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/lit/ - Literature


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12303970 No.12303970 [Reply] [Original]

Is compatibilism just a massive cope?

>> No.12303972

>>12303970
Writing shit down in general is a massive cope and eventually just overcompensating for not having enough sex

>> No.12303977

>>12303970
yup
they want to believe in fate because its cool and poetic, however they dont want to reject free will (common sense) so they self-delude themselves into this crap

>> No.12303978

>>12303972
muh cummies

>> No.12303989

>>12303977
This but the exact other way around. They can’t deny that people are subjected to causality like everything else but still want to take pride in their accomplishments and blame others for their faults.

>> No.12304066

>>12303989
Your preferred theory of mind determines this. So, I do think that they still have a point there. It ultimately boils down to the consciousness.

>> No.12304078

>>12303989
>like everything else
im curious at what makes you come to this part here

>> No.12304091

>>12303989
That's an uncharitable reading of Dennett's work. The point is that the notion of "free will" given by common sense is downright nonsensical (unless you posit a soul, or any other similar gimmick, to escape the deterministic framework). Since that common sense meaning is incoherent we should simply rethink the concept in its real context, which is deterministic. This leads Dennett to reinterpret "freedom" as something that is defined by the possible options available to a given system, object or individual. That system will always follow its determined path, but modally speaking that was a path among others paths (so that in another universe I could have stopped writing this post, whilea rock could not jump, explode or move by itself in other universes unless you turn it into something completely different).
Why do people always get this simple argument wrong? All the criticism are always addressed in literally the first part of the argument (since Dennet concedes that the common understanding of "free will" is incoherent).

>> No.12304096

>>12304091
>This leads Dennett to reinterpret "freedom" as something that is defined by the possible options available to a given system, object or individual
LOL how is that any different than free will

>> No.12304105

>>12304096
Because it is defined modally. When it comes to our reality, which is not modal (as far as we know), we only have one option (the same applies to literally everything else), which is why the common sense interpretation of the concept of free will is self-contradictory.

>> No.12304116

>>12304105
Dennett continuously misinterprets and misunderstands simple arguments (like qualia), the guy's an absolute clown.

>> No.12304117

>>12304116
What does this have to do with his compatibilist argument? Do you disagree with it?

>> No.12304118

>>12304105
i don't find it convincing that a single outcome means necessarily single option

>> No.12304120

>>12303970
why is that man wearing a big red shower cap?

>> No.12304122

>>12304117
because you can't explain away the subjective sense of freedom, which is what free will is ultimately talking about, does anyone really think free will means having an infinite number of paths available to you?

>> No.12304124

>>12304118
Do you reject physicalism?

>> No.12304127

>>12304124
ofc, im not retarded

>> No.12304142

>>12304122
To most people free will means that you can deliberately chose between option. If you only have the impression of choosing, you're not free. As a physicalist he thinks that every action of yours is phisically determined, meaning that at best that impression is a mere illusion.
>>12304124
How do you reject it?

>> No.12304145

>>12304122
well, it would depend on the physics. some interpretations suggest that there is indeed an infinite amount of different paths. multiverse, etc.

>> No.12304146

>>12304127
How do you reject it?

>> No.12304148

>>12304146
this. these tards never have a good theory of physics.

>> No.12304149

>>12304122
>free will means having an infinite number of paths available to you?
well how do you prove its not
it looks like the most logical thing
>>12304146
all things transform into something, they cant disappear, same ought to happen with human mind

>> No.12304155

>>12304145
A multiverse would not change anything, you would still be determined in every single one of them.
>>12304149
>all things transform into something, they cant disappear, same ought to happen with human mind
Emergent properties can easily disappear.

>> No.12304156

>>12304142
>To most people free will means that you can deliberately chose between option. If you only have the impression of choosing, you're not free. As a physicalist he thinks that every action of yours is phisically determined, meaning that at best that impression is a mere illusion.

my felt sense of agency coincides with causality, not that hard

>> No.12304176

>>12304156
>my felt sense of agency coincides with causality, not that hard
What do you mean?

