>>10350070
are people in this thread unironically discussing the existence of the "soul"?

>> No.10360046

>>10359734
But the concept of oblivion doesn't exist in the first place if you don't believe in dualism. There is no "thing" to become "nothing".

>> No.10360065

>>10360039
Yes. Pseudoscientific communities haven't been clued in on 19th century philosophy yet so they are still hung up about it.

>> No.10360149

>>10360039
The soul posited by most dualists doesn't match up with the religious soul. It's just an explanation for mental events.

>> No.10360183
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10360183

>>10359734
>The need for mind-body dualism comes out of sentimentality and a fear of death, nothing less. There's no more reason to believe a person has a soul than a chair does.
Good thing there are reasons to believe a chair has a soul

>> No.10360186

are brainlets conscious?

>> No.10360191

>>10359479
>William Plank
literally who?

>> No.10360192

>>10360186
idunno, lemme ask one
>>10360186
are you conscious?

>> No.10360199

>>10360186
judging by this thread, no

>> No.10360205

>>10360039
nope, retard. substance dualism and property dualism are two different things

also, continental philosophy was a fucking mistake. if you're actually denying the existence of conscious or debating semantics about """""things-in-themselves""""" you should kill yourself

wittgenstein was right

>> No.10360235

>>10359734
>The need for mind-body dualism comes out of sentimentality and a fear of death, nothing less.
Dualism doesn't imply the existence of an immortal soul. But whatever just blab about shit that you haven't read about beyond the first paragraph of a wikipedia article.

>> No.10360295

>>10360205
>if you're actually denying the existence of conscious or debating semantics about """""things-in-themselves""""" you should kill yourself
t. didn't actually read the posts involving Nietzsche

>> No.10360310

>>10360295
quit shilling your own posts

>> No.10360317

>>10360295
explain yourself or fuck off

>> No.10360319

>>10360310
I'll shill what I want until you provide a proper argument.

>> No.10360336

>>10360319
all of your posts about how Nietzsche claimed consciousness isn't real because you can't analyze yourself are retarded. like not even worth responding to bad.

he's literally just saying "consciousness doesn't exist because i say so" when it's the only thing that is truly undeniable.

>> No.10360342

>>10360336
>he's literally just saying "consciousness doesn't exist because i say so"
Why did you bother posting?

>> No.10360352

>>10360342
>I maintain the phenomenality of the inner world, too: everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through— the actual process of inner “perception,” the causal connection between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, are absolutely hidden from us— and are perhaps purely imaginary. The “apparent inner world” is governed by just the same forms and procedures as the “outer” world. We never encounter “facts”: pleasure and displeasure are subsequent and derivative intellectual phenomena—

>There exists neither “spirit,” nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all are fictions that are of no use. There is no question of “subject and object,” but of a particular species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; above all, regularity of its perceptions (so that it can accumulate experience—


explain to me how this is anything different than "DUDE consciousness is an illusion lmao" or fuck off

>> No.10360357
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10360357

>>10360352
>absolutely hidden from us
>really happens to be the only thing you can be sure of

>> No.10360360

>>10360352
he's not arguing against the sensation of existence itself, he's arguing against positing a definite subject that interacts with a definite object.

>> No.10360382

>>10357194
>I also really enjoy literature, but the English class I took this semester turned out to be a bit of a letdown. The lectures were all over the place, none of the readings were especially interesting, and I don't feel like I drew any valuable knowledge about literature from anything we talked about.

i felt the exact same way.

>I have this half-formed dream of being a philosophy professor/academic

I think it's doable, but the competition is pretty tough from what my professors tell me.

>Is there any specific kind of philosophy that you are especially interested in?

I really enjoy ethics and meta-ethics. It's probably my favorite philosophy class that I've taken so far. Something about it is very satisfying to me. I also enjoy philosophy of mind, but something about it is a bit more frustrating. I'm not sure what it is.

>> No.10360388

>>10360360
>There exists neither [...] consciousness

>> No.10360392

>>10360388
i'm pretty sure by "consciousness" he meant the colloquial use of the word and not consciousness in the fundamental "something exists" sense we're talking about here

>> No.10360399

>>10360360
>he's arguing against positing a definite subject that interacts with a definite object.
who is arguing that?

