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15629378 No.15629378 [Reply] [Original]

How do ethical philosophers explain their ought statements?

>> No.15629470

Prescriptivism is a neccessary condition for descriptive statements. Any descriptive statement depends on deciding upon the positive prescritive value of making descriptive statements, and making them truthfully. No descriptive statement is possible unless you adopt the normative ideal of opening your eyes and conceptualising the sense data truthfully. Therefore all statements are prescriptive.

>> No.15629484

>>15629470
swiggity swooty

>> No.15629506

>>15629470
This is incorrect. Descriptive propositions do not contain formal normative operators and they can't be inferred to be enthymematic.

The is-ought divide can easily be traveraed syntactically, as John Searle showed before he got MeToo'd, and A.N. Prior also showed. The real problem is metaphysical. There is nothing about the world that entails it should be a certain way. It only contains a set of possible expressions.

>> No.15629527

>>15629506
The act of making a descriptive proposition is prescriptive, even if the proposition itself is not.

Theological perspectivism gives truth value to ought statements. If God thinks it, it is true.

>> No.15629561

>>15629527
The act of making a proposition can evidence intent but does not carry with it any implied or explicit premise containing a normative operator. Therefore, the existence of the proposition does not entail a prescription.

>> No.15629573

>>15629561
It's not the existence of it, it's the generation of it. The act of bringing the statement into being.

>> No.15629583

>>15629573
The act of making a statement at best can evidence intent which is itself an incoherent concept.

>> No.15629662

>>15629506
What is Searles argument?

>> No.15629834

>>15629378

why do you keep spamming this shit? subjective understanding of objective truth is the best you can ever hope to do in any kind of experience, morals are an attempt at apprehending that. you never really can get to the objective 'is' in the first place, it doesn't refute any attempt at getting to the truth

>> No.15629846

>>15629378
They don't. They just try to justify their feelings.

>> No.15629978

>>15629506
>The is-ought divide can easily be traveraed syntactically
Explain or why are you even posting otherwise?

>> No.15630052

>>15629662
>>15629978
John Searle points out, from the statement "Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars," it logically follows that "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars." The act of promising by definition places the promiser under obligation

Line from wikipedia. Seems pretty stupid. Even dumber:

A. N. Prior points out, from the statement "He is a sea captain," it logically follows, "He ought to do what a sea captain ought to do.

"He is a murderer," it logically follows, "He ought to do what a murderer ought to do.

>> No.15630123

We can all recognize a good clock as opposed to a bad one, and they're good and bad by virtue of their function and how well they act in accord with it. A clock that doesn't give us the time is bad. That is value judgement derived purely from what is. This stuff was common sense until the muddled thoughts of empiricism came along, never really arguing with the previous worldview but merely throwing it out and desperately trying to create a coherent alternative.

>> No.15630145

>>15630123
This is just pathetic ignoring of the problem to try and justify some dogma.
>We can all recognize a good clock as opposed to a bad one
The problem is not with what we all agree about morally it's what we disagree about.

>> No.15630171

>>15630145
What is the problem that's being ignored? One side says you can't derive an ought from an is and I just argued that you can. I'm not appealing to the majority here, a good clock is good regardless of whether some idiots refuse to recognize it.

>> No.15630193

>>15630171
The very first line you wrote
>We can all recognize a good clock as opposed to a bad one
is an appeal to the majority.

>> No.15630203

>>15630193
We as in all reasonable people. That is not a majority and it's beside the point which is that the source of ought is the essence or function of a thing.

What are you even doing here?

>> No.15630223

>>15630203
You are giving an example of something where you think an ought is derived from an is. But to justify your ought you appeal to the majority in the very first line of your argument. You have not derived an ought from an is you've chosen an example where everyone agrees on the good and bad.

>> No.15630224

>>15630193
No, if the majority of people said a stopped clock was a good clock, they would simply be wrong. A stopped clock is bad because it does not tell time, which is the natural end (telos) of a clock. The telos of humanity is more complicated, but it's not a fundamentally different question.