>> No.12304179

>>12304155
>Emergent properties can easily disappear.
the fact that we think implies that it has some kind of substantial existence which is not physical
the very existence of abstract ideas like love implies the same
>A multiverse would not change anything, you would still be determined in every single one of them.
in all honesty idea of multiple realities butchers the fuck out of occhams razor

>> No.12304186

>>12304179
>the fact that we think implies that it has some kind of substantial existence which is not physical
woo yeah luminous beings are we not this crude matter
is this what you fucknuts really believe?

>> No.12304188

>>12304179
>the fact that we think implies that it has some kind of substantial existence which is not physical the very existence of abstract ideas like love implies the same
All of this can be explained in a purely physicalist framework.

>> No.12304195

>>12304176
i make decision x but you tell because it's part of causal chain y, okay, then the only logical conclusion must be that this causal chain incorporates the very agency I feel am exercising when I make this decision

>> No.12304200

>>12304186
>hurr lemme trivialize a philosophical point with an inane pop culture reference

fuck off

>>12304188

not at all.

>> No.12304214

>>12304186
>is this what you fucknuts really believe?
it seems to me like you are the one who believes in magical woo since i dont see any other explanation about abstract ideas
>>12304188
>All of this can be explained in a purely physicalist framework.
connected physical consequences of said abstract ideas can

>> No.12304226

>>12304195
The point is that you make no decision, you do what you're determined to do. I don't see why your psychological experience should matter in this regard.
>>12304200
>not at all.
Eh.
>>12304214
>since i dont see any other explanation about abstract ideas
Neurological patterns can account for shared concepts (such as the ones of math and logic). There is no reason to believe that they exists outside of our arbitrary human framework

>> No.12304242

>>12304226
>Neurological patterns can account for shared concepts
but not about ideas themselves
>There is no reason to believe that they exists outside of our arbitrary human framework
we could as easily claim that everything is an illusion of human mind then

>> No.12304246

>>12304226
>The point is that you make no decision, you do what you're determined to do. I don't see why your psychological experience should matter in this regard.

because it is inseperable from the decision making process you attribute wholly to causality

>Neurological patterns can account for shared concepts (such as the ones of math and logic). There is no reason to believe that they exists outside of our arbitrary human framework

they don't have to, you're missing the point. neurological patterns refute love, oh my god dude come on get a grip

>> No.12304260

>>12304242
>we could as easily claim that everything is an illusion of human mind then
i'm beginning to think you're an illusion anon
i don't think a real person could be quite so wilfully ignorant

>> No.12304273

>>12304260
No, but the idea that abstract notions don't exist because they don't exist outside the human mind is a non-argument. I mean, come on where else would they exist? Rocks don't write love poems so it's all just chemicals broooo? Don't be inane.

>> No.12304288

>>12304242
>but not about ideas themselves
What do you accept as an Idea? If you mean it in a Platonic sense (i.e. identity, limit, size, etc), they are accountable by neurological patterns. The same applies to language and sense perception.
>we could as easily claim that everything is an illusion of human mind then
That's a larger question. Anyway denying the existence of universals is not so often associated with solipsism, so that's a weird argumentative jump.

>>12304246
>because it is inseperable from the decision making process you attribute wholly to causality
A causality that has nothing to do with thay mental state, a causality that is ENTIRELY phisically determined. The fact that you believe that you're taking a choice means nothing, since that same belief is determined by outside forces.
>they don't have to, you're missing the point. neurological patterns refute love, oh my god dude come on get a grip
Talking about charitable readings...
Neurological patterns do not refute love, rather they refute the ontological ideal status of love: it doesn't exist outside of those patterns, which are themselves physical.