>>10360392
>i'm pretty sure by "consciousness" he meant the colloquial use of the word and not consciousness in the fundamental "something exists" sense we're talking about here
ah classic continental philosophers being ridiculously vague so that everyone can misinterpret their babblings

>> No.10360413

>>10360399
>who is arguing that?
the Nietzsche excerpt

also i don't know that there is a word to denote 'consciousness' in the way we were using it in this conversation, other than appropriating the aforementioned term. it's not that Nietzsche is denying and affirming the same thing contradictorily

>> No.10360422

>>10360413
i'm saying who initially posited the idea there is some subject-object interaction in consciousness that he's replying to

also, you need to explicitly say what he is denying. i don't understand what he's denying if he's not denying consciousness itself.

>> No.10360449

>>10360352
"consciousness doesn't exist" and "consciousness is an illusion" are two very different things. Illusions exist.

Nietzsche sums it up briefly here:

>The properties of a thing are effects on other "things": if one removes other "things," then a thing has no properties, i.e., there is no thing without other things, i.e., there is no "thing-in-itself."

And is elaborated on here:

>A thing-in-itself is just as perverse as a "sense-in-itself," a "meaning-in-itself." There are no "facts-in-themselves," for a sense must always be projected into them before there can be "facts." The question "what is that?" is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. "Essence," the "essential nature," is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies "what is that for me?" (for us, for all that lives, etc.). A thing would be defined once all creatures had asked "what is that?" and had answered their question. Supposing one single creature, with its own relationships and perspectives for all things, were missing, then the thing would not yet be "defined." In short: the essence of a thing is only an opinion about the "thing." Or rather: "it is considered" as the real "it is," the sole "this is." One may not ask: "who then interprets?" for the interpretation itself is a form of the will to power, it exists (but not as a "being," but as a process, a becoming) as an affect. The origin of "things" is wholly the work of that which imagines, thinks, wills, feels. The concept "thing" itself just as much as all its qualities.— Even "the subject" is such a created entity, a "thing" like all others: a simplification with the object of defining the force which posits, invents, thinks, as distinct from all individual positing, inventing, thinking as such. Thus a capacity as distinct from all that is individual— fundamentally, action collectively considered with respect to all anticipated actions (action and the probability of similar actions).

>> No.10360483

>>10360449
I should add that the thing-in-itself topic is relevant because the exact same arguments apply to consciousness-in-itself or mind-in-itself.

>> No.10360549

>>10360449
>The properties of a thing are effects on other "things"
wrong, the properties of a thing can only be known by observing its interactions with other things but they would still apply to it even if everything else in the universe were to disappear.

>> No.10360556

>>10360549
So a tree would still be tall if all things shorter than it disappeared?

>> No.10360584

>>10360556
tallness isn't a property of a thing you dumb fuck, it's a property of our perception of that thing

>> No.10360591

>>10360584
what's the difference

>> No.10360628

>>10360449
>>>The properties of a thing are effects on other "things": if one removes other "things," then a thing has no properties, i.e., there is no thing without other things, i.e., there is no "thing-in-itself."
so he's a physicalist

>> No.10360632

>>10360591
it means that tallness is a label that we assign to a thing by comparing it to other things based on a quality that can be roughly expressed as the distance between the point of the object closest to the ground and the point of the object furthest from the groud. objects in which this distance is longer than other objects are taller than other objects, but tallness is not an intrinsic quality that these objects possess, it's a comparison between objects and depends on the objects being compared.

>> No.10360641

>>10360632
how do intrinsic qualities of objects escape the necessity of comparison? that's the whole idea of the excerpt

>> No.10360644

>>10360584
>>10360632
Go ahead and describe a property of a tree that isn't assigned via perception.

>> No.10360650

>>10360644
the property of existence

>> No.10360655

>>10360650
What is it that you think exists?

>> No.10360664

>>10360644
>assigned
trick question, the intrinsic properties of which I write aren't assigned to it by us, they exist independently of there being anyone to observe them

>> No.10360668

>>10360655
the tree. i would also say it possesses properties like roundness, which don't depend on an observer or comparison in the same way that tallness or brownness do

>> No.10360682

>>10360664
So we are back to the problem of a tree still being tall even if all things shorter than it are gone.

>>10360668
Define the tree without any properties assigned to it via perception, and explain how it is the same tree without those properties.