>> No.15630238

>>15630223
I'm appealing to reason. The source of ought is the essence or function of a thing and this is discerned through reason. I don't care what the majority of people say and I don't know why you have this stuck in your head. You misread me and you're refusing to be corrected. You trying so hard to dunk on me that you're won't take me at my own word.

>> No.15630241

>>15630224
All you're doing is repeating the is-ought problem. Why would they be wrong to say a broken clock is good? How do you reason from facts to morality? Without your appeal to the majority you're sunk. And teleology is just hiding the morality question. How do you tell what the final ends of something is and why would the final end matter for morality?

>> No.15630254

>>15630238
What does the essence or function of a thing have to do with what you ought to do with it? All you're doing is restating the is-ought problem. Without resorting to majority opinion you have no response when I say a broken clock is good

>> No.15630256

>>15630241
>All you're doing is repeating the is-ought problem.
No, he literally isn't. If we were talking in person I would challenge you to recite the is-ought problem because I don't think you know what you're talking about. You're an idiot man, you need to read more and talk less.

>> No.15630265

>>15630256
The natural end of the clock is the "is". How does that effect what you ought to do with it? Hume was very aware of Aristotle

>> No.15630273

>>15630254
I'm not restating the is-ought problem dude, I'm denying that it is a problem. You're not understanding this because you're not equipped to have this conversation. Have a good one.

>> No.15630294

>>15630273
> I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not

The essence or function of a thing IS something therefore you OUGHT to do something. You're following the exact pattern Hume attacked

>> No.15630299

>>15630241
The final end is the basis of all morality. Here are two examples :
>I want to go from point A to point B
>the distance of point B from point A is 100m
>(in order to achieve this end,) I ought to travel 100m
another
>it is raining
>I do not want to get wet
>(in order to achieve this end,) I ought to use an umbrella (or get under something, put something over my head, etc.)
The natural end of ethics is the good, the just, whatever you want to call it.

>> No.15630308

>>15630294
Yes, I'm fully conscious of that. Do you understand that I don't agree with Hume? I don't know how you expect people to talk to you.

>> No.15630319

>>15630299
>The final end is the basis of all morality.
>The natural end of ethics is the good, the just, whatever you want to call it.

The final end of something doesn't even exist it's just the subjective opinion of the observer. It's certainly not the basis of morality. Aristotle and Aquinas are not taken seriously anymore in philosophical ethics outside of christcucks

>> No.15630327

>>15630308
So since you don't agree with Hume his argument isn't valid?

>> No.15630330

>>15630327
Yeah, sure dude. That's what I'm saying. You nailed it.

>> No.15630340
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15630340

>>15629378
They literally can't, Hume ended philosophy and anyone that tells you otherwise is lying.

>> No.15630345

>>15630319
>The final end of something doesn't even exist it's just the subjective opinion of the observer.
So it exists? Why does it matter if it's subjective or objective? We're talking about how ethical proposotions can even be made in the first place, not if they're objective or subjective.

>> No.15630353

>>15630294
Ok, you win, it IS invalid to reason from "is" statements to "ought" statements. But your conclusion cannot possibly imply that we OUGHT not to reason in exactly this way.

>> No.15630366

>>15630319
>The final end of something doesn't even exist it's just the subjective opinion of the observer.
You don't really believe this, not if you actually think about it. Try to tell me what DNA is without alluding to what it does or what it's for, and then with a straight face tell me that the definition you gave me is subjective. Scientific inquiry becomes impossible.

Aristotle may not be taken seriously but that's not his problem, it's the problem of the people who chose to ignore instead of refuting him and then going on to build incoherent metaphysical systems which have done nothing but cause problems.

>> No.15630461

>>15630366
I do really believe that and I also have no problem talking about what DNA is for or what it does since I understand it's just an analogy. Personifying an inanimate object doesn't it mean it actually has those emotions or intentions

>> No.15630469

>>15630353
I mean you can reason that way it but it's not logically valid. Whether you OUGHT to reason logically is up to you

>> No.15630491

>>15630345
I don't think most people would call a subjective opinion an ethical proposition but if you want to go that way sure I agree with you. If what you ought to do is defined as a subjective opinion then obviously everyone has subjective opinions about what they ought to do

>> No.15630498

>>15630461
>Personifying an inanimate object
Really, dude? That's what you think is happening here? This is insulting.