>> No.12304305

>>12304288
>they are accountable by neurological patterns
their physical consequences are, still doesnt explain them as such unless we go the route where we can say that entire existence is an illusion
>That's a larger question. Anyway denying the existence of universals is not so often associated with solipsism, so that's a weird argumentative jump.
the idea that world we know is an illusion does not necessarily mean solipsism, its more like extreme agnosticism

>> No.12304326

>>12304288
>A causality that has nothing to do with thay mental state, a causality that is ENTIRELY phisically determined. The fact that you believe that you're taking a choice means nothing, since that same belief is determined by outside forces.

wrong, I can take a perspective and based decisions/actions on brain scans that tell me what I am feeling, thinking, etc. I can acquire a reflexive position on my own causality, as it were.

>Neurological patterns do not refute love, rather they refute the ontological ideal status of love: it doesn't exist outside of those patterns, which are themselves physical.

nothing exists outside subjectivity that we can meaningfully talk about, nothing at all, you're saying nothing.

>> No.12304328

>>12304273
where do you think they exist then? floating around in the air?
you can modify or destroy any aspect of a person's ability to think by modifying or destroying parts of the human brain. for example a common side effect of brain injuries is that people become disinhibited- they can no longer think ahead to see the consequences of their actions.
so yeah, it pretty much is "all just chemicals", i.e. the intricate network of chemical interactions that we have going on inside our skulls every moment.
why isn't that enough for you? why does there have to be something mystical or ineffable? a garden is beautiful without having fairies at the bottom of it.

>> No.12304337

>>12304328
>why isn't that enough for you? why does there have to be something mystical or ineffable? a garden is beautiful without having fairies at the bottom of it.
wouldnt know, youre the expert in magic which is i presume the glue holding together thoughts and brain chemicals

>> No.12304344

>>12304337
you didn't answer the question
where do you think abstract thoughts come from if not from within the human brain?

>> No.12304351

>>12304328
because your idea of the physical incorporates the entire affective universe of human subjectivity, rendering it null and moot. "oh, we're made of stuff" nigger so? the entire point is how something like love or beauty emerges out of pre-subjective material in the first place

and lol at the dawkins quote.

>> No.12304386

>>12304344
>where do you think abstract thoughts come from if not from within the human brain?
the notion might be hard to conceive for you so brace yourself:
its called metaphysics, might wanna read a book or two about it

>> No.12304389

>>12304337
>>12304344
Both of you need to take either the parallelism pill or the new mysterian pill rofl

>> No.12304400

>>12304389
you may want to go back to grand warlock dawkins to instruct you in latest anti-metaphysical spells and incantations

>> No.12304413 [DELETED] 

>>12304400
lol ok that was pretty funny you got me

>> No.12304414

>>12304386
oh god you spooky deep thoughts fucknuts are such a drain on society

>>12304351
>and lol at the dawkins quote.
???

>> No.12304417

>>12304414
>oh god you spooky deep thoughts fucknuts are such a drain on society
im a minimum wage worker so you are probably right on that one

>> No.12304425

>>12304400
Denying the existence of universal is itself a metaphysical position pleb. There is no reason to mention Dawkins, people have debated on these matters starting from the birth of philosophy

>> No.12304430

>>12304425
when someone quotes the corniest dawkins quote damn right i will do this

>> No.12304790

>>12303970
Of course. Everyone who denies the truth of hard determinism is coping.

>> No.12304843
File: 11 KB, 645x729, 1507457837885.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
12304843

>>12304790
>hard determinism exists in a world with QM

>> No.12304858

>>12304122
while i don't know if this plays nice with dennett's theories, i don't think it is really opposed to basic compatibilism
i also agree that the subjective experience of free will is an important component and that you can't purely account for free will in terms of an actor's "actual" choices

>> No.12304940

>>12304858
Dennet is quintesential instrumenatlist - at least fodor tells us that. I dont agree that experience is important, thats not even fucking important question here. What we need to answer is the question of personal and sub-personal levels of explanation and how they relates to bridge laws. I will only remind that any answer other than radical eliminativist will be reported to janny - churchalnd is /ourguy/.

>> No.12304942

>>12303972
>for not having enough
Life is cope for not dying early enough.

>> No.12304949

>>12304843
Well, it's a very real thought-prison.