>> No.10360686

>>10360668
>>10360682
Also, roundness is assigned as well. That is not removed from perception at all.

>> No.10360687

>>10360664
>>10360644
wait no i misread your post
but of course i couldn't possibly do that, as all the information i have about an object comes to me through my perception of it.
that doesn't mean that intrinsic properties don't exist, mind you, only that we can't truly know them

>> No.10360690

>>10360682
>Define the tree without any properties assigned to it via perception, and explain how it is the same tree without those properties.
that wasn't the question and it is irrelevant

>>10360686
roundness is not "assigned". it is just the measure of how closely something is to a circle. it exists whether or not humans exist to perceive it. redness not does exist without humans there to perceive it

>> No.10360708

>>10360687
>that doesn't mean that intrinsic properties don't exist, mind you, only that we can't truly know them
It does mean that, because it deflates the concept of "thing-in-itself," therefore "intrinsic" as a word refers to nothing. Might as well say "nothingness exists."

>>10360690
>roundness is not "assigned". it is just the measure of
>measure
Which means it requires another thing to do the measuring.

>> No.10360717

>>10360708
>it deflates the concept of "thing-in-itself,"
how so?

>> No.10360730

>>10360717
When driven to its end conclusion, the entirety of the universe is undone. All of knowledge included. You are now left speaking about what is unknowable, undefinable, of which there can be nothing said. "i.e. there are no things without other things, i.e., there is no 'thing-in-itself.'"

>> No.10360738

>>10360708
>Which means it requires another thing to do the measuring.

>you have to measure something in order for something to be a certain length
so if humans didn't exist, the earth wouldn't be a certain diameter? (regardless of what units you use)

brainlet

>> No.10360749

>>10360738
>so if humans didn't exist, the earth wouldn't be a certain diameter?
Without a creature around that perceives of "diameters," yes. Any other stance is arguing for a position that is unobtainable (namely one that is universally within all perspectives simultaneously). You are encapsulated in your own body / perspective and all your "knowledge" is peppered by that perspective, realize this.

>> No.10360752

>>10360730
>When driven to its end conclusion, the entirety of the universe is undone. All of knowledge included.
how so?
an actual explanation this time, please, not another unexplained claim

>> No.10360761

>>10360752
Back here:

>The intellect cannot criticize itself, simply because it cannot be compared with other species of intellect and because its capacity to know would be revealed only in the presence of “true reality,” i.e., because in order to criticize the intellect we should have to be a higher being with “absolute knowledge.” This presupposes that, distinct from every perspective kind of outlook or sensual-spiritual appropriation, something exists, an “in-itself.”— But the psychological derivation of the belief in things forbids us to speak of “things-in-themselves.”

>That a sort of adequate relationship subsists between subject and object, that the object is something that if seen from within would be a subject, is a well-meant invention which, I think, has had its day. The measure of that of which we are in any way conscious is totally dependent upon the coarse utility of its becoming-conscious: how could this nook-perspective of consciousness permit us to assert anything of “subject” and “object” that touched reality!—

>> No.10360772

>>10360749
>Without a creature around that perceives of "diameters," yes.
that is blatantly incorrect, and your whole argument fails. you're basically advocating for berkeleyian idealism and saying the external world doesn't exist

>> No.10360776

>>10360772
>you're basically advocating for berkeleyian idealism and saying the external world doesn't exist
i mean you won't be able to refute this merely by claiming it to be wrong

>> No.10360780

>>10360761
in your own words goddammit, a few paragraphs written by nietzsche divorced of their original context and transplanted into our conversation are a poor substitute for any actual explanation of your ideas, especially since they don't even address your claim about the universe and knowledge coming undone, which is preceisely the thing I wanted an explanation on.

>> No.10360789

>>10360776
sure, global skeptics can always say that the external world doesn't exist or that we're in the matrix. thank god recent philosophers have realized that the burden of proof lies more on the skeptic in this case.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Here_is_one_hand

it's just ridiculous to set the burden of proof at the level of "if there's a possible scenario in which the thing proposed is false, then it can be doubted", unless you're doing a descartes style thought experiment to try to find the foundation of knowledge. outside of that, it's ridiculous to actually say that the external world doesn't exist

>> No.10360797

>>10360772
>and saying the external world doesn't exist
This statement is indicative that you aren't fully following what's being said. Not just the external world, but also the internal, by necessity, are up for question. And it's not a claim that they do not exist at all.