>> No.15630578

>>15630498
It should be insulting. You're defending an intellectual position held by religious idiots and claiming one of the most important problems in ethics doesn't exist.

>> No.15630626

>>15629378
Hume's law is only a problem if you try to confuse the spheres of language. It exposes that the language used to describe and the language used to proscribe morality differ greatly and should not be conflated. Obedience to God is how the problem is done away with, as such this is only really a "problem" for atheists

>> No.15630640

>>15630626
Rofl typical Bible thumper garbage

> I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not

Why is what God says moral?

>> No.15630660

>>15630640
I'm not a Christian.
>Why is what God says moral?
Asking "why" is not part of the life of faith, God requires obedience. I'd suggest you read Fear and Trembling.

>> No.15630674

>>15630660
But asking why is part of the is-ought distinction. How does the "is" of God commands it lead to the "ought" of it being moral?

>> No.15630696

>>15630674
I'm not going to spoonfeed you the answers to your doubts, read F&T

>> No.15630720

>>15630696
Read Hume to see why you're wrong

>> No.15630815

>>15630052
Isn't "Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars" just a description of an act that Jones did?
Anyone can imagine a range of contexts where the above statement is true but Jones ought not pay Smith five dollars.

>> No.15630835

>>15630815
Fully agree I just looked it up because I wanted to know what he was talking about. Just from those lines neither one of them have the slightest refutation of is-ought

>> No.15630837

>>15630353
Is that a joke? I feel stupid here, but I'm trying my best.
>>15630660
I can testify that this other man is constantly taking your sentences and perverting them to his own, nefarious deeds.

Can we go back to the clock example? I'm interested how this plays out.
A clock by definition tells time, so that is what it ought to do. Is this correct?

>> No.15630926

>>15630815
It's a statement of an act that Jones did, and logically it follows that Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars. The logic hinges upon his promise, you see. If you promise something, you ought to keep that promise, by definition.

>> No.15631121

>>15630837
It is a joke. It's pointing out that this argument from Hume is self-undermining, as it implies that reasoning is inherently normative: there's no point in arguing against the validity of is/ought reasoning unless you think it's really better to reason in ways that conform to some standard of logical validity. But if the argument holds, then there's no point in making it because you can't conclude that you ought to reason any particular way, no matter what you can prove is the case logically.

>> No.15631142

>>15631121
Which is what I said here >>15630469

>> No.15631158

>>15629378
Kant gives an interesting answer in the first chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason (give it a read, it's only 30 pages long).
His argument hinges on the claim that there is no choice when the will is only determined by external, empirical causes and motives. When we are determined in such a way we don't chose, rather we act as machines (empirical effects mechanically influence our actions). He also claims that through the categorical imperative ( a formal practical principle) we can determine our will only through our own pure practical reason, which gives us maxims that are not derived from the aforementioned contingent empirical factors (like my sensory perceptions, my arbitrary preference based on my subjective feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and so on): only in this case we can talk about choice (if any part of this poor summary of mine seems dubious to you, check that first chapter: there Kant argues each one of these points in greater detail).

So the answer to the question "why should I follow the CI?" is that following it is your only choice, since there is no such thing as "choosing not to follow the CI" (when you don't follow you're acting as an irrational automaton/beast/however you want to call it, which is incapable of choice and deliberation). Rather than saying that someone "chose not to follow the CI" we should say that someone "failed to follow the CI".

>> No.15631190

>>15631158
An odd type of choice if you can only choose from one option

>> No.15631193
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15631193

>>15629378
Goal-directed behaviour is natural to creatures that must think primarily of their own survival and success. Saying "ought" is merely a linguistic marker of a series of hidden inferences from the sum of my knowledge, about how best to extract the greatest good for myself by manipulating the present facts to my advantage. Therefore making ought-inferences is a means of probing socially for co-conspirators, and attempting to bring into conspiracy, by persuasion, those who at first disagree.

>> No.15631201

>>15631193
Based

>> No.15631210

>>15629470
>>15629506
Both of you are wrong.