>> No.12304968

>>12304843
Uh oh
Quantum mysticism makes an appearance
What next? Are you going to tell us how well your chakras are aligned or something?

>> No.12304984
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12304984

>physicalists

>> No.12305151

>>12304091
>Since that common sense meaning is incoherent we should simply rethink the concept in its real context,

this is so stupid. why not simply admit that the free will we would like to have cant exists because it makes no sense?
why redefine free will and make compatibilism seem like a valid answer to „does free will exist?“ when it isn't

compatibilism ignores the question and answers a different one. i hate this shit

>> No.12305172

>>12304984
wait. does that picture say that sound isn't physical?
i despair of you people sometimes

>> No.12305180

>>12305172
>does that picture say that sound isn't physical?
No

>> No.12305215

>>12305180
why is it in the list with the other things that the person who created the chart obviously thinks are not physical?

>> No.12305222

>>12305172
Numbers and Universals are the ?-marked ones.
I would say that physio-chemical substances and structures which accessed experience gained advantages for it. Experiences such as hunger, need to breed, fear... In the end, everything.

>> No.12305243

>>12305215
>what is a question mark?
Skilled avoidance of the questions raised though, top marks for that

>> No.12305400
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12305400

>>12304968
>being this much of a brainlet
The only claim i am making is hard determinism is not correct

>> No.12305419

>>12304091
If the world is indeed deterministic, then all that happens is necessary and contingency only becomes a word game, none of those "possible" scenarios are actually possible (in fact, even the idea of "possibility" becomes meaningless) they are ontologically equivalent to nothingness, therefore the action of you not writing the post is the same as the action of a rock moving by itself or exploding. This tremendous cope serves only to nourish human intuition concerning concepts such as contingency, which arise from cognitive gymnastic, not from "reality".

>> No.12305445

Yeah, it's cope in a way. The emphasis is that negative freedom is important.

>> No.12305464

>>12304940
Based. The linear flow of electrons is literally the only thing that "matter".

>> No.12305473

>cope
Is this the penultimate nu-buzzword to close out 2018

>> No.12305526

>>12303970
Herschel

>> No.12305750

>>12305473
Seething NPC.

>> No.12305810

>>12303972
Incel detected

>> No.12305826

>>12305750
Cope is used by NPCs and holierthanthou's over 90% of the time. The rest of the time it is used as a provocation rather than a call to self-aware behavior.

>> No.12305842

>>12305473
yikes!

>> No.12305850

ITT:
>dude, it's all just chumiculs man!

I am legitimately embarassed that I share a board with such types. I don't waste time on people so intellectually small anymore, but I'll say one simple thing here:

what observes these chemicals?

>> No.12305871

>>12305850
Chemicals. Occam's razor destroys the ridiculous notion of immaterialism observing the material despite of the incompatiblity of material and immaterial.

>> No.12305879

>>12305850
>what observes these chemicals?
It's possible that the chemicals align with things that we call phenomenon for evolutionary advantages.
No feeling of hunger, no drive to eat, unlikely to eat compared to those with the drive. Given that humans have a need for spiritual succession, I wonder what we aligned with... Or consciousness itself, what did carbon atoms have to connect to to gain such abilities?

>> No.12305887

>>12305871
Consciousness is a thing. Care to measure the aspects of molecules that are conscious or experience anything?

>> No.12305897
File: 105 KB, 1024x768, Hempel’s+dilemma_+Either+we+understand+the+physics+at+issue+as+today’s,+in+which+case+physicalism+is+almost+certainly+false,+or+we+understand+it+in+terms+of+a+future+physics,+in+which+case+the+thesis+is+excessively+vague..jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
12305897

>everything is physical
Not necessarily wrong, but it raises the question of what type of monism should we favor and why

>> No.12305901

>>12305871
Okay, so what you're telling me is then that "chemicals observe chemicals", right? Therefore whatever "chemicals" are observed in my brain/CNS, there can be zero denial of the fact of them being conscious, right? It is impossible to claim these chemicals to be unconscious, correct?

