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9955396 No.9955396 [Reply] [Original]

I'm a dualist. Tell me why I'm dumb.

>> No.9955479

>>9955396
causation. don't come back with that interactionist bullshit. if they causally interact, then one should be reducible to the other

>> No.9955489

>>9955396
How do mind and matter (eg the brain) interact or determine each other if they are fundamentally different kinds of being

>> No.9955540

>>9955489
>Substance > Attribultes (extension and thinking + infinite others) > modes

Extension and thinking are the same substance.

>> No.9955546

>>9955396
You're not, really. But you should be a property dualist instead of a substance dualist

>> No.9955866

>>9955540
Even so, Spinoza would hold that extended stuff and mental stuff don't interact. Parallelism or something like that

>> No.9955880

You aren't dumb. You are correct.

>> No.9955885

>>9955479
>>9955489
The universe is fundamentally pluralistic. Different things that don't reduce to one another always interact.

>>9955546
Property dualism and substance dualism are the same thing

>> No.9955899

>>9955396
you're on 4chan

>> No.9955929

>>9955885
Substance dualism is not the same as property dualism. Property dualism is materialistic but states that some matter (the brain) has mental properties that can't be reduced to physical properties. So although brain states aren't identical to mental states, mental states are still caused by brain states. Substance dualism is what Descartes advocated, that is, mental stuff and material stuff are fundamentally different sorts of things.

would also like to hear what you have to say about plurality. I can't think of any other kinds of things other than thought and extension. And I'm inclined to say that thought is in some sense reducible to extension

>> No.9955964

>>9955929
if mental properties can't be reduced to physical properties (as property dualism claims), then they're a different kind of thing.

>I can't think of any other kinds of things other than thought and extension.
thought and extension (or mind and body or subjective and objective, etc.) are each much, much more than just one kind of thing. see bundle theory for thought and modern physics for extension. the world is very obviously pluralistic

>> No.9955981

>>9955964
Now that I think about it I agree with you about property dualism. It's trying to have it both ways, and it really doesn't make any sense. I'll look into bundle theory. thanks

>> No.9956210

>>9955396
none of western thought knows what to do with experience. it has no framework for even thinking about or approaching the question. so in this arena you can have whatever fucking opinion you want, because they're all equally confused and unverifiable anyway. the closest it came was phenomenology, which quickly shot itself in the foot by just becoming a sick kantianism.

dualism's not great, but it's not like there are any options that are better than it, and it's not like one iota of evidence has ever been advanced against it or ever will be.

>> No.9956588

>>9955885
>pluralistic
This is an incredibly implausible since there's a 100% correlation between the content of your postulated mental substance and neuro-physical processes.

>> No.9956749

>still clings to material world

lol idiot

>> No.9956778
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9956778

>>9956749
>your brain on chomsky
BWAHAHAHAHA
AHAHAHAHA
HAHAHA

>> No.9956786

>>9956210
Theres a wealth of psychological thought and scholarship that aims to deal exactly with the issue of experience

>> No.9957439

You're overthinking reality like all dualists. The reason "the mental" seems so irreducible is because it is a physical process of the brain, just like how digestion is a physical process of the stomach and intestines. Brains aren't necessarily unique in this: if we understood what the brain does to produce thoughts and consciousness, ostensibly we could reproduce it in a machine, or find it in a life form that doesn't have the same exact brain structure.

>> No.9957621

>>9955964
No, retard. Substance dualism posits the existence of two substances: mental and physical. Property dualism has one Substance, the physical, on which mental properties supervene but are not ontologically reducible. There is a distinction between substance and property