>> No.15631230

>>15631210
Wrong is a prescriptive statement

>> No.15631255

>>15630052
>John Searle points out, from the statement "Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars," it logically follows that "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars." The act of promising by definition places the promiser under obligation
Such an idiotic conclusion. The descriptive reality of Jones uttering "I promise to pay you $5" by itself entails nothing at all about what Jones is morally obligated to do. You need to include a normative premise to the effect that anyone who says ABC is morally obligated to do XYZ.

>> No.15631267

>>15631230
And?

>> No.15631289

>>15631190
Maybe "deliberation" is a better term, you're right.

>> No.15631300

>>15631142
But then why waste your time trying to convince anyone of anything? The way I see it, we have a rational faculty, the natural end of which is the realization of truth: thus we ought to believe true propositions rather than false ones and methods of reasoning which lead us to the truth are better than methods leading to falsehood. If you don't recognize the natural end of human reason, you're just saying you prefer to think a certain way, and so, good for you dude, but you're acting like it would really be better for us to share your bias against teleological reasoning, and I don't see how you can justify that on the grounds of your own argument.

>> No.15631323

>>15631300
Wait you think that is a criticism of my position? I said that sarcastically clearly everyone thinks we should reason logically. I'm explicitly falling back on the majority here and if you don't believe you need to reason logically I see no reason to argue any further with you

>> No.15631404
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15631404

>>15631323

>> No.15631461

>>15630340
>finishes metaphysics
>finishes philosophy
>finishes science
>finishes religion
How can a man be so based?

>> No.15631465

>>15631404
>Whether you OUGHT to reason logically is up to you

This is sarcasm. To spell this out if you don't think we need to reason logically you're a moron and I'm not going to waste my time arguing with you

>> No.15631482

>>15631300
And I justify saying teleological reasoning is stupid logically. If you don't think we need to reason logically you're an idiot

>> No.15631724

>>15631482
I do think we need to reason logically - it's inherent in the nature of reason that it ought to be logical. And you can argue all day long that something is stupid, but that doesn't mean we oughtn't do it, right?

>> No.15631977

>>15629378
Good and evil must be metaphysically defined, and then actions can be judged descriptively based on whether they align closer to one side or another. All ought statements are statements of subjective intent, desire, or will, and therefore are not apt even to make ethical statements. Morality must be descriptive, or it is not morality, but rather it becomes the will of the speaker.

>> No.15632000

>>15630123
If I want to bash someone in the head and the only thing I have to do it with is a clock, then the clock's ability to tell time well is pointless to me. The "purpose" of something is entirely dependent on a person's desires and context, not something inherent to the thing itself.

>> No.15632072

>>15632000
Your ability to misuse the clock doesn't mean there isn't a proper use for it, and even if that wasn't the case this doesn't mean anything. The ought can still be derived from the essence or function of the item even if the purpose is not discernible. You people are goofy.

>> No.15632079

>>15632000
That might make it a good weapon, but whether it's a good clock is another question.

>> No.15632084

>>15632072
What you think you ought to do with something is just your opinion.

>> No.15632085

>>15632072
You call it misusing because it's not how you (or I) would want to use it in most circumstances, but that says nothing at all other than what the conventional use is.

>> No.15632167
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15632167

>>15631158
I'm not sure Kantian argued this in the correct way (I'll read for myself tonight), but this is truly a brilliant strategy. I can see why he pursued it

>> No.15632178

>>15632167
*Kant, oops

>> No.15633717
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15633717

>>15629470
Haha... It's just the opposite. Any normative statement contains an implicit element of descriptive pragmatism. There is always an intended outcome, with pre/proscriptions being measures intended to achieve it (the efficacy of which can be examined empirically).

If you're arguing that our most basic impulses/instincts are somehow normative, I'd have to disagree... Your impulses precede any notion of justification or reasoning — they are your fundamental nature.

The whole dichotomy is false. There is only 'is', and your reason can only be informed by what 'is' (although one might abstract their head up their own ass in the process). The category of 'ought' is a pragmatic shorthand for the purpose of promulgating morality, but that's all it is.