Also, I don't think >le Occam's Razor has any relevance here.

>> No.12305931

>>12305897
Exactly. You can't reduce reality (it being the collection of everything), making it very hard to define. I think some of the best meta-simplifications is the term "pattern" or "symbol".

>> No.12305945

>>12305887
Fallacy of division. There's nothing mandating that molecules need to be conscious in order for an ordered collection of them to produce consciousness.
If you're unsatisfied with the inability for us to describe precisely how molecules can produce conscious beings and use this to imply that there must be something more, it's an argument from ignorance.
The evidence that the mind is a product of the body comes from studying the brain. Different parts often correspond to specific functions, and a destruction or stimulation of this part of the brain or another results in predictable consequences.

>> No.12305949

>>12305901
Yes, I don't disagree with the hypothesis that the consciousness is material.

>> No.12305952

>>12305871
>Occam's razor
>Dinger's Cat
Are there any more surefire signs of a DUDE SCIENCE brainlet?
I think not.

>> No.12305957
File: 17 KB, 472x339, 1508574652504.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
12305957

>>12305897
All models of physics will always be wrong. This is a hopeless endeavor lol.

>> No.12305959

The question of free will is utterly pointless

>> No.12305962

>>12303970
Believing in compatibilism (or lack of free will, which is the same) means believing that if there was a "nostradamus machine" that could perfectly predict the future, and you consulted that machine as to your next actions, you would somehow be forced to comply with the course of action it plots out for you.

>queue irrelevant nitpicking about the feasability of such a machine by retards/NPCs

>> No.12305970

>>12305962
Is your point that you won't comply with the machine no matter what? If you do comply, would you concede that free will isn't real or remain fooled by the illusion?

>> No.12305972

>>12305945
>There's nothing mandating that molecules need to be conscious in order for an ordered collection of them to produce consciousness.
"Molecules" is a term used by consciousness to translate something into neat bundles. Everything outside of your body is in your mind.

>> No.12305976

>>12305952
This, lol. They don't even understand that these are merely tools, and need to be used correctly to be effective at all. Occam's Razor has zero relevance in a discussion like ours.

>> No.12305978

>>12305972
Even your body is your mind.

>> No.12305982

>>12305978
Yeah, but the internals not before I do something drastic.

>> No.12305991

>>12305957
>This is a hopeless endeavor lol.
No, you change yourself and your perception all the time. There were times you were better off, there can be times you will be in the future.

>> No.12305998

>>12305972
Idk, my chair doesn't seem to be a part of my consciousness. Other people also don't seem to be.

>> No.12306011

>>12305998
Imagine remembering this thought as having occured to you in a dream from which you just woke up.

>> No.12306013

>>12305871
Science psuedes lmao.

>> No.12306017

>>12306011
Based. Good example.

>> No.12306029

>>12305998
Everything in your vision is in your consciousness. The arms in front of you are no different than the table in front of you, or the people around you.

>> No.12306048

>>12305962
your future decision depends on the prediction of the machine so obviously it cant tell you your future because calculating it would result in an infinite loop
so it could never make an accurate prediction to you about you
not sure how this means free will is real tough. if i ask the machine what your next move is and wont tell you it will 100% predict correctly

>> No.12306051

jesus fuck
just let this thread die with some dignity

>> No.12306055

>>12306048
>your future decision depends on the prediction of the machine so obviously it cant tell you your future because calculating it would result in an infinite loop
>so it could never make an accurate prediction to you about you
The machine couldn't directly predict the future anyway, since there is true random in the accurate location (and therefore interaction) of all particles.

>> No.12306058

>>12306048
Isnt that just the halting problem

>> No.12306061

>>12305871
>Occam's razor
>destroys
From your mention of a modern meme-heuristic and also speaking in such immature absolutist terms as "destroys", alongside the ridiculous of your argument that "chemicals observe chemicals" (meaning we could replace every instance of the term "know" or "observe" with the term "chemicals", so instead of saying "I know of X" you could say "chemicals chemical of X", since you've attributed the very function of "knowing" to said chemicals) I feel I can conclude safely that you are more or less from the new-athiest, DUDE SCIENCE camp.