This comment >>10360628 is also indicative of this, to some degree, because psychologically us "physicalists" have no word for something which sees "only the physical" — by necessity that word implies that there is something else. Therefore, only a dualist not sensing our psychology correctly would use the word.

>> No.10360801

>>10360797
>This comment >>10360628(You) is also indicative of this, to some degree, because psychologically us "physicalists" have no word for something which sees "only the physical" — by necessity that word implies that there is something else. Therefore, only a dualist not sensing our psychology correctly would use the word.

you need to stop posting and read more philosophy, seriously. it's embarrassing that you'd actually respond to me saying that i'm not understanding the arguments at hand when you clearly haven't read or understood the majority of posts itt.

>> No.10360807

>>10360801
>you need to stop posting and read more of the philosophy that I like
ftfy

>> No.10360813

>>10360807
if you honestly think that using a word to categorize one of two major groups of thought on a philosophical issue is begging the question against one of them then you're not taking the discussion seriously.

>> No.10360826

>>10360813
>you're not taking the discussion seriously.
Questioning the very root of the dichotomy is not taking it seriously? Simply because there is a commonly referred to dichotomy does not mean it is or will always be a valid one.

>> No.10360841

>>10360826
it proves that you haven't read enough dualist arguments to be qualified to say anything on the subject. even the most staunch materialists acknowledge the strength of the best dualist arguments.

http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/Du.htm

here is a materialist defending dualism

>> No.10360844

>>10360789
>meme arguments
i'd tell him "here's some shrooms" and then his intuition would irrefutably lead him to deny the existence of the external world

>> No.10360864

>>10360841
I could read more, sure. At the same time, not one person has properly argued anything quoted in the thread by Nietzsche or any of my posts for that matter. So if you've done the additional reading, and still can't properly address any of that or provide anything even a smidgen convincing, where do you think it will take me, who has read Nietzsche for a long time in addition to several others (primarily his influencers and who he influenced), to read even more?

>> No.10360879

>>10360864
well you have done a shit job of convincing me to read more Nietzsche, but I'm still going to

you should seek knowledge for its own sake

>> No.10360924

>>10360864
>not one person has properly argued anything quoted in the thread by Nietzsche or any of my posts for that matter
That's because you failed to properly explain your own arguments, let alone Nietzsche's arguments. You (and nietzsche) are clearly using words in ways which imply definitions other than the usual ones but since you haven't provided those definitions and I haven't read Nietzsche I don't have any clue what you're trying to say and so we can't help but keep arguing in circles until you actually explain yourself.

>> No.10360931

>>10360780
My ideas are mostly from Nietzsche, hence why I quote him. He's done the work of writing it out elegantly.

>Against determinism and teleology.— From the fact that something ensues regularly and ensues calculably, it does not follow that it ensues necessarily. That a quantum of force determines and conducts itself in every particular case in one way and manner does not make it into an "unfree will." "Mechanical necessity" is not a fact: it is we who first interpreted it into events. We have interpreted the formulatable character of events as the consequence of a necessity that rules over events. But from the fact that I do a certain thing, it by no means follows that I am compelled to do it. Compulsion in things certainly cannot be demonstrated: the rule proves only that one and the same event is not another event as well. Only because we have introduced subjects, "doers," into things does it appear that all events are the consequences of compulsion exerted upon subjects— exerted by whom? again by a "doer." Cause and effect— a dangerous concept so long as one thinks of something that causes and something upon which an effect is produced.

The part we are interested in:

>It is only after the model of the subject that we have invented the reality of things and projected them into the medley of sensations. If we no longer believe in the effective subject, then belief also disappears in effective things, in reciprocation, cause and effect between those phenomena that we call things. There also disappears, of course, the world of effective atoms: the assumption of which always depended on the supposition that one needed subjects. At last, the "thing-in-itself" also disappears, because this is fundamentally the conception of a "subject-in-itself." But we have grasped that the subject is a fiction. The antithesis "thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; with that, however, the concept "appearance" also disappears. If we give up the effective subject, we also give up the object upon which effects are produced. Duration, identity with itself, being are inherent neither in that which is called subject nor in that which is called object: they are complexes of events apparently durable in comparison with other complexes— e.g., through the difference in tempo of the event (rest— motion, firm— loose: opposites that do not exist in themselves and that actually express only variations in degree that from a certain perspective appear to be opposites. There are no opposites: only from those of logic do we derive the concept of opposites— and falsely transfer it to things). If we give up the concept "subject" and "object," then also the concept "substance"— and as a consequence also the various modifications of it, e.g., "matter," "spirit," and other hypothetical entities, "the eternity and immutability of matter," etc. We have got rid of materiality.