>> No.12306067

>>12306051
this.

>> No.12306112

>>12306011
That's a fair counterpoint. I'd just say that as a matter of having a mental model of reality, having one that assumes an external reality gets more done while assuming less. If I imagine having to rework, say, my understanding of what takes place when light is reflected off of a mirror, I don't gain any new insights by assuming it's all a product of my mind, and any explanation I could produce would be overly complicated by comparison to a physical based answer.
Guess I don't see what the "it's all mental" model can explain that we couldn't without it.
>>12306029
I accept this, but I don't accept that my sense impressions appear in a vacuum.

>> No.12306161

>>12306112
Not sure what you mean by a "void", but I'll just remind everyone here that the "chemicals" which the scientists observe are observed, again, within consciousness, no different than the arms in front of you or the items around you. To then place reality inside of those chemicals, when it is those chemicals inside of reality, is a laughable and egregious error in logic. You will not ever be able to escape consciousness, and it's best to start looking look into spirituality and to understand the nature of said consciousness in which all things exist. Hindu and Buddhist philosophies have definitely understood the depths of it.

>> No.12306175

>>12306048
>>12306055
Interesting. It's as if the concept of Freewill conspired with the mathematical/metaphysical structure of reality such as to ensure the impossibility of its refutation.

>> No.12306199

>>12305871
So either there's an infinite regress of chemicals witnessing chemicals, or chemicals are self-observing, which doesn't answer the question, just rephrases it.

If chemicals are self-observing, then they aren't really chemicals, are they, not what you actually want chemicals to mean, in any case...

unbelievable

Occam's Razor lol

>> No.12306213

>>12306161
My point is that everyone accepts that you are trapped by what you can consciously perceive because by definition that's all you can know. The distinction lies in where people believe those sensory impressions originate from. In the case of the empiricist, the belief is that there's an external reality that impresses upon our sense organs in such a way as to give us a good first approximation as to how reality outside ourselves is. This understanding obviously gets refined over time as we model reality to predict different phenomenon.
The strength of this worldview has been the success of implementing it to predict phenomena. And if you tried to describe our sense impressions solely on the basis of the mind, you'd be left making involved theories of our mind generates reality, and why it makes it this way with these laws and not others. Assuming a physical reality just ends up working better for scientific investigation.
But if it's any consolation, no, we can't prove that you're wrong. It just isn't a model with explanatory power.

>> No.12306223

>>12306213
If you understand nondualism, you'd understand that you ARE the "reality" you speak of. It is not some external construct which acts upon you, or anything else, but you are yourself literally it. I encourage you to look into such realms, because I don't want to spoonfeed people the things I consider muself to have now understood. It actually becomes very simple, once you've grasped the basic kernal of it.

>> No.12306248

>>12306161
>>12306223
this

>> No.12306284

>>12303977
How is free will common sense? It is in fact a controversial matter.

>> No.12306314

>>12306223
>If you understand nondualism, you'd understand that you ARE the "reality" you speak of.
I'm aware that's the view you're exposing.
>It is not some external construct which acts upon you, or anything else, but you are yourself literally it.
That's fine. But I don't see what the argument for this is other that it could conceivably be the case. I don't hold it as a view because it lacks explanatory power. If you could give a convincing argument for the position, I'd be more susceptible to it. Until then, it just comes off as fanciful speculation, but I understand if you're impatient about defending the view. Good day.

>> No.12306356

>>12306314
>But I don't see what the argument for this is other that it could conceivably be the case. I don't hold it as a view because it lacks explanatory power. If you could give a convincing argument for the position, I'd be more susceptible to it.

Give a convincing argument for the assertion that truth should correlate with explanatory power.

>> No.12306391

>>12306314
Wasn't accusing you of "misunderstanding", bro. Was just phrasing it in such a manner that referenced our ignorance towards the concept, and not you alone. I.e "If a person understands nondualism, they understand that..."

But regarding the "explanatory power" part, you would have to throw out such notions of inert descriptions being able to explain reality and embrace a view that is entirely of the poetic. The notion of there being a monistic consciousness, of which you and I and all else is, which sought to experience itself subjectively, purposely forgetting itself as the source of everything and thereby letting itself be entertained again, by losing itself in its own dream. This is a realm which is difficult to find answers of, as the sages themselves are not entirely sure as to how this Maya came to be, from an initially and innately perfect reality. But what I've told you of is one answer, and the one I align with. It's not that I don't want to explain further, it's that you'd learn best by going to the source of these notions, reading the actual literature yourself. I only understand what I've read of and seen in myself so far, but am not knowledgable enough to teach others of such concepts.

>> No.12306441

>>12306356
I think he means predictive power. The theory with most explanatory power is 'a wizard did it', which instantly explains all phenomena and events

>> No.12306510

>>12306356
If a theory is such that no possible observation could be distinguished as incorrect with respect to it, then there is no distinction on the basis of experience by which we can say it is more likely to be false.
If something has explanatory power, it makes predictions from which we can distinguish an observation from fitting the theory or not. If it doesn't fit, some aspect of the theory is likely false. The better ability there is for a theory to make predictions, the more trials we can undergo to test it.
The assumption itself of an external reality doesn't make predictions of course, but our theories always have that notion embedded. It seems to be an idea we're more adept at building off of than anything else.
Even if you are skeptical of the notion despite the success this pillar on which our ideas our based, it's pragmatic to make the assumption as something that's natural to us in understanding phenomena.
I mean, you could have all sorts of ideas about how reality is really the result of the mind, but you have quite a disconnected reason for looking when you cross the street.
>>12306391
Fair enough. Can't promise I'll jump on it though.
>>12306441
Using it as an umbrella term in which predictive power is an important part. Also including a limited number of assumptions, novelty, ability to account for multiple phenomena, etc.

>> No.12306518

>>12306510
>If a theory is such that no possible observation could be distinguished as incorrect with respect to it, then there is no distinction on the basis of experience by which we can say it is more likely to be false.

you're applying empirical standards of deduction to metaphysical principles. you're thinking is fundamentally flawed.

>> No.12306533

>>12306518
I don't see what other basis for knowledge there is other than through perception.

>> No.12306543

>>12306533
What other basis for EMPIRICAL, SCIENTIFIC knowledge, to which metaphysics does not apply or is concerned with.

>> No.12306570

>>12306543
You still need a criterion for deciding what metaphysical propositions are likely true or likely false. What is that criteria if not perception?

>> No.12306589

>>12306570
How could I possibly empirically refute metaphysical principles that, by definition, are the conditions of possibility for experience?

>> No.12306601

>>12306589
You really couldn't.
That's why I focus on what leads to the most coherent worldview and borderline just taking on an instrumentalist stance.
But we're going to be running around in circles at this point. It is a messy issue, and I didn't mean to imply that it's as simple as testing any other scientific theory.

>> No.12306616

>>12306601
i'll give you points for at least being charitable and infinitely less obnoxious than the other instrumentalists on /lit/ who take issue with this kind of stance

>> No.12308166
File: 1.11 MB, 819x566, 1544322048807.png [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
12308166

>>12304142
>To most people free will means that you can deliberately chose between option.

Exactly, like most debates this ultimately boils down to how things are defined. If we clearly define the things we are talking about, much of the debate goes away (maybe transforming into a debate about the definitions). When I say that I have free-will, I mean that I am the one making my own decisions. This is entirely compatible with determinism: even if my decision was pre-determined, it is still me who made it. Maybe we can debate the nature of self/ego (Is there even a definite "me" making the decisions?), but that is an entirely different debate from the freewill/determinism debate.