It keeps going. I suggest reading Will to Power.

>> No.10360938

>>10360879
>you should seek knowledge for its own sake
At the very least I should read more, definitely. I'll read the link above.

>>10360924
This is why I should, because Nietzsche is 19th century and I am most familiar with his writing and philosophers before him.

>> No.10360950

>>10360938
>This is why I should, because Nietzsche is 19th century and I am most familiar with his writing and philosophers before him.
yes, it is. it's practically impossible to engage with 20-21st century analytic philosophy if all you've read is 19th century continental stuff. i'm not just saying this to bash continental philosophy, but it's just not very fruitful discussion-wise unless we're on the same page linguistically.

also, i feel like 20th century philosophers applied formal logic in order to take problems like this out of the picture. it's infuriating to argue in a circle

>> No.10360961

>>10360931
I frankly fail to see how this has anything to do with your assertion that our inability to truly know intrinsic properties causes the entire universe to come undone and deflates the thing-in-itself. You post these quotes as if it should be self-evident that they're correct, that's not how you have an argument.

>> No.10360987

>>10360950
>also, i feel like 20th century philosophers applied formal logic in order to take problems like this out of the picture.
From what I have read, the dominating concepts in philosophy haven't changed since Nietzsche, just how they are worded, and at times not all of the concept carries over intact, like how you won't always keep the same nuances of language when a text is translated (and we should keep that in mind with Nietzsche). Perhaps some elimination of communication barriers occurred in the process.

>> No.10361005

>>10360987
>From what I have read, the dominating concepts in philosophy haven't changed since Nietzsche, just how they are worded
that's not true at all. also, continental philosophers tackled much different concepts than analytic philosophers. continental philosophers tackle stuff like: what is being-in-itself?, and analytic philosophers tackle questions like: is this the same glass of water that was here 10 minutes ago?

but it is worth noting that analytics made a point to be as absolutely clear as possible, and thought that many of the concepts continentals discussed were nonsense. i don't personally think that, but that may explain why you're encountering some difficulty ITT. either way, it's worth reading more analytic stuff (even if it's just so you can argue better with them)

>> No.10361018

>>10361005
I have yet to see a compelling argument for the validity of the categorizations of continental vs. analytic philosophy, other than simply pairing certain people together for the sake of some clique-like maneuvering, much like the categorization of postmodernism, which to me seems to be "20th century French philosophy" since all of the labeled postmodernists are considerably different.

>> No.10361044

>>10361018
my god dude i give up. your arrogance is unbearable.

STOP saying things like "I have yet to see". that shows me you haven't read enough to even have an opinion yet, much less one that you're this sure of

>> No.10361059

>>10361044
I was fucking with you with that one.

Still, if my tone affects you, you might not get very far with Nietzsche. Not to say you aren't capable, but because he does nothing to hide his, since he understands it as directly part of the discourse.

>> No.10361084

>>10360789
>it's just ridiculous to set the burden of proof at the level of "if there's a possible scenario in which the thing proposed is false, then it can be doubted", unless you're doing a descartes style thought experiment to try to find the foundation of knowledge.
Yeah sure thing nigga, but how u know dat? Whatever basis you have for believing that is ridiculous can be doubted...

>> No.10361117
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10361117

>>10361084
>Yeah sure thing nigga, but how u know dat? Whatever basis you have for believing that is ridiculous can be doubted...

Infinite recursive loop detected. Stopping.

>> No.10361130

>>10360789
Skepticism has nothing to do with the post chain you were responding to though. It was also repeatedly stated that it was not being asserted that the world does not exist as fact, just that it is illusive.

>> No.10361134

>>10350909
Dude you're retarded. There's a preordained harmony between souls and bodies, not a causal link.

>> No.10361447

>>10361134
>There's a preordained harmony between souls and bodies
Retard.