The debate arises when free-will is implicitly set against determinism, for example, when it is treated as something magical and beyond universal law. Occaisonally it is cast more scientifically (e.g. Libet experiments) in which people are argued not to have free-will because they aren't aware of having reached a decision when brain readings show that their brains have already decided. While experiments like that are interesting, they nonetheless still show decisions are made internally. Even if I'm not aware of them, the decisions were still made in my own mind (just unconsciously).

>> No.12308180

no. read nietzsche. there are only strong and weak wills, not "free" and "unfree" wills.

>> No.12308183

>>12305419
In order for the rock to explode it would have to be a completely different thing, the same cannot be said for human beings. Also as I've pointed out multiple times, we are not free according to the common sense notion of freedom, Dennett NEVER argues for it. Learn to read

>> No.12308237

>>12308166
You're taking a compatibilist view. Which is fine. But it should be admitted that others want more out of the will.

It breaks down to this:
Suppose one morning you ate Apple Jacks out from your stock of cereals consisting of that, Cornflakes, and Coco Puffs.
If the universe were completely reset to the exact intial conditions of that morning, would it be possible for you to will a different outcome? Say eating Coco Puffs instead? If not, you don't have libertarian free will.

>> No.12308263

Right so free will exists "within constraints." As biologically determined systems there's strict limits on what the human body can accomplish. Depending on your condition and the optionality available you have more choices, however, the range of your choices are going to be limited to what your biology can afford. The brain clearly exhibits a decision module or faculty for deliberating between a set of options, but we have no freedom to escape this deliberation unless we decide to do none of the options.

The complexity involved means the whole beep-boop billiard-ballsy picture people have of determinism is invalid. The controlled complexity of the brain gives it a kind of freedom, within constraints.
Although habit formation fucks this all up.

>> No.12308265

>>12308237
How are you defining free-will? That's the main point of my post.

I define myself as having free-will because I am the one making my own decisions. In your example, I would choose to eat the same cereal (Coco puffs, cornflakes are disgusting) on both repeats. It would nonetheless be my choice, so I have free-will. It would also be deterministic, that is, the same conditions would lead to the same outcomes.

>> No.12308280

>>12308237
This argument is meaningless because in both cases it would be I, myself, that chooses the cereal, and nothing behind my back, to put it kind of crudely if I am being determined by forces behind my back (and I am), then my agency is just the "front-end" of this causality and there's really no issue. There are no constraints.

>> No.12308300

Also it's common to neglect the temporal aspect of decision makings. Some decisions require an instantaneous all or nothing choice. The moose is charging at you do you shoot it or get out of the way or get wrecked? Other decisions are more grandiose if you will. They play out in stages and form a sequence of steps. And some decisions are revisable and some are not. So that whole temporal layering aspect of decision making changes things considerably. There's a continuity and self-referential thing going on with memory.

Just look how messed up people who lose their memories become as per the neurological literature. Their ability to act with any sort of freedom as we would recognize it is diminished substantially.

>> No.12308443

>>12308265
I'm making reference to the agent causal version of free will, which is easier to explain through illustration. But essentially, the idea is that the will determines itself and is unaffected by outside factors. An analogy is often drawn between this notion of free will and the concept of a prime mover of the universe who is uncaused by anything else but itself.
If you're incapable of choosing anything but Cocoa Puffs, you simply don't have free will under this understanding of the term.
If your thoughts on that idea are, "Well, that's a retarded idea that I wouldn't even want to be true, " then go ahead and be on your merry compatibilist way like myself and Dennet.
Just thought I'd chime in with what the distinctions being drawn are.

>> No.12308559

>>12308443
>essentially, the idea is that the will determines itself and is unaffected by outside factors.

Implicit in this is incombatibility. Same goes for other phrasings of agent-casual ideas (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/#3).). They assume that the agent's action are not related to prior events (clearly untrue practically, due to evolution and desires influencing our behavior so much).

This still shows how important us agreeing on what we are talking about is, i.e. consistent definitions. While you may have had agent casual models of free-will in your head this entire time, others in thread have been using more colloquial definitions; we need to agree on a common set of definitions before we can actually debate.